Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Preface -- Abstract -- Contents -- Figures, Tables, and Box -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One: Introduction -- Sociology and Anthropology in DoD's Irregular Warfare Context -- Research Approach and Road Map to This Report -- Chapter Two: Gaining Insights into Unstable, Conflict-Prone Environments Through Social Science Lenses -- Introduction -- Sociological Theories -- Conflict Theory -- Social Movement Theory -- Social Network Theory -- Institutional/Organizational Theory -- Anthropological Theories -- Cultures of Violence -- Cultures of Independence and Resistance -- Inequality and Aggression -- Local Systems of Social Control, Kinship Ties, and Identity -- Other Social Science Theories and Unstable Environments -- Rational Choice Theory -- Greed and Grievance Theories -- Concluding Remarks -- Chapter Three: Factors Associated with Environments Vulnerable to Conflict -- Introduction -- Methodology for Validating the List of Factors and Their Characteristics -- Key Factors and Their Attributes -- Factor 1: Level of External Support for Violent, Nonstate Groups -- Factor 2: Extent to Which Government Considered Illegitimate or Ineffective by the Population -- Factor 3: Presence of Tribal or Ethnic Indigenous Populations with History of Resisting State Rule, and/or Cultures That Encourage or Justify Violent Behavior -- Factor 4: Levels of Absolute or Relative Poverty/Inequality -- Presence of One or More Groups That Have Recently Lost Status or Power -- Factor 5: Extent to Which Local Governance Is Fragmented or Nonexistent and Vulnerable to Co-Option from Insurgent Replacement Institutions -- Factor 6: Existence of Ungoverned Space -- Factor 7: Presence of Multiple Violent, Nonstate Groups Competing for Power.

Factor 8: Level of Government Restriction on Political or Ideological Dissent -- Extent to Which Individuals Feel Alienated from Governing Process -- Factor 9: Level of Consistency/Agreement Between Nonstate Group's Goals and Philosophy and Preferences/Worldview/Ideology of Target Populations -- Factor 10: Extent to Which Population and Nonstate Groups Perceive Faltering Government Commitment to a Counterinsurgency Campaign -- Factor 11: Capacity, Resources, and Expertise of Violent, Nonstate Groups -- Factor 12: Pervasiveness of Social Networks Capable of Being Galvanized and Mobilized to Resistant Action -- Concluding Remarks -- Chapter Four: Relationships Among Factors: Peru and Nepal Case Studies -- The Shining Path in Peru, 1980-1992 -- The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 1997-2006 -- Concluding Remarks -- Chapter Five: Utilizing the Factors for Analysis -- Metrics for Detecting and Assessing Factors -- Metrics for Factor 1: External Support -- Metrics for Factor 2: Government Legitimacy or Effectiveness -- Metrics for Factor 3: History of Resistance -- Metrics for Factor 4: Poverty and Inequality -- Metrics for Factor 5: Fragmented Governance -- Metrics for Factor 6: Ungoverned Space -- Metrics for Factor 7: Multiple Armed Groups -- Metrics for Factor 8: Government Repression -- Metrics for Factor 9: Insurgent Group and Population Goal Consistency -- Metrics for Factor 10: Perceived Government Commitment -- Metrics for Factor 11: Capacity of Armed Group -- Metrics for Factor 12: Social Networks -- Applying the Factors in Analysis -- Using the Factors to Prioritize Level of Effort -- Concluding Remarks -- Chapter Six: Conclusion -- Key Findings -- Recommendations -- Concluding Remarks -- APPENDIXES -- A. Factors from Joint and Army Doctrine -- B. Factor Matrix -- C. Cross-Matching 12 Factors with RAND Case Studies on 30 Counterinsurgencies.

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