Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: The instability of belief ascriptions (and how not to explain it) -- 1. From language to thought -- 2. Accommodating shifty intuitions -- 3. The appeal to ambiguity -- 3.1. Lexical ambiguity -- 3.2. Syntactic ambiguity -- 3.3. Multigrade status -- 3.4. The persistence of shifty intuitions -- 4. The indexical view -- 4.1. Implicit modes of presentation -- 4.2. Hidden-indexical semantics -- 4.3. Articulated indexicality -- 5. Semantic indeterminacy -- 5.1. Incompleteness -- 5.2. Similarity -- 5.3. Hopelessness -- 6. Direct belief -- 7. Summary -- Chapter 2: The pragmatics of substitutivity -- 1. Truth and appropriateness -- 2. Conversational implicature -- 3. Implicated normalcy -- 4. Normalcy for belief ascriptions -- 5. Variations on verbatim acceptability -- 6. Identity beliefs -- 7. Availability -- 8. Semantic intuitions -- 9. Iterability -- 10. Other pragmatic accounts of substitution failure -- 10.1. Soames and what is said -- 10.2. Thau and what is implicated -- 11. Summary -- Chapter 3: Conceptions, belief, and "inner speech" -- 1. The medium view of conceptions -- 2. The behavior problem -- 2.1. The problem -- 2.2. The Higher Order View of conceptions -- 2.3. A solution to the problem -- 3. Suspended belief -- 4. The inner speech picture of thought -- 5. Thinking in words -- 5.1. Silent uttering -- 5.2. Imagining -- 6. Two paradigms of belief -- 7. Summary -- References -- Index.