Mind Ascribed -- Editorial page -- Title page -- LCC data -- Dedication -- Table of contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Preliminaries -- 1.1 Mind and content: First steps -- 1.2 Truth and meaning -- 1.3 A road map -- Part I. Towards interpretivism -- 2. How not to have a mind -- 2.1 A general metaphysical scheme: Pleonastic properties and the natural basis -- 2.2 Mind-body relations -- 2.3 Supervenience -- 2.4 Reduction and identity -- 2.5 Realisation and functionalism -- 2.6 Ascription theory and explanatory relations -- 3. Interpretivism -- 3.1 Varieties of interpretivism -- 3.2 Donald Davidson and radical interpretation -- 3.3 Daniel Dennett and the intentional stance -- 3.4 Some roots of divergence -- 3.4.1 Rationality -- 3.4.2 The sources of evidence for interpretation -- 3.4.3 Explaining meaning -- Part II. Elaborating and defending the ascription theory -- 4. Folk psychology and mental terms -- 4.1 Common-sense functionalism and the meaning of mental terms -- 4.2 Natural kinds and the reference of mental terms -- 4.3 The role of folk psychology in the ascription theory -- 5. The ascription theory -- 5.1 Preliminaries -- 5.2 The ascription sources -- 5.3 Modelling the coherence -- 5.4 The canonical ascription -- 5.5 The indeterminacy and uncodifiability of the mental -- 6. Objections and defence -- 6.1 Objections -- 6.1.1 The circularity charge -- 6.1.2 The regress objection -- 6.1.3 Intrinsic intentionality -- 6.1.4 Liberalism and chauvinism -- 6.1.5 Observer-dependence -- 6.2 Arguing for interpretivism -- 6.2.1 The consideration from behavioural criteria -- 6.2.2 The consideration from the publicity of meaning -- 6.2.3 The consideration from folk psychology -- 6.2.4 The consideration from stance-dependent patterns -- Part III. Extending the view -- 7. Interpretivism and mental causation -- 7.1 Davidson on mental causation.

7.2 Troubles with the causal role of the mental -- 7.3 Causal explanation and causation -- 7.4 Causal efficacy and causal relevance -- 7.5 The relevance of mental causation -- 8. Perception -- 8.1 The specificity of perception -- 8.2 The factivity constraint -- 8.3 The veridicality of perception -- 8.4 The content of perceptual states -- 8.5 Non-conceptual content in the ascription theory -- 8.6 Phenomenology, non-conceptual content and protocontent -- 9. Self-knowledge -- 9.1 Approaches to self-knowledge -- 9.2 Self-constitution -- 9.3 First-person operationalism -- 9.4 The idea of a mechanism -- 9.5 The ascriptionist model of self-knowledge -- 10. Conclusion -- References -- Index -- The series Advances in Consciousness Research.