Contents -- Preface -- I. Introduction -- 1. Decentralization and Incentives -- 2. Incentive Compatibility since 1972 -- II. Informational Comparisons -- 3. Informational Requirements of Parametric Resource Allocation Processes -- 4. Price versus Direct Revelation: Informational Judgments for Finite Mechanisms -- III. Information and Stability -- 5. The Informational Requirements of Local Stability in Decentralized Allocation Mechanisms -- 6. On the Existence of a Locally Stable Dynamic Process with a Statically Minimal Message Space -- IV. Market Mechanisms -- 7. Technical Information, Returns to Scale, and the Existence of Competitive Equilibrium -- 8. Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics -- 9. On the Second Welfare Theorem for Anonymous Net Trades in Exchange Economies with Many Agents -- V. Nonmarket and General Mechanisms -- 10. Incentive Compatible Approximation of a Nashlike Solution under Nonconvex Technology -- 11. Limited Communication and Incentive-Compatibility -- 12. Differential Information and Strategic Behavior in Economic Environments: A General Equilibrium Approach -- 13. Incentives, Information, and Iterative Planning -- 14. The Vulnerability to Manipulative Behavior of Resource Allocation Mechanisms Designed to Select Equitable and Efficient Outcomes -- Contributors.