The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC data -- Table of contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Introduction -- Conscious states, reflexivity, and phenomenal character -- Some remarks on methodology -- The primacy of phenomenology -- 2. Some semantics of "consciousness" -- Preamble -- Creature consciousness: transitive and intransitive -- State consciousness -- Unconscious mental states -- Self-consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Hacker and Lycan's criticisms of the "what-it-is-like" locution -- 3. A formula for state consciousness -- Nagel's what-it-is-like formula -- Putative counterexamples -- Access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness -- The daydreaming, long-distance truck driver -- Non-conscious phenomenality -- Summary -- 4. Consciousness and self-awareness -- Preamble -- A gloss on intentionality -- The Transitivity Principle -- Two positive arguments for the Transitivity Principle -- The Symmetry Argument -- Objections and replies -- The argument from spontaneous reportability -- 5. Higher-Orderism -- Preamble -- The Higher-Order theory of consciousness -- Confabulated conscious states -- A phenomenological objection -- 6. A "one-state" alternative -- Preamble -- The Brentanian model -- The regress argument -- A twist -- De Se content -- The "self" -- Objections and replies -- 7. Representationalism -- Preamble -- The representational theory of phenomenal character -- The Transparency Assumption -- The Property Assumption -- 8. The nature of phenomenal character -- Preamble -- Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness -- Differences in phenomenal character -- Pains and other bodily sensations -- Some brief remarks on privacy -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index of subjects -- Index of names -- The series Advances in Consciousness Research.