Contents -- 1. What Is Transcendental Psychology? -- The "Dark Side" of the Critique -- Countercurrents: Reinhold to Austin -- Kant Against "Psychology" -- Transcendental Psychology -- In Defense of Transcendental Psychology -- 2. The Science of Sensibility -- What the Transcendental Aesthetic Is About -- Early Modern Theories of Spatial Perception -- Kant's Analysis of Spatial Perception -- Intuition, Matter, and Form -- Pure Forms (and Nativism) -- The Method of Isolation -- Distance, Extent, and Shape -- Touch: Leibniz Versus Berkeley -- Kant's Empirical Assumptions -- The Isolation Argument -- Two Arguments of the Metaphysical Exposition -- The Standard View -- The First Argument -- The Second Argument -- The Transcendental Exposition -- The Role of Geometry -- Geometry and the Space of Perception -- Parsons's Interpretation -- Kant's Results -- The Forms of Intuition and Contemporary Evidence -- Depth Perception -- Is the Space of Perception Euclidean? -- The Assumption of a Common "Outer Sense" -- Is Spatial Perception Determinate? -- Discovering the Forms of Intuition -- 3. Transcendental Psychology in the Transcendental Deduction -- What (If Anything) Happens in the Deduction Chapter? -- Representing Objects -- The Problem -- The Views of Leibniz and Christian Wolff -- Empiricism and Sensationism -- Associationism -- A Priori Necessary Synthesis -- What Is an Object of Representations? -- Unity and Synthesis -- What Is Synthesis? -- The Law of Association -- Associationism and Apriority -- Representations and Concepts -- Kant's Defensible Results -- Synthesis and the Productive Imagination -- Robert Paul Wolff on Rules of Synthesis -- The "Problem" of Early Cognition -- Constructing Representations of Objects and the "Binding" Problem -- Making Judgments About Objects -- The Problem of Judgment -- The Synthesis of Intuitions.

The "One-Step" Deduction -- Constructing Judgments -- The Objective and Subjective Sides of the Deduction -- 4. Replying to Hume's Heap -- Troubles with Apperception -- Avoiding the Subjective Deduction -- Apperception as the Cogito -- Strawson and the Self-Ascription Reading -- The "Logical" Reading of Apperception -- Two Mistaken Assumptions -- Hume -- Hume's Problem -- Hume's Absence -- Kant's Knowledge of Hume's Position -- The Denial of Real Connection -- Synthesis and Apperception -- Connecting Cognitive States by Synthesis -- Transcendental Synthesis -- Apperception and Transcendental Synthesis -- Apperception -- Arguing for the Synthetic Unity of Apperception -- Apperception and Representation -- Judgments -- Kant's Functionalism -- Intuitions -- The Reply to Hume -- 5. A Cognitive Criterion of Mental Unity -- Unity of Apperception as Mental Unity -- Synthetic Connection -- Connection and Connectibility -- The Plan of the Chapter -- Refining the Account of Synthetic Connection -- Is the Self the Combiner? -- Locke and Leibniz on Personal Identity -- The Issue -- Leibniz Versus Locke -- Moral Responsibility -- The Problem of Self-Consciousness -- Modern Mentalism, Wiggins, and Parfit -- Modern Mentalism -- Wiggins's Argument Against Mentalism -- Parfit's Denial of Personal Identity -- Objections Considered -- Is the Cognitive Criterion Too Weak? -- Is It Too Strong? -- Is It Too A Priori? -- Modularity -- Summary of the Account -- Apperception and Kant's System -- Too Many Selves -- The Ideality of Time -- 6. Perceiving Times and Spaces: The Cognitive Capacity at the Center of the Deduction -- Cognitive Tasks, Apperception, and the Deduction of the Categories -- Perception: The Eighteenth-Century Background -- The Standard View -- Intellectual Theories of Perception -- The Synthesis of Apprehension in A -- A99 -- A119-20.

Examples from the Pölitz Lectures -- The Case for the Synthesis of Apprehension -- A99 Revisited -- A Role for Concepts in Perception in A -- The Need for Nonreproductive Synthesis -- Perceptual Recognition -- Concept Application -- ¶ 26 in the B Deduction -- The Centrality of ¶ 26 -- Perception as "Scanning an Image" -- Perceiving Times and Spaces -- Differences Between the Editions -- P-Functions as Spatial and Temporal C-Functions -- Perceiving Objects by Perceiving Spatial and Temporal Arrays -- Kant's Long Argument -- Additional Considerations -- The Basic Argument -- Universal Applicability and Objective Validity -- The Argument from Apperception -- How the Argument Fails -- Defending the Long Argument Interpretation -- Some Advantages -- Henrich's Antipsychological Reading -- Allison's Apsychological Reading -- The Loss of Generality -- ¶ 26 as Completing the Argument of the Metaphysical Deduction -- How Serious Is the Loss of Generality? -- Transcendental Psychology in the Second Analogy -- Guyer's Interpretation -- Guyer's Objection to a Psychological Reading -- Versus Guyer's Antipsychologism -- What Kant Has Shown -- 7. The Limits of Transcendental Psychology -- Kant's Paralogisms -- Puzzles of the First Paralogism -- Understanding the First Paralogism -- Identity Through Time -- Leibniz and the Simplicity of the Soul -- 8. Cognitive Constraints on Empirical Concepts -- Kant and Cognitive Science -- Do We Employ Necessary and Sufficient Conditions? -- Difficulties with the Classical View -- Kant on Concepts and Concept Application -- Empirical Warrant and the Open-Ended Character of Experience -- When Should We Codify Our Concepts? -- Implications for Necessary and Sufficient Conditions -- Further Implications -- Empiricism and "Original Sim" -- Quinean Empiricism -- Current Directions -- Concepts and Reasoning -- The Task of Inference.

Analytic and Synthetic Approaches to Concepts -- How to Carve Nature at the Joints -- The Structure of Concepts -- Examples of Dependency Relations -- Implementing the Demand of Reason -- Theoretical and Experimental Implications -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index of Cited Passages -- General Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.