Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Foreword -- Two Arguments against Antirealism in Relation to Artefact Kinds -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Identity criteria and ontological respectability -- 3. Artefact kinds: the Aristotelian tradition -- 4. A first argument against antirealism in relation to artefact kinds -- 5. A second argument against antirealism in relation to artefact kinds -- 6. The tuber puzzle -- 7. Conclusions -- REFERENCES -- Realism, Tense, and Context Sensitivity -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Time and realism -- 3. The overlap argument -- 4. Where the overlap argument fails -- 5. An alternative conception of the present -- 6. Realism -- REFERENCES -- Proof of the Existence of Universals-from a Fallibilist -- 1. The existential premise -- 2. The first if-then truth -- 3. The second if-then truth -- 4. The third if-then truth -- 5. The fourth if-then truth -- 6. Concluding addendum -- REFERENCES -- Methodological Cartesianism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Impredicativity and Cartesianism -- 3. The evolutionary impasse -- 4. Seeing as if minded -- REFERENCES -- The Transparency Objection against Modal Anti-Realism and the Paradox of Conceivability -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Three kinds of modal anti-realism -- 3. The biconditional -- 4. Constraints on Γ -- 5. The transparency objection -- 6. A radical interpretation of (3) -- 7. The paradox of conceivability -- 8. Three possible anti-realist reactions -- Appendix. The paradox of T-conceivability -- REFERENCES -- Temporal Realism and the R-Theory -- REFERENCES -- Was Frege a Realist? And, if so, in What Sense? -- REFERENCES -- Is Exemplification Absurd? A Note on Lowe's Criticism -- 1. Introduction: metaphysical dogmas and the logic of spatial universality -- 2. The argument: exemplification and its logic -- REFERENCES -- Why Realism Needs Ontology -- 1. What is realism?.

2. Perceptual knowledge -- 3. Nomological knowledge -- 4. Ontological knowledge -- REFERENCES -- The Impossibility of Philosophical Skepticism -- 1. Moore's impasse -- 2. The impossibility of philosophical skepticism -- 3. Philosophical skepticism refutes itself -- REFERENCES -- Metaphysical Realism and Castañeda's Minimal Transcendental Realism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Ontology, metaphysics and metaphysical certainty -- 3. Radical skepticism and minimal transcendental realism -- 4. The indivisible noumenon and Castañeda's epistemology -- 5. Minimal transcendental realism vs. metaphysical realism -- 6. Further support for metaphysical realism coming from Castañeda -- 7. Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- Realism and Intentionality -- 1. A definition of epistemological realism -- 2. Another definition of epistemological realism -- 3. The structure of knowing -- 4. Local and global error -- 5. On critical realism -- 6. The vindication of perception -- 7. The intentional connection -- 8. Representationalism -- 9. Causation and cognition -- 10. The correspondence theory of truth -- REFERENCES -- Defending Deployment Realism against Alleged Counterexamples -- 1. Historical counterexamples to the "no miracle" argument -- 2. Deployment realism and Lyons ' new objection -- 3. Is success explainable without truth? -- 4. Success without truth: getting right predictions by chance -- 5. Success without truth: independently probable predictions -- 6. Consequences not actually true or antecedents not actually false -- 7. False principles not used or used inessentially -- 8. Conclusions -- REFERENCES -- Fiction in Science? Exploring the Reality of Theoretical Entities -- 1. Model-based inference and the question of scientific realism -- 2. Fictional entities and non-fictional entities -- 3. Legitimate and illegitimate inferences.

4. Implications for realism about theoretical or hidden entities -- 5. Conclusions -- REFERENCES -- Does Bell's Theorem Imply Metaphysical Realism? -- 1. What is metaphysical realism? -- 2. What does Bell's Theorem say? -- 3. Einstein, Bohr, and realism -- 4. Conclusion -- Appendix -- REFERENCES -- Semantic Antirealism: Last Gasp -- REFERENCES -- The Reality of Linguistic Norms or Linguistic Rules Rule -- Part 1. Davidson on communication -- Is meaning normative? -- Part 2. Correctness conditions and norms -- Correctness conditions -- Are the norms substantial? -- REFERENCES -- On Russell's Robust Sense of Reality -- 1. A traditional interpretation -- 2. Difficulties with the traditional interpretation -- 3. Multi-faceted realism -- 4. The primary sense of existence -- REFERENCES -- Austrian Logical Realism? Brentano on States of Affairs -- 1. Varieties of states of affairs in Austrian philosophy -- 2. Content and object of presentations -- 3. Contents and objects of judgments -- 4. True negative existential judgments -- 5. Objective vs. real -- 6. Final remarks -- REFERENCES -- Realism versus Idealism in the Nature-Nurture Dispute -- 1. Nature or nurture -- 2. Realist versus idealist metaphysical priority -- 3. Realism and idealism, nature and natural nurturing -- 4. Centrality of realism-idealism controversy in metaphysics -- 5. Real nature and ideal nurture -- 6. Strongest defense of realism and against idealism-conceptualism -- 7. Conflicting metaphysical prioritizations -- REFERENCES -- What Does Realism Entail for the Humanist? -- 1. Untying the Gordian knot -- 2. Ontological realism -- 3. Epistemological fallibilism -- 4. The stratification of the world -- 5. Critical naturalism -- 6. Ontology and emancipation -- REFERENCES -- Name Index.