Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence -- Copyright -- Preface -- Contents -- Executive Summary -- WHAT IS DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD? -- ENDURING PRINCIPLES IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY -- DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES -- Weapons of Mass Destruction -- Policies Involving the Role and Use of Nuclear Weapons -- Applying Deterrence Policy -- Missile Defenses -- SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS -- METRICS AND DECISION AIDS -- 1 Deterrence: An Overview -- INTRODUCTION -- THE MEANING OF DETERRENCE -- THE NEW CONTEXT -- ENDURING PRINCIPLES -- The Dynamic Quality of National Interests -- Credibility -- Communications -- Perceptions -- Applicability -- Intelligence -- DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES -- Policies Involving Nuclear Weapons -- Coupling of Nuclear Weapons with Other Forces -- Targeting Policy -- No First Use -- Weapons of Mass Destruction and Precision-Guided Munitions -- Extended Deterrence -- Applying Deterrence Policy -- Existential Deterrence -- Self-Deterrence -- Escalation -- Declaratory Policies -- Alliance Implications of Exercising Deterrence Policy -- Unilateral and Multilateral Deterrence -- Alliances and Coalitions -- Defense Against Ballistic Missile Attack -- The Strategic Significance of Ballistic Missile Attacks -- Defense in Depth Against Ballistic Missiles -- Active Defense Against Ballistic Missile Attack -- ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND PLANNING -- 2 IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE POLICY: TASKS FOR POLICY MAKERS -- THE NEW DETERRENCE ENVIRONMENT -- CREATING A FABRIC OF DETERRENCE -- SOME DIFFICULT CHOICES -- CONCLUDING REMARKS -- 3 Significance of Post-Cold War Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps -- INTRODUCTION -- OBJECTIVES AND METRICS IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY -- Objectives of Deterrence -- How to Measure the Chances for Success.

ENSURING U.S. NAVAL FORCES' CAPABILITY FOR DETERRENCE -- Sustain the Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine Force -- Increase the Ratio of Offensive to Defensive Capability -- Sustain the Naval Forces' Forward Presence -- Incorporate Deterrence in the Overall Naval Forces' Planning Process -- DECISION AIDS: INTELLIGENCE, GAMES, MODELING, AND SIMULATION -- APPENDIX A Revising the Practice of Deterrence -- CHANGING CONTEXT -- STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS -- RUSSIAN CASE -- THE SUBORDINATION AND REVISION OF DETERRENCE -- Alert Practices -- The Accounting for and Physical Security of Fissionable Materials -- Restraints on Operational Doctrine -- CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE -- APPENDIX B Contemporary Strategic Deterrence and Precision-Guided Munitions -- WHAT IS DETERRENCE? WHY AND HOW? -- COLD WAR DETERRENCE AND THE LIMITS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR -- CURRENT CHALLENGES -- APPENDIX C Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Coalitions for Defending Against Regional Challengers Armed with Weapons of Mass… -- INTRODUCTION -- POTENTIAL FOR CHALLENGES TO A VITAL U.S. REGIONAL INTEREST -- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH REGIONAL PROLIFERATORS -- CHANGED ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE UNILATERALLY -- IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THROUGH A COALITION -- INCENTIVES TO JOIN THE COALITION AND SUPPORT ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY -- ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR COALITION INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX D The Remaining Unique Role of Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence -- BACKGROUND -- THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MISSION -- CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX E Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence -- INTRODUCTION: A DEFINITION OF DETERRENCE -- Meaning of "Deterrence" -- Deterrence vs. Dissuasion.

