Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- The Object and Approach of This Book -- Limitations -- I A Theory of Regulation -- 1 Typical Justifications for Regulation -- The Control of Monopoly Power -- Rent Control or "Excess Profits" -- Compensating for Spillovers (Externalities) -- Inadequate Information -- Excessive Competition: The Empty Box -- Other Justifications -- The Mixture of Rationales -- 2 Cost-or-Service Ratemaking -- The System -- The Problems -- Conclusion -- 3 Historically Based Price Regulation -- The System -- The Problems -- Conclusion -- 4 Allocation under a Public Interest Standard -- The System -- Conclusion -- 5 Standard Setting -- The System -- Problems Inherent in the Process -- Conclusion -- 6 Historically Based Allocation -- The System -- The Need for Exceptions -- The Exception Process -- Conclusion -- 7 Individualized Screening -- The Food Additive Screening System -- Problems with This Form of Regulation -- Conclusion -- 8 Alternatives to Classical Regulation -- Unregulated Markets Policed by Antitrust -- Disclosure -- Taxes -- The Creation of Marketable Property Rights -- Changes in Liability Rules -- Bargaining -- Nationalization -- 9 General Guidelines for Policy Makers -- II Appropriate Solutions -- 10 Match and Mismatch -- 11 Mismatch: Excessive Competition and Airline Regulation -- The Industry -- Regulation -- Harmful Effects of Regulation -- Mismatch as Cause -- An Alternative to Classical Regulation -- Conclusion -- 12 Mismatch: Excessive Competition and the Trucking Industry -- The Industry and Regulation -- The Effects of Regulation -- Alternatives to Classical Regulation -- Conclusion -- 13 Mismatch: Rent Control and Natural Gas Field Prices -- The Industry -- Regulation -- Adverse Effects -- The Mismatch and the Shortage -- The Mismatch and Natural Gas Allocation -- Alternatives -- Conclusion.

14 Partial Mismatch: Spillovers and Environmental Pollution -- The Problems of Standard Setting -- Incentive-Based Systems: Taxes and Marketable Rights -- Conclusion -- 15 Problems of a Possible Match: Natural Monopoly and Telecommunications -- The Characteristics of the Longline Problem -- The FCC's Response to the Problem -- The Basic Choices -- Conclusion -- III Practical Reform -- 16 From Candidate to Reform -- The Elements of Implementation -- The Kennedy Hearings -- Conclusion -- 17 Generic Approaches to Regulatory Reform -- Better Personnel -- Procedural Changes -- Structural Change -- Encouraging Substantive Refonn -- Appendix 1 The Regulatory Agencies -- Appendix 2 A Note on Administrative Law -- Further Reading -- Notes -- Index.