Front Cover -- About the Author -- Title page -- Copyright -- Epigraph -- Contents -- Preface to the first edition -- Preface to the second edition -- Preface to the third edition -- Preface to the fourth edition -- Introduction -- CHAPTER 1 Science as knowledge derived from the facts of experience -- A widely held commonsense view of science -- Seeing is believing -- Visual experiences not determined solely by theobject viewed -- Observable facts expressed as statements -- Why should facts precede theory? -- The fallibility of observation statements -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 2 Observation as practical intervention -- Observation: passive and private or active and public? -- Galileo and the moons of Jupiter -- Observable facts objective but fallible -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 3 Experiment -- Not just facts but relevant facts -- The production and updating of experimental results -- Transforming the experimental base of science: historical examples -- Experiment as an adequate basis for science -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 4 Deriving theories from the facts: induction -- Introduction -- Baby logic -- Can scientific laws be derived from the facts? -- What constitutes a good inductive argument? -- Further problems with inductivism -- The appeal of inductivism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 5 Introducing falsificationism -- Introduction -- A logical point in favour of falsificationism -- Falsifiability as a criterion for theories -- Degree of falsifiability, clarity and precision -- Falsificationism and progress -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 6 Sophisticated falsificationism, novel predictions and the growth of science -- Relative rather than absolute degrees of falsifiability -- Increasing falsifiability and ad hoc modifications -- Confirmation in the falsificationist account of science -- Boldness, novelty and background knowledge.

Comparison of the inductivist and falsificationist view of confirmation -- Advantages of falsificationism over inductivism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 7 The limitations of falsificationism -- Problems stemming from the logical situation -- Falsificationism inadequate on historical grounds -- The Copernican Revolution -- Inadequacies of the falsificationist demarcation criterion and Popper's response -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 8 Theories as structures I: Kuhn's paradigms -- Theories as structures -- Introducing Thomas Kuhn -- Paradigms and normal science -- Crisis and revolution -- The function of normal science and revolutions -- The merits of Kuhn's account of science -- Kuhn's ambivalence on progress through revolutions -- Objective knowledge -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 9 Theories as structures II: research programs -- Introducing Imre Lakatos -- Lakatos's research programs -- Methodology within a program and the comparison of programs -- Novel predictions -- Testing the methodology against history -- Problems with Lakatos's methodology -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 10 Feyerabend's anarchistic theory of science -- The story so far -- Feyerabend's case against method -- Feyerabend's advocacy of freedom -- Critique of Feyerabend's individualism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 11 Methodical changes in method -- Against universal method -- Telescopic for naked-eye data: a change in standards -- Piecemeal change of theory, method and standards -- A light-hearted interlude -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 12 The Bayesian approach -- Introduction -- Bayes' theorem -- Subjective Bayesianism -- Applications of the Bayesian formula -- Critique of subjective Bayesianism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 13 The new experimentalism -- Introduction -- Experiment with life of its own -- Deborah Mayo on severe experimental testing.

Learning from error and triggering revolutions -- The new experimentalism in perspective -- Appendix: happy meetings of theory and experiment -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 14 Why should the world obey laws? -- Introduction -- Laws as regularities -- Laws as characterisations of powers or dispositions -- Thermodynamic and conservation laws -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 15 Realism and anti-realism -- Introduction -- Global anti-realism: language, truth and reality -- Anti-realism -- Some standard objections and the anti-realist response -- Scientific realism and conjectural realism -- Idealisation -- Unrepresentative realism or structural realism -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 16 Epilogue to the third edition -- Further reading -- CHAPTER 17 Postscript -- Introduction -- Confirmation by arguments from coincidence -- Philosophical versus scientific knowledge of atoms -- Independent evidence and the 'theory-dependence of observation': Perrin's experiments on Brownian motion -- Realism versus anti-realism again -- Partitioning of theories: atomism in nineteenth century chemistry -- Strongly confirmed theories are never completely discarded -- Approximate truth is all we have -- Levels of reality -- Further reading -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index of names.