NUCLEAR VS. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE -- Nuclear Deterrence -- Deterrence After the Cold War: Are Conventional Forces Enough? -- Conclusion: Nuclear Weapons Remain a Necessary Component of U.S. Deterrence -- DETERRENCE VIA NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE -- Current U.S. Nuclear Policy -- Future Options for Nuclear Deterrence -- REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- APPENDIX F Notes on the "Band" Between "Existential Deterrence" and the Actual Use of Force -- APPENDIX G.1 Special Challenges in Extending Deterrence in the New Era -- A PROVOCATIVE PREMISE -- TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR DETERRING THREATS TO NON-VITAL INTERESTS -- Factors Contributing to Deterrence -- Possible Suggestions for Weak and Medium-Strength States -- Possible Suggestions for U.S. Security Planning -- POTENTIAL ACTIONS -- APPENDIX G.2 Decision Modeling as an Aid to Strategic Planning and Crisis Action -- ABSTRACT -- INTRODUCTION -- MODELING OPPONENTS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS -- Assessment of Options -- Alternative Images of the Opponent -- Identifying the Factors Affecting Judgments and Decisions -- Estimating the Opponent's Judgments and Decisions -- FACTORS TENDING TO INCREASE RISK TAKING -- A GENERIC SITUATION ENCOURAGING AGGRESSION -- CONCLUSIONS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- APPENDIX G.3 Protecting Weak and Medium-Strength States: Issues of Deterrence, Stability, and Decision Making -- ABSTRACT -- INTRODUCTION -- A Central Premise -- Approach -- DETERRENCE AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CENTURY -- Potential Threats -- Useful Distinctions -- Sobering Realities -- More Cheerful Considerations -- AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF DETERRENCE -- Observations and Motivations -- Modeling the Decision Making of Adversaries -- Assessment of Options -- Information Needed -- Alternative Images -- Factors and Judgments.

Abstracting from the Decision-Modeling Approach: A Success Tree for Deterrence -- Discussion -- DETERRING STRONG NEIGHBORS: STRATEGIES FOR WEAK OR MEDIUM-STRONG STATES -- Potential Insights from a Decision-Modeling Perspective -- Minimize Incentives for Invasion or Coercion -- Lay the Groundwork for Favorable Moral and Cultural Considerations -- If Feasible, Maintain a Substantial Defense with Allies -- Use Arms Control to Enhance Military Security and Political Relationships -- Don't See Nuclear Weapons as a Panacea -- EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN DEFENSE OF WEAK OR MEDIUMSTRONG STATES -- Recognize and Express Interests, Including Less-than-vital Interests, Explicitly and Credibly -- Prepare Politically and Militarily for Prompt Intervention Given Strategic Warning -- Beware of "Deterrent Actions" Without Backup -- Enhance the Credibility of Defense with Forward Presence -- Plan to Supplement the Defender's Defenses Quickly and Optimally -- Deter Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction -- Use Arms Control and Other International Mechanisms to Limit Forces and Constrain Force Postures in Ways Promoting Stability -- Develop Theater Missile Defenses -- Seek Alternatives to Current U.N. Mechanisms -- RECOGNIZING THAT IMMEDIATE EXTENDED DETERRENCE MAY FAIL -- Punishment as a Strategic Option -- CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY STRATEGY, DEFENSE PLANNING, AND CRISIS DECISION MAKING -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- APPENDIX H Theater Missile Defense, National IBM Systems, and the Future of Deterrence -- CONTEXT -- BACKGROUND -- THE PROBLEM -- NEAR-TERM OPTIONS FOR U.S. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE -- WHAT IS THE THREAT? -- Credibility and Responsibility -- THE BIG PROBLEM FOR CITY DEFENSE -- The Threat to the United States -- REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE IN RELATION TO THE ABM TREATY -- Revival of the Strategic Defense Initiative? -- A Truly Cooperative Defensive System?.

Brilliant Pebbles Resurgent? -- Instead of Brilliant Pebbles, Brilliant Eyes? -- CONCLUSIONS -- APPENDIX I Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems -- INTRODUCTION -- BACKGROUND -- VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE CURRENT WORLD -- CASE STUDIES -- CONCLUSION -- NAVY- AND MARINE CORPS-SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS -- APPENDIX J Controlling Instabilities Caused by Rogue Governments -- THE EMERGING THREAT -- IMPLICATIONS OF THIS THREAT -- A DEFENSE IN DEPTH -- AN APPROACH TO INTERCEPTING BALLISTIC MISSILES AFTER LAUNCH -- SUGGESTED ACTIONS -- APPENDIX K Deterrence-Quo Vadis?.