Being in Time -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC data -- Table of contents -- Introduction -- Conclusion -- Time after time -- 1. Introduction: Ubiquitous time -- 2. A middle way: Dynamical systems -- 3. Brainspace -- 4. Temporality now! -- 5. Countdown to implementation -- 6. Crossing the explanatory gap -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness -- 1. Introduction- the optimistic outlook -- 2. The creative nature of visual perception -- 3. A colossal library -- 4. Building templates- hierarchically -- 5. A combinatorial explosion -- 6. The ambiguity inherent in isolated responses -- 7. Neuronal reflections -- 8. Experimental consequences -- 9. What is so unique about the cerebral cortex? -- 10. Is consciousness a local or global phenomenon? -- 11. Is visual awareness dependent on higher levels of the cortical hierarchy? -- References -- From probabilities to percepts -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The ubiquity of sensory ambiguity and its absence from sensory consciousness -- 3. An orthogonal order of estimates and the 'precedence of the gaze' -- 4. Design features of a global best estimate buffer -- 4.1 The neural numerology of sensory experience -- 4.2 Our panoramic, nested, ego-centric, three-dimensional visual world -- 4.3 "Just in time" for the next gaze movement: brief career of the global best estimate -- 5. Cortex, colliculus and "the other thalamus" -- 6. Conclusion -- References -- Being in time -- 1. A few more constraints on theories of phenomenal experience -- 1.1 Autonomy -- 1.2 Timeliness -- 1.3 Computational tractability -- 2. Implications of the autonomy of experience -- 3. Time is of the essence -- 4. Waiting for Godot -- 4.1 The attractor hypothesis -- 4.2 The way ahead -- 5. Computational tools for distributed dynamic coordination -- 6. Summary -- Acknowledgments -- References.

The (lack of) mental life of some machines -- 1. Introduction - special laws: -- 2. One bit at a time -- 3. How detailed is detailed enough? -- 4. Not all machines are born equal -- 5. Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Restless minds, wandering brains -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Escaping robustness -- 2. Perceptual switching -- 3. An EEG-study of perceptual mind wandering -- 4. The dynamics of mind-wandering -- 5. What happens to the laminar intervals when observers do engage in a task? -- 6. Conclusion -- Acknowledgement -- References -- Fuzzy consciousness -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Cylinder sets -- 3. The pushing and pulling of consciousness -- 4. Discussion -- References -- Two dynamical themes in Husserl -- 1. Background -- 2. Horizon theory/constitution -- 3. Transcendental-eidetic phenomenology -- 4. Conclusion -- References -- Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness -- 1. Introduction: Unity, holism, and temporal continuity -- 2. Mereotopology as a new tool for the study of consciousness -- 2. A critical application: Does an experience have temporal parts? -- 3. "Self-embedding": Sketch of a positive proposal -- 4. Conclusion -- References -- The brain and its states -- 1.Introduction -- 2. Some concepts of consciousness -- 3. Creature consciousness -- 4. Transitive consciousness -- 5. State consciousness -- 6. Phenomenal consciousness -- 7. Identity, reduction, and explanation -- 8. Conclusion -- Works cited -- An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness -- 1. Introduction: A plural approach -- 2. Outline of the chapter -- 3. Brains and workspaces -- 4. Action, awareness, and consciousness -- 5. Sensitive dependence on social conditions -- 6. Plural processes underlie phenomenal consciousness -- 7. Challenge 1: The sustained dynamics of phenomenal experience.

8. Challenge 2: Multi-scale phenomenal consciousness -- 9. The hierarchy of human activity: Which scales? -- 10. Models of an integrative pluralistic solution -- References -- Index.