Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Error theory and motivation -- 1.0 FAULTY FRAMEWORKS -- 1.1 THE SEMANTICS OF AN ERROR THEORY -- 1.2 NONCOGNITIVISM -- 1.3 MACKIE'S ERROR THEORY -- 1.4 INTERNALISM ABOUT MOTIVATION -- 1.5 PURE EVIL -- 1.6 MOTIVATION INTERNALISM AS A COMMITMENT OF MORAL DISCOURSE -- 1.7 IMPASSE -- 2 Error theory and reasons -- 2.0 MORAL INESCAPABILITY -- 2.1 INSTITUTIONAL ''OUGHT''S -- 2.2 STRONG CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES AS REASON-BRINGING -- 2.3 INSTITUTIONAL REASONS -- 2.4 AN ARGUMENT FOR A MORAL ERROR THEORY -- 2.5 CARNAP'S ARGUMENT AGAINST EXTERNAL QUESTIONING -- 2.6 PRACTICAL REASONS AS NON-INSTITUTIONAL -- 3 Practical instrumentalism -- 3.0 OBJECTIVE REASONS, SUBJECTIVE REASONS, AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY -- OBJECTIVE REASONS: -- SUBJECTIVE REASONS: -- INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY: -- 3.1 ENDS: DESIRES OR INTERESTS? -- 3.2 MORALITY AS A SYSTEM OF HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES -- 3.3 SMITH'S ARGUMENT FOR MORALITY AS A SYSTEM OF CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVES -- 3.4 SMITH'S ARGUMENT FOR MOTIVATION INTERNALISM -- 3.5 TAKING STOCK OF THE STRATEGY -- 3.6 THE NON-HUMEAN THEORY OF NORMATIVE REASONS -- 3.7 RATIONALITY AND EPISTEMIC SUCCESS -- 3.8 NORMATIVE REASONS AND MORAL REASONS -- 3.9 SUMMARY AND PREVIEW -- 4 The relativity of reasons -- 4.0 THE RATIONALIST'S DILEMMA -- 4.1 THE RELATIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS: THE CONCEPTUAL QUESTION -- 4.2 THE RELATIVITY OF NORMATIVE REASONS: THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION -- 4.3 HARMAN'S MURDER, INCORPORATED -- 4.4 MORAL RELATIVISM -- 4.5 SUMMARY AND PREVIEW -- 5 Internal and external reasons -- 5.0 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REASONS -- 5.1 EXTERNAL REASONS AND MOTIVATION -- 5.2 MILLGRAM'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS -- 5.3 HAMPTON'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS -- 5.4 KORSGAARD'S CHALLENGE TO WILLIAMS -- 5.5 SUMMARY -- 6 Morality and evolution -- 6.0 THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: HELPING KIN.

6.1 THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: RECIPROCAL HELPING -- 6.2 EVOLUTIONARY ETHICAL NATURALISM -- 6.3 EVOLUTIONARY ETHICAL NATURALISM AND THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY -- 6.4 MORAL GENEALOGY, MORAL ERROR, AND THE GENETIC FALLACY -- 6.5 UNJUSTIFIED MORAL JUDGMENTS VS. PROBABLY FALSE MORAL JUDGMENTS -- 6.6 SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS -- 7 Fictionalism -- 7.0 IF THERE'S NOTHING THAT WE OUGHT TO DO, THEN WHAT OUGHT WE TO DO? -- 7.1 WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF MORAL BELIEFS? -- 7.2 THE FICTIONALIST OPTION -- 7.3 FICTIVE JUDGMENTS: VAIHINGER -- 7.4 FICTIVE JUDGMENTS: CRITICAL CONTEXTS -- 7.5 FICTIONALISM AND MAKE-BELIEVE -- 7.6 FICTIONALISM AND METAETHICS -- 7.7 CONCLUSION -- 8 Moral fictionalism -- 8.0 THE VALUE OF MORAL BELIEFS -- 8.1 MORALITY AS FICTION -- 8.2 THE RETURN OF GYGES AND THE SENSIBLE KNAVE -- 8.3 ODYSSEUS AND THE SIRENS -- 8.4 A MODEST CONCLUSION -- Epilogue: Debunking myths -- Select bibliography -- Index.