Cover image for Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.
Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.
Title:
Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.
Author:
Audi, Robert.
ISBN:
9780195344356
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (317 pages)
Contents:
Contents -- INTRODUCTION: Four Dimensions of Ethical Theory -- I. Ethical Knowledge, Intuition, and Moral Skepticism -- II. Moral Concepts and the Natural Order -- III. Moral Psychology and Ethical Character -- IV. Reason, Judgment, and Value -- I: MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY -- 1. Internalism and Externalism in Moral Epistemology -- I. Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology -- II. Internalism and Externalism in Ethics -- III. The Range of Internalist and Externalist Moral Theories -- IV. The Moral Appraisal of Actions and Agents -- 2. Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics -- I. Traditional Ethical Intuitionism -- II. Intuitions, Intuitionism, and Reflection -- III. Self-Evidence and the Systematization of Intuitions -- IV. Reflection as a Basis for Moral Judgments -- V. Modified Ethical Intuitionism -- 3. Skepticism in Theory and Practice: Justification and Truth, Rationality and Goodness -- I. Skepticism about Theoretical Reason -- II. The Practical Analogy to Theoretical Skepticism -- III. Three Major Responses to Normative Skepticism -- IV. The Irreducibility of Truth and Goodness -- V. Internalist Objectivism and Reasons for Action -- II: ETHICAL CONCEPTS AND MORAL REALISM -- 4. Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts -- I. Some Major Aims of Moral Epistemology -- II. Cognitivism versus Noncognitivism in Moral Epistemology -- III. Rationalism, Empiricism, and Supervenience in Moral Epistemology -- IV. Empiricism and Reductive Naturalism -- V. Rationalism, Naturalism, and A Priori Supervenience -- VI. Prospects for a Rationalistic Moral Realism -- 5. Ethical Naturalism and the Explanatory Power of Moral Concepts -- I. The Supervenience of the Moral -- II. Explanationist Moral Realism -- III. An Alternative Moral Realism -- III: CHARACTER, RESPONSIBILITY, AND VIRTUE.

6. Self-Deception, Rationalization, and the Ethics of Belief: An Essay in Moral Psychology -- I. Self-Deception and Rationalization -- II. The Self-Deceptive Rationalization of Actions and Attitudes -- III. Self-Deception and Reasons for Acting -- 7. Responsible Action and Virtuous Character -- I. The Conceptual Territory -- II. Responsibility for Character -- III. Responsibility and Control -- IV. The Internality of Responsibility -- 8. Acting from Virtue -- I. Aristotelian and Kantian Conceptions of Action from Virtue -- II. The Motivation and Range of Action from Virtue -- III. The Cognitive and Motivational Grounding of Action from Virtue -- IV. The Moral Scope of Acting from Virtue -- IV: PRACTICAL REASON AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS -- 9. Autonomy, Reason, and Desire -- I. Autonomy as Self-Government -- II. An Instrumentalist Conception of Autonomy -- III. An Objectivist Conception of Autonomy -- IV. Autonomy and the Role of Reason -- 10. Moral Judgment and Reasons for Action -- I. The Issues: Judgments, Motives, and Reasons -- II. Motivational Reasons and Motivational Internalism -- III. Practical Judgment and the Diversity of Internal Motivation -- IV. Rational Agency and the Evidential Role of Moral Motivation -- V. Normative Reasons and Motivational Internalism -- VI. Reasons Internalism and Moral Motivation -- VII. Reasons Externalism and Moral Motivation -- 11. Intrinsic Value and the Dignity of Persons -- I. An Aristotelian Case for Intrinsic Goodness -- II. The Range of Purportedly Intrinsic Goods -- III. Prospects for an Aristotelian Hedonism -- IV. Axiological Experientialism -- V. The Axiological and the Deontic -- VI. The Epistemology of Value -- VII. Problems for Valuational Pluralism -- 12. CONCLUSION: The Moral Justification of Actions and the Ethical Character of Persons -- I. Ethics and the Theory of Reasons for Action.

II. Epistemology and Ethical Theory -- III. The Justification of Moral Judgments: A Kantian Intuitionism -- IV. The Descriptive and Explanatory Powers of Moral Concepts -- V. Ethics in Action, Morality in Character -- VI. Virtue in Character and Moral Worth in Action -- VII. Reason and Motivation -- VIII. The Place of Value in the Foundations of Ethics -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.
Abstract:
This book presents an ethical theory that uniquely integrates naturalistic and rationalistic elements. Robert Audi develops his theory in four areas: moral epistemology, the metaphysics of ethics, moral psychology, and the foundations of ethics. Comprising both new and published work, the book sets forth a moderate intuitionism, clarifies the relation between reason and motivation, constructs a theory of intrinsic value and its place in moral obligation, and presents a sophisticated account of moral justification. The concluding chapter articulates a new normative framework built from both Kantian and intuitionist elements. Connecting ethics in novel ways to both the theory of value and the philosophy of action, the essays explore topics such as ethical intuition, reason and judgement, and virtue. Audi also considers major views in the history of ethics, including those of Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Moore, and W. D. Ross, and engages contemporary work on autonomy, responsibility, objectivity, reasons, and other issues. Clear and conceptually rich, this book makes vital reading for students and scholars of ethics.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
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