Becoming Human -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC data -- Dedication page -- Table of contents -- Introduction -- 1. On the nature of an hypothesis on human abilities -- 2. Developments over the last 20 years -- 3. Outlining the proposal put forward here -- 4. A brief description of the sections of this book -- SECTION ONE. Evolutionary precursors -- Chapter 1. Monkeys' mirror neurons -- 1.1 Mirror neurons in macaques, a significant discovery and a controversial interpretation -- 1.2 On supposed 'social' utility: Is the role of macaques' mirror neurons to understand and predict behaviour of conspecifics? -- 1.3 Mirror neurons, a secondary effect of self-perceptible movements -- 1.3.1 Self-visible hands: Connecting Keysers & Perrett with Piaget -- 1.3.2 Neonatal imitation and mirror neurons associated with the mouth: An open question -- 1.4 Simulation or expectation? The crucial question about the abilities of non-human primates -- 1.4.1 Animal behaviour and expectation -- 1.4.2 The new type of expectation which appeared alongside mirroring: Describing the difference between my hypothesis and that of Keysers & Perrett (2004) -- 1.5 An adaptive but 'non-social' role? A speculation which would act as an argument in favour, were it to enjoy slightly more support -- 1.6 The relationship between the central hypothesis of this chapter and the above speculation -- 1.7 Summarizing the hypothesis defended in this chapter -- Chapter 2. Chimpanzees and the visual field of the conspecific -- 2.1 From mirror neurons to the ability to reckon the visual perceptions of the conspecific -- 2.1.1 From the perception of the matching between another's and one's own body to the ascription of visual perceptions to conspecifics -- 2.1.2 The side-effect of the perception of the matching between one's own body and another's body.

2.2 Are chimpanzees merely exploiting visual findings of the conspecific? Introducing the current debate -- 2.2.1 Ascribing visual perceptions: The experiments carried out by Hare, Call & Tomasello -- 2.2.2 Povinelli's argument: The conspecific's blindfolded eyes -- 2.2.3 Blindfolded eyes and adaptive usefulness -- 2.2.4 Ravens and chimpanzees -- 2.3 What is involved in ascribing visual perceptions to conspecifics? -- SECTION TWO. The basic human ability -- Chapter 3. The three modes of processing the eyes of others -- 3.1 The progressive convergence of this issue and the 'theory of mind' -- 3.2 What are the three different modes of processing the eyes of others to be proposed here? -- 3.2.1 The difference between the first mode and the second one -- 3.2.2 The third mode. The most basic and primaeval exclusively human capability -- 3.3 Why would the 'third mode' be so demanding? -- 3.3.1 The peculiarity of visual perceptions ascribed in the 'third mode' -- 3.3.2 Radically not-own visual field, expectation, simulation -- 3.3.3 Self-recognition in the mirror and perception of a radically not-own visual field: Facing a potential objection -- 3.4 The communicative use of sight direction -- 3.5 The white of the eye -- Chapter 4. Pointing gestures -- 4.1 Pointing gestures in children -- 4.2 Why don't apes point? Distinguishing the indirect cause from the direct cause -- 4.3 The requesting gestures of the apes of Gómez and Leavens -- 4.4 Communicative action versus communicatively shaped action -- 4.5 Commenting about Grice and also about triadic communication -- 4.6 Some unavoidable issues which must be dealt with -- 4.6.1 Wild chimpanzees that extend their arm in the direction of an object: How could those gestures really happen and yet be so scarce? -- 4.6.2 Dogs and chimpanzees compared to the human pointing gesture.

