Nuclear Arms Control -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- 1 Overview -- ARMS CONTROL AS A PROCESS -- THE OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL -- APPROACHES TO ARMS CONTROL -- Limits -- Freezes -- Restructuring -- Reductions -- Bans -- Special Stabilizing Measures -- THE U.S.-SOVIET STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP -- OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS -- VERIFICATION -- RECORD OF COMPLIANCE -- POLITICAL OR MILITARY "LINKAGE" -- THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS -- DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY -- SPECIFIC PROPOSALS -- 2 Strategic Offensive Nuclear Arms Control -- PART I THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT) -- Introduction -- Background -- The Origins -- SALT I Negotiations -- The SALT II Negotiations -- The Provisions of Salt I and Salt II -- The SALT I Interim Agreement -- The SALT II Treaty -- The Main Issues Surrounding Salt II -- The Strategic Relationship -- SALT II Supporters -- SALT II Critics -- The Rationale for SALT II: Preserving Essential Equivalence -- SALT II Supporters -- SALT II Critics -- Verification -- SALT II Supporters -- SALT II Critics -- Compliance -- Compliance with SALT I from 1972 to 1979 -- Compliance with SALT I and SALT II from 1980 to 1984 -- PART II THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START) -- Background -- The Origins -- Initial START Proposals -- The Scowcroft Commission and Build-Down -- The Revised U.S. START Proposal -- The U.S. START Proposal Incorporating Build-Down -- U.S. and Soviet Start Proposals -- The U.S. START Proposal as of December 1983 -- The Soviet START Proposal as of December 1983 -- The Main Issues Surrounding Start -- The Strategic Relationship -- START Supporters' Assessment of the Strategic Relationship -- START Critics' Assessment of the Strategic Relationship -- The Soviet View of the Strategic Relationship -- The Rationale for START: Selective Deep Cuts to Restore Stability -- START Supporters' Approach.

Domestic Criticisms of START -- The Soviet Approach to START -- Verification -- 3 The Nuclear Freeze -- INTRODUCTION -- BACKGROUND -- The Origins -- The Congress and Freeze Resolutions -- DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR FREEZE PROPOSAL -- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR FREEZE -- The Strategic Relationship: Equivalence Versus Inferiority -- Supporters of the Comprehensive Freeze -- Critics of the Comprehensive Freeze -- Rationale: Freeze at Parity to Stop the Arms Race -- Supporters of the Comprehensive Freeze -- Critics of the Comprehensive Freeze -- Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Freeze -- Supporters of the Comprehensive Freeze -- Critics of the Comprehensive Freeze -- The Soviet Union and the Nuclear Freeze -- 4 The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Negotiations -- INTRODUCTION -- BACKGROUND -- The Origins -- NATO's Dual-Track Deployment Decision -- The INF Negotiations -- The "Walk in the Woods" Formula -- The Soviet Offer to Match British and French Missiles -- The U.S. Interim Agreement Proposal -- The "Walk in the Park" Proposal -- SUMMARY OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET INF POSITIONS AS OF NOVEMBER 1983 -- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING THE INF NEGOTIATIONS -- The European Nuclear Balance: Different U.S. and Soviet Perspectives -- The U.S. View -- The Soviet View -- The Main Differences Between the U.S. and Soviet INF Proposals -- The U.S. Approach -- The Soviet Approach -- Verification -- The Deployment and the Future of NATO -- Integrating the START and INF Negotiations -- 5 Strategic Defensive Arms Control: The SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty -- INTRODUCTION -- BACKGROUND -- The Origins -- The Johnson Years -- The Nixon Years: ABM and SALT -- The Strategic Defense Initiative -- PROVISIONS OF THE SALT I ABM TREATY -- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING THE SALT I ABM TREATY -- Reopening the ABM Debate.

