Contents -- I: Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State-of-Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology. -- II: Derivation of first condition -- the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case. -- III: Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick-Dretske analysis. -- IV: Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice. -- V: Distinction between Informant and Source of Information -- its nature and point. Application to putative 'knowledge without belief cases -- and to comparativism: Goldman. -- VI: Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle. -- VII: Local v. Global Reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn. -- VIII: Externalist and Internalist analyses. The firstperson case. Knowing that one knows. -- IX: Insufficiency of the various analyses. The 'No false lemma' principle. Its rationale-and its effect. -- X: Objectivisation. The 'cart before the horse' objection-and the response. -- XI: Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws. -- XII: Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account. -- XIII: Two explanations of scepticism: the first-person approach, and the absolute perspective. -- XIV: Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?. -- XV: Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker. -- XVI: Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London-and German. -- XVII: Other locutions: Knowing how to. The Inquirer and the Apprentice. 'Knows how to' compared with 'can'-and with 'knows that'. -- Appendix: Unger's Semantic Relativism.

References -- Index of Names.