Regulating Competition in Stock Markets: ANTITRUST MEASURES TO PROMOTE FAIRNESS AND TRANSPARENCY THROUGH INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CRISIS PREVENTION -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Acknowledgments -- PART 1: Happiness, Health, and Longevity during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis -- CHAPTER 1: Does the Recent Financial Crisis Impact Health and Happiness? -- Concepts of Happiness -- The History of Modeling Health and Financial Crisis -- Crisis Impact on Mental Health, Morbidity, and Mortality -- Crisis Impact on Happiness -- Impact of Declining GDP, Unemployment, Financial Loss, and Financial Strain on Happiness -- Health and Happiness -- Theory: How Emotions Impact Physical Health -- Happiness Is a Good Measure of Welfare and Utility -- Our Three Objectives -- We Created Our Happiness and Health Domain Indices -- Our Financial Crisis-Impact Model -- Our Model of Happiness Consists of Two Equations -- Survey Participants and Timing -- Results -- Estimates of Happiness Equations -- Variations of Our Model -- Financial Crisis as a Major International Traumatic Event -- How Much Happiness Was Lost in the Financial Crisis? -- How Much Did Health Deteriorate? -- Can We Just Wait for the Next Financial Crisis? -- Notes -- CHAPTER 2: Profound Unhappiness in the International Recession: The Case of Suicide in Industrialized Countries -- Background -- Two Concepts of Happiness -- A Psychological Viewpoint -- Unhappiness, Hopelessness, and Depression -- Hypothesis: Happiness as Accomplishment Predicts Happiness as Pleasure -- The Macro-economic Predictors -- Analysis -- Conclusions -- PART 2: Imperfect Competition and Antitrust Regulations in the Stock Markets -- CHAPTER 3: Preventing Stock Market Crises (I): Regulating Shareholding Concentration -- Is Perfect Competition Possible in the Stock Market? -- Concentration, Manipulation, and Monopoly.

Can Stock Markets Still Be Manipulated? -- Manipulation Is Frequent in U.S. Markets -- Manipulation Is Occasionally Rampant Worldwide -- Manipulation Is Chronic and Frequent in Global Stock Markets -- Prosecution Rate of Market Manipulation Is Low -- Theoretical Literature on Market Manipulation -- We Choose the Accumulation-Lift-Distribution Scheme to Study -- Manipulative Objective of Each Stage of the ALD Scheme -- Are Monopolistic Practices Involved in the ALD Scheme? -- Antitrust Against ALD Manipulation -- Existing Approach and Our Proposal to Regulate Market Manipulation -- Regulatory Proposal: A Generic Recommendation -- Benefits of Regulating Concentration -- Concluding Remarks and Future Research -- Notes -- CHAPTER 4: Preventing Stock Market Crises (II): Regulating Trade-Based Price-Lifting -- How Is Large Price Impact by Other Investors Induced? -- Empirical Research on Volume-Based Price Impact -- The SEBI Prosecution Cases -- The Manipulation Tactics Used in Price Lifting -- Fictitious Trading -- Time Intervals between Matched Orders Are Negligibly Short -- Advancing the Bid Is Involved in Fictitious Trading -- Fictitious Trading Can Be Used for Price Pegging -- Marking the Close and Advancing the Bid -- Fake Trading -- Anatomy of an Investor's Trades in a Stock during a Trading Day -- Unified Approach to Surveillance and Regulatory Measures -- Selling Speed in Distribution and Short Selling -- Concluding Remarks -- Notes -- CHAPTER 5: Preventing Stock Market Crises (III): Regulating Earnings Manipulation -- How Important Is Earnings Information to Investors? -- Earnings Manipulation Is Problematic -- How Is Earnings Manipulation Done in Reality? -- Earnings Manipulation Is Pervasive -- Earnings Manipulation Is Persistent -- Auditors Frequently Fail to Stop Earnings Manipulation -- Proposals to Effectively Regulate Earnings Manipulation.

