Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Executive Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Part I: Setting the Stage -- Chapter One: Introduction: How Wars End -- Overview -- How Wars End -- The Final Transition in Iraq -- The Three Faces of the War in Iraq -- Overarching Themes -- Organization of the Report -- Chapter Two: The First Six Years -- Overview -- Prewar Planning -- Combat Operations (March 20 to June 23, 2003) -- Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority (April 23, 2003, to June 28, 2004) -- Transition from the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to the Coalition Provisional Authority -- Military Activities in Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority -- Iraqi Army -- Police -- Assessing the Effectiveness of Training -- Governance -- Economy and Essential Services -- Transfer of Sovereignty, Transition to the U.S. Embassy -- Multi-National Force-Iraq in Support of the Iraqi Interim Government and the U.S. Embassy (June 28, 2004, to May 3, 2005) -- Multi-National Force-Iraq Campaign Plan -- Developing Iraqi Security Forces -- National Elections, January 2005 -- Multi-National Force-Iraq in Support of the Iraqi Transitional Government and the U.S. Embassy (May 3, 2005, to May 20, 2006) -- Iraqi Security Force Development -- Provincial Iraqi Control -- Developing Counterinsurgency Doctrine -- Civil-Military Relations -- Multi-National Force-Iraq in Support of the Government of Iraq and the U.S. Embassy (May 20, 2006, to December 31, 2008) -- Announcing the Surge, Transition to a New Leadership Team -- Population Security -- Sons of Iraq -- Civil Affairs -- Benchmarks -- Charge of the Knights -- Security Agreement and the Strategic Framework -- Framing the Issues in the United States.

Elements of the Security Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement -- Chapter Three: Multi-National Force-Iraq Transition Planning and Execution, 2009-2010 -- Overview -- Multi-National Force-Iraq Under the Security Agreement, Through Withdrawal from Cities (January 1, 2009, to June 30, 2009) -- Camp Lejeune Speech -- Out of the Cities -- Multi-National Force-Iraq and U.S. Forces-Iraq Through the End of Combat Operations (June 30, 2009, to August 30, 2010) -- Iraqi Security Forces Capacity -- 2010 Joint Campaign Plan -- Operations Order 10-01 and Fragmentary Order 10-01.4 -- National Elections, March 2010 -- The Iraq Transition Conference -- Change in Leadership -- Part II: Transition Management and Planning -- Chapter Four: Transition Management -- Team Building -- Operations Order 11-01: Key Objectives and Guidance for Operation New Dawn Execution -- Transition Implementation Planning -- Transition Management Working Groups -- Changes to Transition Management Processes Under Operations Order 11-01 -- Iraqi Participation in Transition Planning and Execution -- Summary -- Chapter Five: The Influence of Washington and Baghdad on the Transition -- Key Political Decisions Shaped Plans -- Deputies' Committee Decisions -- Withdrawal Time Lines -- Lack of Certainty Regarding an Enduring U.S. Troop Presence Complicated Planning -- Executive Branch Planning Processes Complicated Transition-Related Decisions -- Iraq's Failure to Form a Government Causes Delays -- Congressional Influence on the Transition -- Funding for the Transition -- Impact of Continuing Resolutions and Funding Delays -- Summary -- Part III: Executing the Transition and Retrograde of Forces -- Chapter Six: Enduring Security Challenges -- Drivers of Instability -- Communal and Factional Struggle for Power and Resources -- Insufficient Government of Iraq Capacity.

