Cover -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Prolegomenon: Husserl's turn to history and pure phenomenology -- 1. Plato's Socratic theory of eide: the first pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology -- 2. Plato's arithmological theory of eide: the second pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology -- 3. Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of eide: the third (and final) pillar of the ancient precedent to pure phenomenology -- 4. Origin of the task of pure phenomenology -- 5. Pure phenomenology and Platonism -- 6. Pure phenomenology as the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of absolute consciousness -- 7. Transcendental phenomenology of absolute consciousness and phenomenological philosophy -- 8. Limits of the transcendental-phenomenological investigation of pure consciousness -- 9. Phenomenological philosophy as transcendental idealism -- 10. The intersubjective foundation of transcendental idealism: the immanent transcendency of the world's objectivity -- 11. The pure phenomenological motivation of Husserl's turn to history -- 12. The essential connection between intentional history and actual history -- 13. The historicity of both the intelligibility of ideal meanings and the possibility of actual history -- 14. Desedimentation and the link between intentional history and the constitution of a historical tradition -- 15. Transcendental phenomenology as the only truen explanation of objectivity and all meaningful problems in previous philosophy -- 16. The methodological presupposition of the ontico-ontological critique of intentionality: Plato's Socratic seeing of the eide -- 17. The mereological presupposition of fundamental ontology: that Being as a whole has a meaning overall.

18. The presupposition behind the proto-deconstructive critique of intentional historicity: the conflation of intrasubjective and intersubjective idealities -- 19. The presupposition behind the deconstruction of phenomenology: the subordination of being to speech -- Epilogue: Transcendental-phenomenological criticism of the criticism of phenomenological cognition -- Coda: Phenomenological self-responsibility and the singularity of transcendental philosophy -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.