Contents -- I. The Argument for the Tensed Theory of Time -- 1. The Translation Method and the Tensed and Tenseless Theories of Time -- 1.1. The Translation Method -- 1.2. The Old Tenseless Theory of Time -- 1.3. The New Tenseless Theory of Time -- 1.4. The A Priori Version of the Nonsemantic Tenseless Theory of Time -- 1.5. The A Posteriori Version of the Nonsemantic Tenseless Theory of Time -- 2. The Untranslatability of A-Sentences by Tenseless Date-Sentences -- 2.1. The Date Theory of A-Sentences -- 2.2. The Truth Conditions of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences -- 2.3. The Confirmation Conditions of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences -- 2.4. The Entailment Relations of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences -- 2.5. The Logical Identities of A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences -- 2.6. A Similarity Between A-Sentence-Tokens and Tenseless Date-Sentences: Intersubstitutivity in Extensional Contexts -- 3. The Untranslatability of A-Sentences by Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences -- 3.1. The Old and New Token-Reflexive Theories of A-Sentences -- 3.2. The Truth Conditions of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences -- 3.3. The Confirmation Conditions of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences -- 3.4. The Entailment Relations of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences -- 3.5. The Logical Identities of A-Sentences and Tenseless Token-Reflexive Sentences -- 3.6. The Psychological Theory of A-Sentences -- 4. The Tensed Theory of A-Sentences -- 4.1. The Transition to Positive Arguments for the Tensed Theory of Time -- 4.2. Outline of the Argument That A-Sentences Express A-Propositions -- 4.3. The Tensed Explanation of the Tenseless Token-Reflexive Rules of A-Sentence-Tokens.

4.4. The Tensed Explanation of the Tenseless Token-Independent Rules Governing the Propositions Expressed by A-Sentence-Tokens -- 4.5. The Tensed Explanation of A-Indexicals and their Relation to A-Nonindexicals -- 4.6. The Tensed Theory of Temporal Quasi Indicators -- 4.7. The Cognitive Significance of A-Indexicals -- II. The Argument for Presentism -- 5. Presentness as a Logical Subject of A-Sentences -- 5.1. The Theory of Presentism -- 5.2. A Preliminary Analysis of Property Ascription -- 5.3. The Conveyance Relation -- 5.4. Two Species of the Prepositional Relation -- 5.5. Direct and Indirect Property Ascription -- 5.6. States of Affairs -- 5.7. Presentness as a Metaphysical Subject of All A-States-of-Affairs -- 5.8. The "No-Property" Tensed Theory of Time -- 5.9. McTaggart's Paradox -- 6. Presentness as a Logical Subject of Tenseless Sentences -- 6.1. All Subjects but Presentness Are Local Logicometaphysical Subjects -- 6.2. Tenseless Singular and Existential Sentences Other Than B-Sentences -- 6.3. B-Sentences -- 6.4. Synthetic Generalizations -- 6.5. Tautological and Analytic Sentences -- 6.6. Non-English Sentences -- 7. Absolute Presentness and the Special Theory of Relativity -- 7.1. The Special Theory of Relativity -- 7.2. Metaphysical Time and Special-Theory-Relativity-Time -- 7.3. The Reductionist Nature of the Special Theory of Relativity Temporal Definitions -- 7.4. The Primitiveness and Absoluteness of Metaphysical Time -- 7.5. All Mental Events Exist in Metaphysical Time -- 7.6. All Physical Events Are in Metaphysical Time -- 7.7. Metaphysical Time Is the Only Possible Time -- 7.8. Metaphysical Time Distinguished from Other Candidates for "Absolute Time" -- 8. Conclusion -- 8.1. Summary of the Argument for Presentism -- 8.2. Ethical Implications of the Argument for Presentism: The Presentist Attitude -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E.

F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.