Concluding Remarks -- Notes -- CHAPTER 6: Preventing Stock Market Crises (IV): Regulating Trading by Corporate Insiders -- What Is the Purpose of Trading by Corporate Insiders? -- The Relationship between Earnings Manipulation and Trading by Corporate Insiders -- Trading by Corporate Insiders Is an Important Drive for Earnings Manipulation -- The Main Incentives for Earnings Manipulation All Enrich Corporate Insiders -- Is Debate on Insider Trading Regulation Over? -- Literature on Insider Trading -- Insider Trading Prior to the Announcement of a Takeover Deal -- Recent Literature on International Experience of Insider Trading -- Evidence of More Trades by Corporate Insiders on Earnings Manipulation -- Insider Trading with Earnings Manipulation Is Not Effectively Regulated -- International Insider Trading Regulation -- Insiders' Timing of Trade to Avoid Legal Risk -- Option Backdating -- Insider Trading Prosecution Rate Is Too Low -- InformationMonopoly and Information Asymmetry -- Proposals to Effectively Regulate Trading by Corporate Insiders -- Two Measures to Regulate Trading by Corporate Insiders -- Two Measures to Regulate Abnormal Price Behavior Prior to a Corporate Announcement -- Discussion of the Four Proposed Measures -- Conclusion -- Notes -- CHAPTER 7: Preventing Stock Market Crises (V): Regulating Information Manipulation by Sell-Side Analysts -- What Is the Actual Role of Sell-Side Analysts? -- How Is the Value of Sell-Side Analysts' Work Defined? -- The U.S. Markets -- Non-U.S. Developed Markets -- Emerging Markets -- The Publicity Effect on Market Reaction -- Uninformed Investors Are Often Misled or Hurt by Analysts' Recommendations -- Analysts Can Hardly Attend Fairly to Public Interests -- Analysts Are Not Financially Independent -- Individual Investors Systematically Lose in Stock Trading.

Analyst-Generated Information Benefits the Informed -- Analysts' Recommendations Are Inconsistent with Their Earnings Estimates -- Analysts Have Been Overoptimistic for Decades -- Value of Analysts' Recommendation and Forecast to Issuers -- Analysts Serve as Marketing Professionals for Issuers -- Evidence of Analysts' Marketing Service for Issuers' SEOs and IPOs -- Analysts' Marketing Precipitates the Postoffering Underperformance -- Analysts' Walk-Down in the Full-Year Cycle of EPS Estimates -- Value of Analysts'Work to Investment Banks and Brokerage Firms -- Analysts' Collusive Role in Proprietary Trading Strategies -- Analysts Generate Trading Commissions for Brokerage Firms -- Analysts Tip Preferred Client Institutional Investors -- Analysts Inform Brokerage Colleagues -- Comparison of Sell-Side Analysts and Corporate Insiders -- Legal Difficulty in Prosecuting Wrongdoing by Sell-Side Analysts -- Regulatory Proposals -- Discussion of the Regulatory Proposals -- Discussion of the Six Measures -- Relevant Regulation s in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 -- China's Regulations of 2005 -- Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 -- Concluding Remarks -- Notes -- CHAPTER 8: Preventing Stock Market Crises (VI): Regulating Information-Based Manipulation -- All Types of Market Manipulation Come Down to Perception Manipulation -- Anatomy of SEC Market Manipulation Litigation Cases (1999 to 2009) -- Information-Based Manipulation Schemes in Practice -- Securities Litigation Cases with Information-Based Manipulation -- Rumors Can Move the Market Substantially with Media Reporting -- Investment Gurus Can Profit Significantly When Touting Stocks Publicly -- Jim Cramer, Host of CNBC's Mad Money Show -- Thom Calandra, CBS MarketWatch Columnist -- Wang Jianzhong, China's First Black Mouth -- Information-Based Manipulation Schemes on the Internet.

There Are More Than One-and-a-Half Billion Internet Users Globally -- Online Investors Lose More -- Internet Message Boards -- Internet Chat Rooms -- Spamming -- Internet Information-Based Manipulation Has Been Poorly Curbed -- Analysis of Information-Based Manipulation -- The Manipulator's Exercise of Information Monopoly Induces Investors to Trade -- Information Monopoly Is the Product of Price-Moving Potential, Publicity, and Credibility -- Inconsistency in the Manipulator's Trading Completion with His Information -- Regulatory Recommendations -- Consistency Requirement Is the Regulatory Principle -- Effectiveness of the Quantifiable and Adjustable Regulatory Recommendations -- The Proposals Are Complementary to the Current Regulations -- Discussion of Information Monopoly in Reality -- Corporate Insider Trading, Analyst Recommendations, and Frontrunning -- Flash Crash and High-Frequency Trading -- Concluding Remarks -- A Perspective for Future Research -- Notes -- CHAPTER 9: Preventing Stock Market Crises (VII): Principles of Regulating New Reporting That Cultivates Long-Run Manias and Triggers Short-Run Panics -- Information Monopoly and Certain Business News Reporting -- Information Monopoly Utilized for Stock Trading -- In formation Content in Information Monopoly -- A ProlongedMania in Stock Buying Leads to a Marketwide Crisis -- Some Business News Reporting Is Capable of Moving Stock Prices in the Short Run -- Single News Events That Move Stock Prices -- EntreMed Story -- Emulex Hoax and ADS Rumor -- More Evidence That Some Business News Reporting Moves the Market -- Literature on Price Impact of Publication of Sell-Side Analysts' Recommendations -- Recent Literature on the Short-Run Price Impact of Business News Reporting -- Some Business News Reporting Affects Individual Investors in the Long Run.

Business News Reporting Is Frequently Upward-Biased.