FULL-VIEW INTEGRATED TECHNICAL ANALYSIS -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 The Need for a Full View Integrated Approach -- 1.1 The Motivation -- 1.1.1 The Need for a New Paradigm -- 1.1.2 The Answers from FVITA -- 1.2 The Necessity of FVITA -- 1.3 Random Walk? -- 2 Two Basic Elements of Market Dynamics -- 2.1 Oscillators-An Overview -- 2.2 The Oscillator of Choice-Stochastics -- 2.3 Trend Indicator-Moving Average -- 2.4 Trend Indicator-Moving Average Convergence/Divergence -- 2.5 Adaptive Trend Indicators -- 2.5.1 Kaufman's Adaptive Moving Average -- 2.5.2 Chande's Variable Index Dynamic Average -- 2.5.3 Mart's Master Trading Formula -- 2.6 Adaptive Oscillators -- 2.7 Other Tools of Technical Analysis -- 3 Multi-Screen Systems -- 3.1 The Need for Multi-Screen Approaches -- 3.2 Triple Screens -- 3.3 Extended Interval Charts in FVITA-Daily and Up -- 3.4 Intra-Day Interval Charts in FVITA -- 4 Bounded, Interval-Specific Bull and Bear Markets -- 4.1 Interval-Specific Bull and Bear Market I-Concept -- 4.2 Interval-Specific Bull and Bear Market II-Criteria -- 4.3 Interval-Specific Bull and Bear Market III-Limits of Countermovements -- 4.4 Triple Screen System Under Full View -- 5 Market Turning Points and Duration of Pauses -- 5.1 Support and Resistance -- 5.2 Bollinger Bands -- 5.3 Waves -- 5.4 Turning Points after Eight and R9 Observations -- 5.5 Thrust -- 5.6 Type I, II, and III Pauses -- 6 Trend Reversals vs. Temporary Countertrends -- 6.1 Trend Reversals -- 6.2 Without the Two-Day Chart -- 6.3 Running Space after Trend Reversal -- 6.4 Temporary Countertrends -- 6.5 Straight Pauses -- 6.6 Exception 1: Composite Bottoming-Up and Composite Topping-Off -- 6.7 Exception 2: Approaching the Turning Point -- 6.8 Relationship between Low- and High-Order Signals -- 6.9 Trading Strategies on Trend Signals -- 7 Pauses Under Different Market Conditions.

7.1 Pausing-Down from a Historical New High -- 7.2 Pauses Against Temporary Trends -- 7.3 Trading Strategies for Pauses -- 8 Case Studies -- 8.1 Case 1: The 2007 Financial Market Crisis-DJIA -- 8.2 Case 2: The 2000 High-Tech Bubble and its Aftermath-DJIA -- 8.2.1 The Formation of the High-Tech Bubble-DJIA -- 8.2.2 The Bursting of the High-Tech Bubble-DJIA -- 8.3 Case 3: The 1990 Bubble and Fall-Topix -- 8.3.1 The Formation of the 1990 Bubble-Topix -- 8.3.2 The Bursting of the Bubble in 1990, I-Topix -- 8.3.3 The Bursting of the Bubble in 1990, II-Topix -- 8.4 Case 4: The 2003 Rebound and 2007 Crash -- 8.4.1 The Rebound in 2003-Topix -- 8.4.2 The Fall after the Crash in 2007-Topix -- 8.5 Case 5: The 2007 Crash-Shanghai Composite Index -- 8.5.1 Market at the Turning Point-Shanghai Composite Index 2007 -- 8.5.2 The Crash of 2007-Shanghai Composite Index -- 9 Random Walk, Efficient Market vs. Market Activism -- 9.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis-The Roots -- 9.2 Efficient Market Hypothesis-The Evidence -- 9.3 EMH, Market Activism and the 100 Bill Story -- 9.4 Flawed Empirical Observations Against Market Activism -- 9.5 A Fund to Show Effective Market Activision -- 9.6 A Theoretical Argument for Technical Analysis -- 10 Integrating Macro, Fundamental, Quantitative and Technical Analysis -- 10.1 The Fragmented State of Market Analysis -- 10.2 Integrating Different Technical Analyses Under FVITA -- 10.3 Macroeconomic Analysis and FVITA -- 10.3.1 Integrated Approach to News Processing -- 10.3.2 Integrated Analysis of Bubbles and Panics -- 10.4 Firm Fundamentals and FVITA -- 10.5 Options and FVITA -- 11 Other Issues -- 11.1 Statistical Analysis -- 11.2 Technical Analysis as Public Knowledge -- 12 Concluding Remarks -- Glossary -- References -- Index.