An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense.
Title:
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense.
Author:
Hutcheson, Francis.
ISBN:
9781614878131
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (257 pages)
Series:
Natural Law Paper
Contents:
Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense -- Front Matter -- Title Page -- Copyright Details -- Table of Contents -- Introduction, p. ix -- Acknowledgments, p. xxv -- An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense -- The Preface, p. 3 -- The Contents, p. 13 -- Treatise I -- Section I. A General Account of our several Senses and Desires, p. 15 -- Section II. Of the Affections and Passions: The natural Laws of pure Affection: The confused Sensations of the Passions, with their final Causes, p. 30 -- Section III. Particular Divisions of the Affections and Passions, p. 48 -- Sections IV. How far our several Affections and Passions are under our Power, either to govern them when raised, or to prevent their arising: with some general Obersvations about their Objects, p. 66 -- Section V. A Comparison of the Pleasures and Pains of the several Senses, as to Intenseness and Duration, p. 87 -- Section VI. Some general Conclusions concerning the best Management of our Desires. With some Principles necessary to Happiness, p. 110 -- Treatise II. Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, p. 133 -- Section I. Concerning the Character of Virtue, agreeable to Truth or Reason, p. 137 -- Section II. Concerning that Character of Virtue and Vice -- the Fitness or Unfitness of Actions, p. 155 -- Section III. Mr. Woolaston's Significancy of Truth, as the Idea of Virtue, considered, p. 161 -- Section IV. Shewing the Use of Reason concerning Virtue and Vice, upon Supposition that we receive these Ideas by a Moral Sense, p. 173 -- Section V. Shewing that Virtue may have whatever is meant by Merit -- and be rewardable upon the Supposition that it is perceived by a Sense, and elected from Affection or Instinct, p. 178.
Section VI. How far a Regard to the Deity is necessary to make an Action Virtuous, p. 187 -- Textual Notes, p. 205 -- Index, p. 221.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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Electronic Access:
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