Senseless Panic: How Washington Failed America -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part One: No Calm Before the Storm -- Chapter 1: Home Alone -- Chapter 2: The Early Years (1978 - 1981) -- Chapter 3: The Savings Bank and S&L Crises -- Chapter 4: Penn Square Fails -- Chapter 5: The Butcher Empire Collapses -- Chapter 6: Deposit Insurance Reform/Tackling Wall Street -- Chapter 7: Continental Illinois Topples -- Chapter 8: Preparing to Leave -- Chapter 9: Lessons Learned -- Part Two: Here We Go Again -- Chapter 10: Policy Mistakes-1989 through 2007 -- Mark-to-Market Accounting -- Deposit Insurance Premiums -- Prompt Corrective Action -- Mathematical Capital Models -- Loan Securitization -- Loan Loss Reserves -- Leverage on Wall Street -- Deregulation of Short Sellers -- Repeal of Glass-Steagall -- Uncontrolled Growth of Freddie and Fannie -- Monetary Policy -- Chapter 11: The Subprime Mortgage Problem -- Chapter 12: SEC and FASB Blunders -- Chapter 13: Schizophrenic Failure Resolution -- Bear Stearns -- IndyMac Bank -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- Lehman Brothers -- American International Group (AIG) -- Washington Mutual (WaMu) -- Chapter 14: The 700 Billion Bailout -- Chapter 15: Never Again -- Systemic Risk Council -- Too Big to Fail -- Restore Glass-Steagall -- Consolidate and Strengthen Bank Supervision -- Increase Capital, Reserve, and Liquidity Requirements -- Eliminate Procyclical Rules -- Strengthen the SEC and Oversee FASB -- Strengthen the FDIC -- Resolution Authority -- Afterword -- Epilogue -- The Real Risk in Banks -- Have We Solved "Too Big to Fail"? -- The Bailouts Drove Panic -- TARP and More Panic -- Revamping the Regulatory System -- The Mistake of Mark-to-Market Accounting -- Why Wells Fargo Had to Take TARP Funds -- More Panic from Stress Tests -- How to Emerge from the Crisis.

Cross-Selling to Reduce Risk -- The Consequences of the Basel Accords -- A Single Banking Regulator? -- Authors' Notes on Sources -- About the Authors -- Index.