BEYOND PHYSICALISM -- Editorial page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Dedication page -- Table of contents -- List of Figures -- Acknowledgements -- INTRODUCTION -- 1. The Phenomenology Problem -- 2. The Metaphysical Problem -- 3. The Need to Go Beyond -- CHAPTER ONE Nonconceptual Experience -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Preliminary Case for Nonconceptual Experience -- 2.1. The Ancient Pedigree of Nonconceptualism -- 2.2. Some Reasons to Think Experience is Nonconceptual -- 2.2.1. Perceptual Illusions and Noticing Aspects -- 2.2.2. The Imagery Debate -- 2.2.3. The Fine-grainedness of Experience -- 3. Experience, Conceptual Description and Theory -- 3.1. The Conceptual Expression of Experience -- 3.2. The Role of Experience in Interpretation -- 3.3. On Simulation and Basic Communalit -- 3.3.1. The Off-Line Processing Proposal -- 3.2.2. The Introspective Modelling Proposal -- 3.3. The Nonsensicality of Behavioural Meaning -- 4. Conclusion -- CHAPTER TWO. From a Sensational Point of View -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Is Experience Theory-Resistant? -- 2.1. The Verstehen Version of the What-it-is-Like Argument -- 2.2. The Failings of the Knowledge Argument -- 2.2.1. Know how = Experience and Ability -- 2.3. The Virtues of the Knowledge Argument -- 3. Rejecting the Strong Representationalist Thesis -- 3.1. The Rejection of Standard Representational Theories -- 3.1.1. The Best of Intentionality -- 3.2. The Subject and Subjectivity -- 3.3. The Representationalist Dilemma -- 3.3.1. Changing the Subject -- 3.3.2. Avoiding the Subject -- 4. Conclusion -- CHAPTER THREE. The Failure of Explanatory Physicalism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Functionalism and the Why-Question -- 2.1. Abstract Functionalism -- 2.1.1. Standard Objections to Abstract Functionalism -- 2.2. Homuncular Teleofunctionalism -- 2.3. From Functionalism to Physicalism.

3. What's the Matter with Explanatory Physicalism? -- 3.1. Reductive Physicalism -- 3.1.1. The Criterion Objection -- 3.1.2. The Multiple Realizability Objection -- 3.1.3. The Intelligibility Objection -- 3.2. Eliminativist Physicalism -- 3.3. Non-Reductive Physicalism: The Soft Option -- 3.3.1. Emergentism -- 3.3.2. Non-Constructive Naturalism -- 4. Conclusion -- CHAPTER FOUR. Intelligibility and Conceptual Limits -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Problems in Defining the Physical -- 2.1. A Reply to Crane and Mellor -- 2.2. Interpretation and Quantum Physics -- 3. Experience and the Object-based Schema -- 3.1. Stuff and Nonsense -- 3.2. Two Rejections of the Reified Mind -- 3.2.1. Heterophenomenology and the Lack of Interpretation -- 3.2.2. Wittgenstein's Expressivist Account -- 4. Referring to Modes of Presentation -- 4.1. Questioning the Standard -- 5. Conclusion -- CHAPTER FIVE. Pluralistic Naturalism and Absolute Idealism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Two Metaphysical Approaches -- 2.1. Ontological Pluralism and Substance Dualism -- 2.2. Minimal Physicalism -- 2.2.1. Supervenience, Covariance and Strict Implica -- 2.2.1.1. Objections to Supervenience and Strict Implicat -- 2.2.2. The Token Identity Thesis -- 2.3. The Advantages of Monism -- 3. The Return of Absolute Idealism -- 3.1. Two Absolute Idealist Accounts of Reality -- 3.1.1. Is Reality Spiritual in Nature? -- 3.2. The Superior Metaphysics of Absolute Idealism -- 3.2.1. Aesthetic Considerations -- 3.3. Dissolving the Metaphysical Problem -- 4. Conclusion -- CHAPTER SIX. Defending Absolute Idealism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Hasn't Absolute Idealism Already Been Refuted? -- 3. A Tale of Two Philosophies -- 3.1. The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Analytic Philosophy -- 3.2. Bradley's Absolute and Relative Truths -- 4. Bradley's Philosophy of Science -- 4.1. Does Science Seek Unity?.

4.2. The Case for A Disunified Science -- 4.3. Bradleyian Conclusions -- 5. A Reply to McHenry -- 6. Conclusion -- CHAPTER SEVEN. Truth and the Whole Truth -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Discursive Picture of Reality -- 2.1. Correspondence Theories of Truth -- 2.1.1. The Very Idea of Total Correspondence -- 2.1.2. Naturalised Correspondence Theories -- 3. Modest Realism and Correspondence -- 3.1. The Mind-Independence of the World -- 4. The Return of The Absolute -- 4.1. Truth as and Independent Norm -- 4.2. What Explains Scientific Progress? -- 5. Conclusion -- Notes -- Chapter One -- Chapter Two -- Chapter Three -- Chapter Four -- Chapter Five -- Chapter Six -- Chapter Seven -- References -- Index.