Contents -- Preface -- CHAPTER ONE: How to Refute Scepticism -- 1.1 The Goal and Strategy -- 1.2 Varieties of Scepticism -- 1.3 Outline of My Argument -- 1.4 The Context of the Dispute Between the Sceptic and the Nonsceptic -- CHAPTER TWO: The Evil Demon Exorcised -- 2.1 The Evil Genius Argument -- 2.2 The Sceptical Hypotheses and Basic Epistemic Maxim Which Result in Four Sceptical Epistemic Principles -- 2.3 Some Abbreviations Used Throughout This Book -- 2.4 Two of the Sceptical Epistemic Principles: The Contrary Consequence Elimination Principle and the Defeater Consequence Elimination Principle -- 2.5 A Defense of the Contrary Consequence Elimination Principle -- 2.6 Clarification of the Contrary Consequence Elimination Principle and the Strategy to Argue for It -- 2.7 A Partial Characterization of Justification: Confirming and Overriding Evidence -- 2.8 The Argument for the Contrary Consequence Elimination Principle and Other Welcomed Principles of Justification -- 2.9 Summary of the Analysis of the Evil Genius Argument up to This Point -- 2.10 The Contrary Consequence Elimination Principle, Though True, Does Not Provide a Reason for Direct Scepticism -- 2.11 Irrationality and Dogmatism: Two Misinterpretations of the Contrary Consequence Elimination Principle -- 2.12 The Defeater Consequence Elimination Principle Is False, but, Even if It Were True, It Would Be Equally Useless to the Sceptic -- 2.13 A Revised Interpretation of the Sceptic's Basic Epistemic Maxim: The Contrary Prerequisite and the Defeater Prerequisite Elimination Principles -- 2.14 The Evaluation of the Contrary Prerequisite and the Defeater Prerequisite Elimination Principles: Unacceptable -- 2.15 Other Unsuccessful Versions of the Contrary Prerequisite Elimination Principle -- 2.16 A Seemingly More Moderate Sceptical Epistemic Principle -- 2.17 Summary of Chapter Two.

2.18 A Sceptical Rejoinder and the Task Remaining for Chapter Three -- CHAPTER THREE: Absolute Certainty in This World -- 3.1 Review of the General Argument -- 3.2 Some Preliminary Remarks About Certainty -- 3.3 Six Desiderata (D1 Through D6) of an Adequate Account of Absolute Certainty -- 3.4 D1: The Distinction Between Psychological and Evidential Certainty -- 3.5 D2, D3, D4: Absolute and Relative Certainty and Their Relations -- 3.6 D5: Knowledge Entails Absolute Certainty -- 3.7 D6: Intuitions About Certainty -- 3.8 The Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge and Absolute Certainty -- 3.9 Further Discussion of Defective Justification and a Defense of the Characterization of Misleading and Genuine Initiating Defeaters -- 3.10 A Particularly Relevant Objection to the Defeasibility Theory: Does It Lead to Scepticism? -- 3.11 D1 and D5 Are Satisfied: Knowledge Clearly Entails Evidential and Psychological Certainty -- 3.12 D2: Nondefective Justification and Absolute Certainty -- 3.13 Empirical, Contingent Propositions Can Be Evidentially Certain -- 3.14 D3, D4: Relative Certainty -- 3.15 D6 and the Lottery Paradox -- 3.16 Some Contingent Beliefs Are Absolutely Certain -- CHAPTER FOUR: Tying It All Together -- 4.1 Review of the General Goal and Strategy -- 4.2 There Is No Good Reason to Believe That S Never Knows That P -- 4.3 There Are Good Reasons to Believe That S Sometimes Knows That P -- 4.4 The Last Words -- Notes -- Glossary -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- W -- Z.