Contents -- Contributors -- Sponsors -- Introduction -- 1. Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion -- CAPITAL MARKETS, EFFICIENCY, AND CORPORATE CONTROL -- 2. Corporate Control, Efficient Markets, and the Public Good -- 3. Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets -- 4. Comment -- 5. Comment -- MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR AND TAKEOVERS -- 6. Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web -- 7. Corporate Takeovers: Financial Boom or Organizational Bust? -- 8. Comment -- 9. Comment: Golden Parachutes and the Myth of the Web -- 10. Comment: Shareholders and Managers-A Risk-Neutral Perspective -- EVIDENCE ON THE GAINS FROM MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS -- 11. Are Acquiring-Firm Shareholders Better Off after an Acquisition? -- 12. Mergers and Managerial Performance -- 13. The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers -- 14. Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth -- 15. Comment -- 16. Comment -- 17. Discussion -- MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS: TAXES, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND THE INCENTIVES OF MANAGERS -- 18. Taxation and the Dynamics of Corporate Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax-Motivated Acquisitions -- 19. Taxes and the Merger Decision -- 20. The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence -- 21. Comment -- 22. Comment -- 23. Comment -- 24. Comment -- LEGAL RULES, TAKEOVER STRATEGIES, AND DEFENSIVE TACTICS -- 25. The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy -- 26. Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation -- 27. The Regulation of Takeovers in Great Britain -- 28. Comment -- 29. Comment -- 30. Comment -- ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE -- 31. Stock Exchange Rules Affecting Takeovers and Control Transactions -- 32. Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock -- 33. Comment -- 34. Comment -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q.

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