Supporters of the Strategic Defense Initiative -- Critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative -- Verification and Compliance -- 6 Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Arms Control -- BACKGROUND -- The Origin of the ASAT Program -- The Ford-Carter Years -- The Reagan Years -- SUMMARY OF U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON ASAT ARMS CONTROL -- The U.S. Position -- The Soviet Position -- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL -- The U.S. View -- The Soviet View -- U.S. Supporters of ASAT Arms Control -- 7 Nuclear Test Bans -- INTRODUCTION -- BACKGROUND -- The Eisenhower Administration -- The Kennedy Administration -- The Nixon and Ford Administrations -- The Carter Administration -- The Reagan Administration -- THE MAIN ISSUES SURROUNDING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN -- Overall U.S. Security -- Importance of Testing to U.S. Security -- Reliability of Stockpiled Weapons -- Development of New Weapons -- Nuclear Effects -- Safety -- Peaceful Nuclear Explosions -- The Weapons Laboratories -- Verification -- General -- Threshold of Detection and Identification -- Hiding in Earthquakes -- Nonseismic Information -- On-Site Inspection -- Significance of Testing Below the Threshold -- Significance of Very Low Yield Tests -- Impact on Nuclear Proliferation -- 8 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons -- INTRODUCTION -- THE NATURE OF THE RISK -- The Relationship of Proliferation to U.S. and International Security and Stability -- The Technical Problem -- Capabilities Versus Intentions -- THE HISTORY OF NON-PROLIFERATION -- NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY -- Denial Versus Constructive Engagement -- Uniform Versus Discriminatory Policies -- Relationship to NPT Obligations -- Extreme Denial -- THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS -- The Non-Proliferation Treaty -- The Treaty of Tlatelolco and Other Possibilities for Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones.

Agreements Limiting Nuclear Testing -- The Physical Security Convention and Related Measures -- THE ADEQUACY AND SUFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS -- Essential Characteristics -- Technical Considerations -- Timely Warning -- Coverage -- Adequacy of Safeguards Agreements -- Inspection Rights -- Implementation of Existing Safeguards -- HOLDOUTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME -- The Countries of Greatest Near-Term Concern -- The Problem of Coordination with Other Concerned Countries -- Acronyms -- Appendix A Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain... -- INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES... -- Article I -- Article II -- Article III -- Article IV -- Article V -- Article VI -- Article VII -- Article VIII -- PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON... -- AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED... -- 1. Agreed Statements -- 2. Common Understandings -- A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions -- B. Standing Consultative Commission -- C. Standstill -- 3. Unilateral Statements -- A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty -- B. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers -- C. Covered Facilities -- D. "Heavy" ICBM's -- Appendix B Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of... -- TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC... -- Article I -- Article II -- Article III -- Article IV -- For the United States of America -- For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- For the United States of America -- For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article V -- Article VI -- Article VII -- Article VIII -- Article IX -- Article X -- Article XI -- Article XII -- Article XIII -- Article XIV -- Article XV -- Article XVI -- Article XVII -- Article XVIII -- Article XIX -- PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION... -- Article I -- Article II -- Article III -- Article IV -- MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS REGARDING THE... -- STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY -- STATEMENT OF DATA ON THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS OF THE DATE OF SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY -- JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS -- SOVIET BACKFIRE STATEMENT -- Appendix C Treaty Between The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of... -- TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC… -- Article I -- Article II -- Article III -- Article IV -- Article V -- Article VI -- Article VII -- Article VIII -- Article IX -- Article X -- Article XI -- Article XII -- Article XIII -- Article XIV -- Article XV -- Article XVI -- AGREED STATEMENTS, COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS, AND UNILATERAL STATEMENTS REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF... -- 1. Agreed Statements -- 2. Common Understandings -- A. Location of ICBM Defenses -- B. ABM Test Ranges -- C. Mobile ABM Systems -- D. Standing Consultative Commission -- E. Standstill -- 3. Unilateral Statements -- A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty -- B. Tested in ABM Mode -- C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty -- D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars.

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION...