TABLE OF CONTENTS -- INTRODUCTION -- The initial intuition -- Main objective -- Preliminary clarificatory remarks -- Two central problems -- The problem of control and responsibility -- The normative problem -- Abstracts of the chapters -- Chapter 1: What the philosophy of action teaches us -- Chapter 2: The impossibility of acquiring beliefs directly for reasons -- Chapter 3: Pascalian and theoretical control -- Chapter 4: Doxastic responsibility as responsibility for consequences -- Chapter 5: Epistemic praiseworthiness and epistemic blameworthiness -- Chapter 6: Beyond epistemic justifiedness -- Chapter 7: Epistemic justifiedness and non-epistemic justifiedness -- Chapter 1: What the philosophy of action teaches us -- Actions and happenings -- Non-reductionist conception of action -- Reductionist conception of action -- Actions, happenings and activities -- Acting for reasons -- Three distinctions about reasons -- Motivating reasons vs. normative reasons -- Internalism vs. externalism about reasons -- Humean vs. anti-Humean conception of motivation -- Back to the doxastic realm -- Epistemic reasons, non-epistemic reasons and evidence -- Delineating the interesting issue -- Chapter 2: The Impossibility of directly acquiring beliefs for reasons -- Direct and indirect belief acquisitions -- Direct/indirect acquisitions of belief and epistemic/non-epistemic reasons -- Williams' argument -- "To believe that p is to believe that p is true" -- Believing vs. imagining -- Transparency -- The teleological account -- Conclusions -- Chapter 3: Theoretical and Pascalian control -- Two forms of indirect doxastic control -- Theoretical control -- Pascalian control -- Indirect doxastic influence on belief acquisitions -- Unlimited doxastic control considered -- Ryan's unlimited doxastic control.

Pieces of evidence vs. motivating reasons -- Steup's unlimited doxastic control -- Chapter 4: Doxastic Responsibility as Responsibility for Consequences -- Responsibility for consequences -- Responsibility for basic actions -- Responsibility for the consequences of actions -- Responsibility for resultant belief acquisitions, theoretical and Pascalian control -- Responsibility for resultant belief acquisitions and indirect doxastic influence -- Responsibility for believing -- Chapter 5: Epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness -- Epistemic and non-epistemic desirability -- The fundamental epistemic end -- Other epistemically desirable states -- The fundamental epistemic end: some specifications -- Epistemic and non-epistemic ends: summary -- Varieties of epistemic goodness* -- Final and instrumental epistemic goodness -- Epistemic rationality and epistemic commendability -- Varieties of epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness -- Final and instrumental epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness -- Epistemic praiseworthiness/blameworthiness for rational belief acquisitions -- Epistemic praiseworthiness for epistemically commendable belief acquisitions and epistemic blameworthiness for epistemically non-commendable belief acquisitions -- Chapter 6: Beyond epistemic justifiedness -- Accessibilism, mentalism, and externalism -- Accessibilism and perceptual disjunctivism -- Normative properties -- Valuable, rational, commendable belief acquisitions and the threefold classification of justifiedness -- Externalism: the goodness* of instrumental goodness -- Mentalism: the goodness* of rationality -- Accessibilism: the goodness* of commendability -- The reliabilist and the accessibilist explanation of the goodness* of justifiedness.

The reliabilist explanation of the goodness* of justifiedness -- The credit explanation of the goodness* of justifiedness -- Accessibilist explanation of the goodness* of justifiedness -- Chapter 7: Epistemic and non-epistemic justifiedness -- The divergence thesis -- The "pragmatic" refutation of the divergence thesis: Clifford and James -- Clifford's ethics of belief -- James' ethics of belief -- The point of agreement -- The divergence of rationality -- The objection against the divergence of rationality -- Conclusion -- Bibliography.