Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 1. The Problem of the Reality of Free Will -- 2. Definitions of Terms -- 3. Overview of the Text -- Part I: Hierarchical Compatibilism Defended -- 2 A Compatibilist Account of Free Will -- 1. Two Hierarchical Accounts -- 2. Problems for the Accounts of Frankfurt and Watson -- 3. The First Line of Reply: Let's Distinguish between Intrusive and Non-Intrusive Controllers -- 4. The Second Line of Reply: The Autonomy Variable Strategy -- 5. Five Autonomy Variables -- 6. The Autonomy Variable Account -- 7. How the Autonomy Account Handles the Local and Global Challenges -- 8. The Third Line of Reply: "Free Will" as an Internalistic Concept -- 9. Conclusion -- 3 Does Freedom Require Morality? -- 1. Three Arguments for the Affirmative Answer -- 2. The Case for the Negative Answer -- 3. Replies to the Three Arguments -- 4. Conclusion -- 4 Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Content and Ascribability Issues -- 3. Reduced Content and Consequentialist Ascribability -- 4. Problems with Consequentialist Ascribability -- 5. Formalist Moral Responsibility -- 6. Conclusion -- Part II: Free Will Unravelled -- 5 Free Will as an Exemplar Concept -- 1. The Normative Problem -- 2. Four Cases to Illustrate the Normative Problem -- 3. The Bribe Problem -- 4. Do Causes That Incline without Compelling Reduce Free Will? -- 5. Does Being Free Entail Feeling Free? -- 6. Three Exemplars of Freedom -- 7. Some Empirical Support for the Free Will Exemplars -- 8. The Three Exemplars and the Unsettled Free Will Questions -- 9. Conclusion -- 6 Meta-Compatibilism -- 1. The Argument for Meta-Compatibilism -- 2. Objections and Replies -- 3. Conclusion -- 7 An Argument for Moral Non-Realism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Three Theories of Moral Properties -- 3. The Argument against Objective Moral Realism.

4. Why Non-Naturalist Theories Cannot Satisfy Both the Conformity and Simplicity Conditions -- 5. Difficulties for the Naturalist Alternatives -- 6. The Universal Subjective vs. Anarchistic Subjective Theories -- 7. Conclusion -- 8 Troubles with Libertarianism -- 1. Three Libertarian Conditions -- 2. Nonvalerian Theories -- 3. Dennett's Valerian Theory -- 4. Kane's Theory -- 5. Delay Libertarianism -- 6. Libertarianism's Problems with Rationality -- 7. Conclusion -- 9 Conclusion -- 1. Six Conditions for an Account of Free Will -- 2. Rating the Free Will Theories -- 3. What Is Left -- NOTES -- REFERENCES -- INDEX -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.