Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- I Philosophical Defenses -- 1 The Case for Indirect Realism -- 2 Illusions and Hallucinations as Evidence for Sense Data -- 3 Experience and Representation -- 4 Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents -- 5 The World of Qualia -- 6 Subjective Physicalism -- II Scientific Defenses -- 7 Color Qualities and the Physical World -- 8 Heat, Temperature, and Phenomenal Concepts -- 9 A Process-oriented View of Qualia -- 10 The Ontological Status of Qualia and Sensations: How They Fit into the Brain -- III Attacks -- 11 The Churchlands' War on Qualia -- 12 Why Frank Should Not Have Jilted Mary -- 13 Phenomenal Knowledge without Experience -- 14 A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense -- 15 How to Believe in Qualia -- 16 Transparency and the Unity of Experience -- 17 Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience -- 18 From the Looks of Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representationalism -- 19 Why Transparency Is Unethical -- Contributors -- Index.