Contents -- 1. The Division Problem -- 1. Introduction to the Problem -- 2. Classificatory and Individuative Strangeness -- a. Individuative Strangeness and Ontological Commitment -- b. The Believer and the Disbeliever -- c. The Hybrid Meta-Language -- d. Individuative Strangeness without Classificatory Strangeness -- 3. Strange Languages and Strange Thoughts -- a. Strong and Weak Versions of Strangeness -- b. Thinking in a Strange Language -- c. Synonymy and Strangeness -- d. Strange Propositions -- e. Strange Primitives -- 4. Further Examples of Strangeness -- a. Classificatory Examples -- b. Individuative Examples -- 5. The Weight of the Intuitions -- 6. The Distinctness of the Division Problem -- 2. Projectibility and Strange Languages -- 1. Goodman's Problem and the Division Problem -- 2. The Projectibility Principle -- a. Projectible Terms -- b. The Epistemological Claim -- c. The Similarity Principle -- d. Another Argument for the Epistemological Claim -- e. Transcendental Arguments and the Epistemological Claim -- 3. Projectibility and Ostensive Learning -- 4. Projectibility, Similarity, and Individuation -- a. Strange Similarity Classes -- b. Intrinsic Similarity Classes -- c. Similarity and Salience -- d. Predictable Things -- 3. Reality's Joints I: Properties -- 1. Reality's Joints and the Division Problem -- 2. Natural Properties -- 3. The Similarity Analysis -- a. The Problem of Imperfect Community -- b. Dimensions of Comparison -- c. The Property P* -- d. Other Consequences of (N) -- 4. The Causal Analysis -- a. The Standard Causal Analysis -- b. A Modified Causal Analysis -- c. Metaphysical versus Nomic Naturalness -- 5. Against Egalitarianism -- a. The Counterintuitiveness of Egalitarianism -- b. The Empirical Argument -- c. The A Priori Argument -- 6. Degrees of Naturalness -- a. Degrees of Metaphysical Naturalness.

b. Degrees of Nomic Naturalness -- c. The Overall Scale -- 7. Explanation and Classification -- a. The Explanation Claim -- b. Putnam's Constraint -- c. Strict Correctness and Pragmatic Adequacy -- d. Explanatory Equivalence and the Strange Languages -- 4. Reality's Joints II: Things -- 1. Natural Things -- a. Egalitarian and Inegalitarian Views -- b. Analyses of Thing-Naturalness -- c. Four Problems for (P) -- d. How Deep Is Thing-Naturalness? -- 2. The Semantic Argument -- a. Objections to the Argument -- b. Objections to the Revised Argument -- c. Normative and Modal Arguments -- 3. Inscrutability -- a. Pseudo-Languages -- b. Truth-Conditional and Inscrutability Theses -- c. Constraints on Reference Schemes -- d. Interpretive Charity -- 5. The Pragmatic Response -- 1. Extreme Relativism versus Pragmatism -- 2. Salience -- a. Salience and Ostensive Learning -- b. Salience and Perceptual Speed -- c. The Salience Principle -- 3. Important Properties and Things -- a. Importance and Salience -- b. Which Properties Are Important? -- c. The Attention Claim -- d. Attention and Projectibility -- e. Important Things -- f. Summary of the Argument Thus Far -- 4. Economy -- a. The Economy Principle -- b. Economy and Incompatibility Languages -- c. Scopes of Attention -- d. How Fundamental Is Economy? -- e. Stylistic Economy versus Inductive Simplicity -- f. Heuristic Devices -- 5. The Pure Pragmatic Position -- 6. The Order of Understanding -- 1. The Impossibility Claim -- 2. Concept-Dependence Claims -- a. The Interpretation of the Claims -- b. "Having a Concept" -- c. Analysis and Concept-Dependence Claims -- d. The Intuitiveness of the Claims -- 3. Fine-Grained Propositions and Concept-Dependence -- a. The Fine-Grained Doctrine -- b. Natural Constituents -- c. Derivation of Concept-Dependence Claims -- d. Asymmetric Concept-Dependence.

e. Further Applications -- 4. Derivation of the Impossibility Claim -- a. Strange Propositions -- b. The Derivation of IC -- c. The Thesis of the Necessity of Language -- 5. A "Solution" to the Division Problem -- a. The Fundamental Case -- b. Secondary Strange Languages -- c. Weak Strange Languages -- d. The Lexicon of a Natural Language -- e. The Altered Perspective -- 7. Ontology and the Division Problem -- 1. Ontology and the Order of Understanding -- a. Propositions as Individuals -- b. The Relevance of Ontological Inegalitarianism -- c. The Bare Argument -- 2. Soft and Hard Ontology -- a. Soft Questions and Verbal Questions -- b. Hard Ontology -- c. Soft Ontology -- d. Soft Semantic Questions -- e. Implications of Softness -- f. Connections between Hard and Soft -- 3. Prospects for the Impossibility Claim -- a. The Mysterious Attraction -- b. Functionalism and the Mysterious Attraction -- c. Comparing Classification and Individuation -- d. The Difficulty of Degrees -- 4. Concluding Remarks -- Appendix 1. Projectible Terms -- 1. Relative and Absolute Projectibility -- 2. Which Terms Are Projectible? -- 3. Projectible Terms and Hypotheses -- Appendix 2. Similarity and Natural Properties -- 1. Quine's Similarity Condition -- 2. Boundary Requirements -- 3. Imperfect Community Reconsidered -- 4. (N) and Complementary Properties -- 5. The Problem of Conjunctive Entailment -- Appendix 3. The Fine-Grained Doctrine -- 1. Fine-Grained Propositions -- 2. Analysis -- 3. A Kripkean Problem for the Fine-Grained Doctrine -- 4. Fine-Grained Properties -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.