Contents -- ONE: Introduction: Realism and Naturalism in the Philosophy of Science -- The Background -- Empiricist Analysis of the Social and Behavioral Sciences -- The Move toward Holism and Naturalism -- A Survey of Sciences Worthy of the Name -- Abduction and Naturalistic Scientific Realism -- PART I: Scientific Realism: Minimal, Robust, and Measured -- TWO: Measurement as Population-Guided Estimation -- Introducing Population-Guided Estimation -- What Is Measurement? -- Measurement Theory -- Philosophical Theories of Measurement -- Task and Quantitative Method in the Behavioral and Social Sciences -- Sketching the Realist Theory of Measurement -- Adipose Theory and Epistemically Bite-Sized Commitment -- Old Empiricist Accounts of Behavioral Measurement -- Components of a (Naturalistic) Epistemology of Measurement -- Causal Direction in Measurement -- Conclusion: Theory, Law, and Measurement -- THREE: Realism: Minimal and Robust -- PGE and Statistical Measurement -- Austere Realism: Dispositional Structures in Statistical Practice -- Explanation and Irreducible Facts -- Manipulability and Entity Realism -- Premature Reports of Realism's Death -- Abduction, Realism, and General Form -- No-Miracles Arguments for Scientific Realism -- Confirmation Theory and Intolerance of Miracles -- Conclusion: The Role of Independence in No-Miracles Arguments -- FOUR: Measured Realism -- Finding the "Right" Test of Measured Realism -- The Shape of Measured Realism -- Independence and Idealized Philosophical Talk about Theories -- Imperfect Isolation and Imperfect Integration: The Independence of Lawful Generalizations -- One Model of Independence: Mercenary Reliance -- The Constructive Empiricist "Rational Reconstruction" of Theory Conjunction -- Mercenary Reliance in Theory Conjunction -- Motivating Epistemic Symmetry.

Scientific Realism and the Principle of Epistemic Symmetry -- Entity Realism Is Not Enough, and Robust Realism Is Too Much -- Conclusion: Integration, Independence, and Progress by Association -- PART II: Epistemological Naturalism and the Measurement of Intention -- FIVE: Statistical Designs as Instruments -- Epistemically Bite-Sized Theoretical Factors -- Operationalism and Instruments of Measurement -- Statistical Designs as Instruments -- Manipulation by Law -- A Statistical Instrument in Action: Numerical Reflections of Psychological Magnitudes -- Empiricist Alternatives to Operationalism -- Conclusion -- SIX: Statistical Testing and the World's Contribution to Rationality -- Introduction: Robustness and Significance Testing -- The Charge that Significance Tests in Psychology Are Unintelligible -- The Development of Corrective Meta-Analytic Techniques -- The Robustness of Psychological Phenomena -- Submission and Editorial Biases -- The Worldly Regulation of Method -- SEVEN: Diverse Tests on an Independent World -- Motivating Idle Possibilities -- Philosophical Analysis and Scientific Method -- Demon Criticism: Error Due to Chance Factors -- Diverse Testing and the Threat of Pseudo-robustness -- Bias-Correcting Techniques -- Worldly Conspiracies and Predicting the Future History of Science -- Theoretical Integration as Triangulation -- Morals of Naturalism -- EIGHT: Failed Attempts: The Frailties of Narrative Methods -- Criticizing Narrative Methods: Preliminary Qualifications -- The Profile of Narrative Methods -- Biases of Narration and Chronicler Sensitivity -- Offending Styles of Narrative Explanation -- Prescribing the Antidote: Listening to Measured Realism and PGE -- NINE: Conclusion -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.