Violent Extremist Groups -- External Interference from Neighboring Countries -- Enduring Threats and Responses -- Iranian Influence in Iraq -- U.S. Military Efforts-Balancing Iranian Influence -- BII Transition: From U.S. Forces-Iraq to the U.S. Embassy -- Violent Extremist Organizations -- Promised Day Brigade -- Asa'ib al-Haq -- Kata'ib Hezbollah -- Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi -- Al-Qaeda in Iraq -- U.S. Military Efforts to Defeat Violent Extremist Organizations -- The Arab-Kurd Conflict -- Importance of Arab-Kurdish Tensions -- Political Background -- Unresolved Issues -- U.S. Military Efforts -- The Arab-Kurd Transition Plan -- Summary -- Chapter Seven: Enhancing the Security Sector Capacity of the Government of Iraq -- U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Plans for Security Sector Transition -- Minimum Essential Capabilities -- Moving Toward a "Normal" Security Assistance Model -- Iraq Security Sector Overview -- Iraqi Ministry of Defense -- Army and Army Air Corps -- Navy and Marines -- Air Force -- Iraqi Special Operations Forces -- Ministry of Interior -- Police -- Transitioning U.S. Responsibility for Training Iraqi Police -- The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Police Development Program -- Rule of Law -- Airspace Management -- Summary -- Chapter Eight: Enabling an Expeditionary Embassy -- Scale of Effort -- Embassy Staffing Numbers -- Iraq Operating Environment -- U.S. Forces-Iraq and Embassy Baghdad's Transition Planning -- Constituent Posts -- Construction Planning Hindered by Many Factors -- Funding Shortfalls Caused Scaling Back of Embassy's Provincial Presence -- Personnel Challenges -- Ratio of Support to Programmatic Staff -- Security -- Embassy Security Programs -- Assured Mobility -- Facility and Static Security -- Future Security Challenges -- Contracting -- Embassy Baghdad's Use of Contractors.

Security Contract-Worldwide Protective Services -- Life-Support Contract-Logistics Civil Augmentation Program -- The Department of State Has Improved Its Contract Oversight Capability -- Embassy Air -- Medical Support -- Knowledge Management -- Summary -- Chapter Nine: Reposture the Force -- Closing and Transitioning Bases and Facilities to Iraqi Control -- Base Closure Direction, Planning, and Tasks -- Executing the Base Closure Process -- Environmental Cleanup and Oversight -- Final Status of Closure, Transfer, and Transition -- Equipment Disposal: A Major Logistics Challenge -- Transfer of Equipment to the Embassy -- Transfer of Equipment to the Iraqi Government -- Transfer of Equipment to Afghanistan -- Transfer of Equipment Out of Theater -- Operational Maneuver -- Redeployment Planning and Procedures -- Security Considerations for Redeployment -- "Collapse" of Forces for Redeployment -- Movement Security Vignette: Positioning the Strategic Reserve -- How This War Ended -- War Termination Assessment -- Diplomatic and Ceremonial Activities -- Final Handover to the Iraqis -- The Last Convoy -- Summary -- Part IV: The Aftermath, Conclusions, and Recommendations -- Chapter Ten: After the Transition -- Internal Political Crisis -- Enduring Security Challenges -- Iran and the Conflict in Syria -- Violent Extremist Organizations -- Arab-Kurd Tensions -- Capacity-Building -- Security Cooperation -- Police Training-The Gutting of the Police Development Program -- The Expeditionary Embassy in Practice -- Embassy Security -- Embassy Size -- Closure of Kirkuk Consulate Demonstrates Transition's Myriad Challenges -- Summary -- Chapter Eleven: Conclusions and Recommendations -- Conclusions -- Tackling the Challenges of the Transition -- The Importance of Process -- Security Challenges and ISF Capabilities -- The Expeditionary Embassy.

Assessing the Transition -- Implications for Future Transitions: Key Insights and Recommendations -- Recommendation 1 -- Recommendation 2 -- Recommendation 3 -- Recommendation 4 -- Recommendation 5 -- Recommendation 6 -- Recommendation 7 -- Recommendation 8 -- Recommendation 9 -- Recommendation 10 -- Recommendation 11 -- Recommendation 12 -- Summary -- Appendixes -- A. Comments of Ambassador James Jeffrey -- B. Joint Campaign Plan-Base Document -- C. JCP Annex F-Transition -- D. USF‑I J4 Joint Plans Integration Center Input -- E. USF‑I J4 Department of State Transition Cell RAND History Report -- F. Joint Logistics Operations Center Input -- Bibliography -- Index.