Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Figures and Maps -- Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One: Introduction -- Background -- The Transition from Counterinsurgency to Stability -- The Case Studies -- Chapter Two: The Philippines -- Introduction: Background of the Communist Conflict in the Philippines -- Counterinsurgency Under Marcos -- The Post-Marcos Period -- Strategy -- CPP/NPA -- The Philippine State -- Self-Defense Militias -- AFP COIN Progress -- Transition? -- Conclusion: Lessons for the United States -- Chapter Three: Counterinsurgency Transition Case Study: Colombia -- Nature and Scope of the Conflict -- International and Transnational Actors -- Strategy (Pre-Transition) -- Colombian Government Strategy -- Insurgent Strategy -- External Powers Supporting Belligerents -- Key Strengths and Weaknesses of the Strategies -- How the Parties Define "Victory" -- The Transition Period -- Managing the Transition -- Institutional Framework: Theory and Practice -- Stages of Transition -- Implementation: What Is the Actual Experience of the Colombian Transition? -- Gaps -- Conclusions -- Assessment of Colombian Transition Plan -- Prospects for the Future -- What Capabilities Does the United States Need to Have or Need to Develop? -- Chapter Four: Counterinsurgency Transition Case Study: El Salvador -- Introduction -- Strategy (Pre-Transition) -- The Transition Period -- Domestic Factors -- The United States' Role -- The Role of the International Community -- Managing the Transition -- Ceasefire and Demobilization -- Public Security and Security-Sector Reform -- ESAF Reform -- Police Reform -- Human Rights, Truth and Reconciliation -- Addressing the Factors Contributing to the Insurgency -- Conclusions -- A Successful Transition? -- Lessons Learned.

Chapter Five: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, 2006-2009 -- Introduction -- Background: Mali's North-South Divide -- A History of Contestation -- Phase 1: The ADC Rebellion, May-July 2006 -- Introduction: Brief History of the Conflict Leading Up to the Period of Transition -- Strategy (Pre-Transition) -- The Transition Period -- Managing the Transition -- Phase 2: The ATNM Rebellion (May 2007-February 2009) -- Introduction: Brief History of the Conflict Leading Up to the Period of Transition -- Strategy (Pre-Transition) -- The Transition Period -- Managing the Transition -- Conclusions -- Chapter Six: The Transition in Al-Anbar, Iraq -- Introduction -- A Brief History of the Conflict in Al-Anbar Province -- Pre-Transition Strategy, 2005-2006 -- Insurgent Strategies in the Pre-Transition Period -- External Powers Supporting the Anbar Insurgents -- Counterinsurgency and Transition, 2006-2008 -- The Transition in Anbar: Contributing Factors -- False Starts and Missed Opportunities on the Road to Transition -- External Actors' Understanding of the Changing Conflict Dynamics -- Setting the Stage for and Managing the Transition -- Transition Process Components -- Signs the Coalition Forces Were "Winning" -- The Transition Outcome in Al-Anbar -- Major Gaps in Transition Capabilities -- Conclusions -- Chapter Seven: Afghanistan -- Introduction -- Key Domestic, International, and Transnational Actors -- Stabilization Attempt -- Incumbent Strategy -- Anti-Coalition Militant Strategy -- External Powers -- Strengths and Weaknesses of the Initial Stabilization Attempt -- Defining Victory -- Reasons the Initial Attempt to Transition Toward Stability Failed -- Factors That Resulted in Failure -- Recommended Strategy for the Future -- Chapter Eight: Conclusion -- Overarching Insights -- Insights and Implications for U.S. Policy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Beyond.

Intelligence Support to the Host Nation -- Managing Militias Toward the End Game -- Providing the Resources and Management Structure for a Protracted Transition Phase -- Appendix: Indicators of Transition -- References -- Summary and Chapter One -- Chapter Two -- Chapter Three -- Chapter Four -- Chapter Five -- Chapter Six -- Chapter Seven -- Chapter Eight.