4.7 True pointing in chimpanzees brought up by humans? -- 4.8 Lack of motivation in chimpanzees? Seeing more in detail the difference between Tomasello's proposal and the one which is being defended in this chapter -- 4.9 What are the requirements for a genuine understanding of pointing gestures? A closer look at the expectation/simulation dichotomy -- 4.9.1 Going back to the expectation/simulation dichotomy -- 4.9.2 The different manners in which somebody else's body may be informative -- Chapter 5. Four-hand co-operative actions and children's interpersonal co-ordination games -- 5.1 Co-operative actions -- 5.1.1 Four-hand action -- 5.1.2 A comparison with co-operation among chimpanzees -- 5.2 The interpersonal motor co-ordination game -- 5.2.1 From the adaptive advantages of play in general to the interweaving of evolution and culture -- 5.2.2 An interpersonal motor co-ordination play -- 5.2.3 The 'tea, chocolate and coffee' game: The learning process -- 5.3 Enjoyable communicative imitation -- SECTION THREE. Specifying some necessary requisites of language -- Chapter 6. Saussurean parity and the perception of a radically not-own self -- 6.1 Toward a formulation of the problem -- 6.1.1 Production and reception in animal communication -- 6.1.2 The problem involved in Saussurean parity -- 6.2 Saussurean parity and the second mental line: Our suggestion for resolving the problem -- 6.3 'Motor reception during the learning stage', the reliable core of the 'motor theory of speech perception' -- 6.3.1 Liberman's theory: The 'motor theory of speech perception' -- 6.3.2 Piagetian premotor plan -- 6.3.3 What happens once acquisition has come to an end? A proposal for a reformulation of the motor theory of speech reception -- 6.4 The comprehension of deictics which 'cannot be repeated as an echo': What about the egocentrism of deixis? -- 6.4.1 Deixis.

6.4.2 The egocentrism of deixis, and deictics 'which cannot be repeated as an echo' -- Chapter 7. About evocation -- 7.1 What is it we mean by "evocation"? -- 7.2 Do animals have the ability to evoke absent objects as such? -- 7.2.1 Some potentially relevant data -- 7.2.2 Outlining one possibility -- 7.2.3 Is a clear answer to be found in research with chimpanzees? -- 7.3 How then would evocation have originated? -- Chapter 8. Symbolic play -- 8.1 Describing symbolic play -- 8.2 How movements have adapted throughout evolution -- 8.3 Is simulation linked to the real movements of symbolic play? -- 8.4 What is repeated in vacuo is a previously perceived model, not one's own behaviour -- 8.5 The big extension of the simulatory centre (i.e., the new function that got to be performed by this centre): How would a truly simulatory interpretation of a non-interacting model have been achieved? -- 8.6 An indication in favour: Comparing symbolic play and adult-feeding game -- 8.6.1 Why might it be helpful to pay attention to this type of game now? -- 8.6.2 Similarities and differences between symbolic play and the adult-feeding game -- 8.6.3 The simulatory centre in the feeding game and in symbolic play -- 8.7 When might the kinaesthetic interpretation of a non-interacting model become dependent on the basic human ability? Insisting on the ideas presented in 8.5 -- 8.7.1 The core of my hypothesis: Fictionalisation of postures is required by latent sequential imitation -- 8.7.2 Can forward models refute the previous proposal? -- 8.8 Motor learning and symbolic play: A convenient comparison -- 8.9 How does symbolic play come to be symbolic? -- 8.9.1 From motor simulation to the evocation of absent objects: Completing the description of 'the big extension'.

8.9.2 Addressing a seemingly vicious circle: What is in the mind of the producer when he or she decides to bring about a certain specific evocation? -- 8.10 From the basic ability to symbolic play: A proposal on ontogenesis and a question about evolutionary-historical origins -- Chapter 9. From symbolic play to linguistic symbol -- 9.1 Adaptation to the model, a feature shared by the movements of symbolic play and the articulatory-phonetic movements of language -- 9.1.1 Evidence that encourages us to search for a similarity -- 9.1.2 The similarity in the respective motor aspects -- 9.1.3 Back to Saussurean parity once more -- 9.2 The special character of articulatory-phonetic imitations: Arbitrary and with no adaptation to the environment -- 9.2.1 Articulatory-phonetic patterns and imitation of movements: The social or phonemic model -- 9.2.2 The fuller the control exercised by the 'motor adaptation to a model', the more stable the model -- 9.3 Articulatory-phonetic pattern and evocation: The analogy with symbolic play -- 9.4 Is the great difference between playful symbol and linguistic symbol a genuine obstacle to the connection between them? -- 9.4.1 What does this difference consist of? -- 9.4.2 Children and the comprehension of displaced speech: The possible role of echolalic repetitions -- 9.4.3 Latent, displayed, latent: Is my hypothesis on simulation overly complex? -- 9.4.4 Why might the latent route to evocation occur more readily in language? -- 9.5 The phonemic-social model, the expansion of working memory and inner speech -- 9.6 Language and the adaptive advantages of symbolic play -- 9.7 Taking a step towards the next section: 'Linguistic symbol' versus linguistic meaning -- SECTION FOUR. The origin of predication and syntax -- Chapter 10. From the general exposition to the crucial requisite achieved by the protodeclarative.

10.1 The origin of syntax: Overview of the hypothesis.