Cover image for Preference and Information.
Preference and Information.
Title:
Preference and Information.
Author:
Egonsson, Dan.
ISBN:
9780754684534
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (176 pages)
Series:
Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy
Contents:
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1 Analysing Disappointment -- 1.1 Sumner's Example -- 1.2 Disappointment and the Vigorousness of a Preference -- 1.3 The Need for an Information Requirement -- 1.4 Two Understandings of 'Object' -- 1.5 Fumerton's Distinction -- 1.6 Fumerton's Distinction and the Information Requirement -- 2 The Quantitative Element -- 2.1 Disappointment in the Intentional Understanding -- 2.2 Preference and Satisfaction Rationality -- 2.3 The Wittgenstein Case -- 2.4 Recapitulation -- 2.5 Buying a Pig in a Poke -- 3 The Qualitative Element -- 3.1 'The Desire Satisfaction Theory' -- 3.2 Feelings and Reactions to Feelings -- 3.3 Knowing and Having an Experience -- 3.4 Vividness and Possibility -- 3.5 The Time Aspect -- 3.6 Two Situations -- 3.7 Versions of the Information Requirement -- 3.8 A Problem of Possible Alternatives -- 3.9 A Comment on Metaphorical Language -- 4 The Qualitative Element Criticized -- 4.1 Maximization -- 4.2 The Hypnotist and Drug Examples -- 4.3 Gibbard's First Example -- 4.4 Gibbard's Second Example -- 4.5 Savulescu on Obstructive Desires -- 5 Comparing Examples -- 5.1 Producing a Neurosis -- 5.2 Thanking Yourself Afterwards -- 5.3 A Standing Desire for Future Satisfaction -- 5.4 The Importance of the Future -- 5.5 Ought Future Wants to be Discounted? -- 5.6 Conclusion and Coda -- 6 Truth and Deliberation -- 6.1 The Truth Element and Epistemic Circumstances -- 6.2 The Availability Qualification -- 6.3 Two Models -- 6.4 Deliberative Correctness -- 6.5 Conclusion -- 7 Intrinsic and Final Preferences -- 7.1 Korsgaard's Distinctions -- 7.2 Combinations -- 7.3 Applications of the Dependency Idea -- 7.4 Moore on Intrinsicality -- 7.5 Strong and Weak Dependency -- 7.6 Negative Conditionals -- 7.7 Moore's 'Value as a Whole' -- 7.8 Another Objection.

7.9 The Model of Instrumental Preference Rationality -- 7.10 Returning to the Discussion of Preference Objects -- 7.11 Objects and Non-Instrumental Preferences -- 7.12 Concluding Remarks -- 8 Strongly Intrinsic Preferences -- 8.1 Consistency -- 8.2 An Example -- 8.3 Brandt's Conception of Irrational Intrinsic Preferences -- 8.4 Kusser's Argument against Brandt -- 8.5 Conclusion -- 9 A Problem of Hypothetical Approval -- 9.1 Traditional Formulations -- 9.2 The Punk Rock Example -- 9.3 Railton's Objectified Subjective Interests -- 9.4 The First Argument -- 9.5 The Second Argument -- 9.6 Rosati's 'Two-Tier Internalism' -- 9.7 Conclusion -- 10 Hypothetical Approval in Medicine -- 10.1 Life-Sustaining Treatment -- 10.2 The Conscious-T Case -- 10.3 Consent -- 10.4 Psychiatric Care -- 10.5 Assessing the 'Best Interest Model' -- 10.6 Assessing the 'Incompetency Model' -- 10.7 Two Final Psychiatric Cases -- 10.8 Conclusion -- 11 Summary and Conclusions -- 11.1 Summary -- 11.2 Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index.
Abstract:
Standard preferentialist theories allege that a person's preferences and their satisfaction are the correct measure of well-being. In this book, Egonsson presents a critical analysis of the "full-information account of the good," which claims that only the satisfaction of rational and fully informed preferences has value for a person.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
Electronic Access:
Click to View
Holds: Copies: