Cover image for War by Other Means--Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency : RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Final Report.
War by Other Means--Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency : RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Final Report.
Title:
War by Other Means--Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency : RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Final Report.
Author:
Gompert, David C.
ISBN:
9780833045836
Personal Author:
Physical Description:
1 online resource (520 pages)
Contents:
Cover -- Preface -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Chapter One - Defining the Problem -- GWOT or COIN? -- The Globalization of Insurgency and COIN -- The Untidy and Dynamic World of COIN -- What to Expect from This Report -- Chapter Two - Framing the Problem -- A Planning Construct -- Types of Insurgency -- Type I-Local Insurgency -- Type II-Local-International Insurgency -- Type III-Global-Local Insurgency -- Type IV-Global Insurgency -- Aspects of COIN -- Understanding -- Shaping -- Acting -- Timing: Understanding, Shaping, and Acting over the Lifetime ofInsurgency -- COIN Capabilities -- Territorial -- Structural -- Kinetic -- Informational -- Cognitive -- Chapter Three - Countering Type III Insurgency -- The Main Threat -- COIN Challenges from Type III Insurgencies -- The Paradox of Force -- Achieving Legitimacy and Security While ReducingReliance on Deadly Force -- Chapter Four - Overview of Capabilities Needed to CounterType III Insurgency -- Timely Civil COIN -- The Power of Information -- Improving Local Forces -- A Change in Emphasis for U.S. Military Forces -- Chapter Five - Civil Capabilities -- Introduction -- Competition in the Civil Realm -- Strategies to Meet the Challenges of Type III Insurgency -- Carrot-and-Stick -- Hearts-and-Minds -- Transformation -- Integrating the Three Strategies to Counter Type IIIInsurgency -- Expertise and Resources in Functional Areas -- Coordinated Participation of Multiple Organizations -- The Host Nation -- The U.S. Government -- Other Governments -- International Organizations -- Nongovernmental Organizations -- Guiding Principles for Implementing a Strategy -- Coordinate Civil and Military Efforts -- Start Early -- Manage Expectations -- Current Efforts -- Capabilities: How Ready Is the United States to ConductCivil COIN?.

Nature of the Quantitative Analysis -- The Necessary Operational Culture Is Lacking -- Current Numbers of Personnel Are Too Low -- Fiscal Resources Are Insufficient -- Thinking About Future Capabilities -- Illustrative Scenario 1: "The Big One" -- Illustrative Scenario 2: Two "Mediums" -- Illustrative Scenario 3: Two "Mediums" Plus Prevention -- The Security Problem -- Conclusion -- Chapter Six - Information Capabilities -- Information as a Strategic Resource -- Putting Users First in Setting and Meeting InformationRequirements -- Getting Information -- Promoting a Cell Phone Society -- National Registry-Census, ID Cards, and Vetting -- Three-Dimensional Awareness -- Embedded Video -- National Wiki -- Enabling Information Users to Be Productive Information Providers -- ICON -- How Much Difference Would ICON Make? -- An ICONic Vignette -- Feasibility and Implementation -- Chapter Seven - Perception and Cognition -- Influencing Opinion -- From Information Power to Brain Power -- Cognitive Capabilities for COIN -- Conclusion -- Chapter Eight - General Security Capabilities -- Rethinking Basic Requirements -- Core Security Capabilities -- Institutional Management Capacity -- Uniformed Command and Leadership -- Logistics -- IO Capabilities and Competence -- Justice Systems -- Police and Law Enforcement -- Constabulary Police -- Technical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) -- Human Intelligence -- Border Security -- Coastal Security -- Tactical Air Mobility -- Long-Range Air Mobility -- Specialized Forces for High-Value Targets (HVTs) -- Precision Strike -- Ground Combat -- The Relationship of Local and Foreign Capabilities -- Chapter Nine - Local Security Capabilities -- Factors Affecting Local Capability -- Timing -- Insurgent Strength -- Initial Condition of the Local Government -- Priorities for Local Security Capabilities.

Real-World Obstacles -- Chapter Ten - U.S. Security Capabilities -- Building for Success -- Hedging Against Disappointment -- Building for Success -- Three U.S. Missions: Prepare, Enable, Operate -- Requirements for Preparing, Enabling, and Operating -- Deficient U.S. Capabilities -- Hedging Against Disappointment -- Training and Education -- Nonlethal Force Options -- Land Mobility -- Inclusive, Integrated, User-Based Networks for Sharing andCollaboration -- Sustainable Ground Operations -- U.S. Ground Forces-Better or Bigger? -- Conclusion -- Chapter Eleven - Multilateral Counterinsurgency -- The Case for Multilateral COIN -- The Content of Multilateral COIN Capabilities -- Preparing for Multilateral COIN -- The NATO-EU Model -- The Non-NATO Model -- Conducting Multilateral COIN -- Multilateral COIN Campaign Models -- Functions, Principles, and Options -- Political Authority, Strategy-Setting, and Policymaking -- Campaign Oversight -- Command, Control, and Collaboration in Security Operations -- Local Cooperation -- Information -- Politics -- Chapter Twelve - Investment Priorities -- The Need to Invest -- Setting Investment Priorities -- Planning High-Priority Investments -- Investing for an Uncertain Future -- Costs -- Conclusion -- Chapter Thirteen - Organization: Unsettled Structures forUnsettled Times -- Organizational Issues in Perspective -- Capability Gaps and Organizational Implications -- Justice and Police -- Building Local Security Institutional Capacity -- Organizing, Training, Equipping, and Advising Foreign Armed Forces -- Employment Impact -- Mass Public Education -- Macro-Structural Considerations -- Government Option 1: Business-as-Usual -- Government Option 2: Install a COIN Czar -- Government Option 3: Create a COIN Agency -- Defense COIN Options -- Defense Option 1: Business-as-Usual.

Defense Option 2: Expand the Scope and Size of U.S. SOCOM -- Defense Option 3: Assign COIN as a Principal Mission of RegularForces -- Defense Option 4: Create a Defense Security Agency -- Summary -- Micro-Structural Considerations -- Chapter Fourteen - Implications and Recommendations -- Definitions Matter -- Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities -- Will It Really Work? -- Implementation Strategy -- Investment -- Organization -- Harnessing Information Power -- Multilateral COIN -- Engendering Local Responsibility -- Getting Started: Specific Recommendations forImmediate Attention -- Civil COIN -- Information and Cognition -- Local Security Services -- U.S. Forces -- Multilateral -- Organization -- Conclusion -- Appendix A - Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings -- Appendix B - Multilateral COIN Capacity -- Appendix C - Indicators and Warnings -- Appendix D - Ground-Force Tasks and Improvements -- About the RAND COIN Team -- Works Cited.
Abstract:
Examines how the United States should improve its counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities through, for example, much greater focus on understanding jihadist strategy, using civil measures to strengthen the local government, and enabling local forces to conduct COIN operations. Provides a broad discussion of the investments, organizational changes, and multilateral arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.
Local Note:
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2017. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
Electronic Access:
Click to View
Holds: Copies: