Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The challenges of diversity -- 1.2 Leitkultur -- 1.3 Liberal neutrality -- 2 Defining liberal neutrality -- 2.1 Neutrality is an ill-defined term -- 2.2 Conceptions of neutrality -- 2.2.1 Neutrality of impact -- 2.2.2 Neutrality as equality of opportunity -- 2.2.3 Justificatory neutrality -- 2.3 Contexts of neutrality -- 2.3.1 Constitutional essentials -- 2.3.2 Political decision-making -- 2.3.2.1 Neutrality as respectful non-identification -- 2.3.2.2 Relational neutrality -- 2.3.3 Neutral behaviour of state officials -- 2.4 Neutrality as a two-fold concept -- 3 The right and the good -- 3.1 Neutrality versus toleration -- 3.2 The right versus the good -- 3.3 Theories of rights -- 3.4 Thin versus thick conceptions of the good -- 3.4.1 Rawls's thin theory of the good -- 3.4.2 Dworkin's thin theory of the good -- 3.5 Another complication -- 3.6 Comprehensive versus political conceptions -- 3.7 The need for a thin political theory of the good -- 4 Grounding neutrality -- 4.1 Society as a fair system of cooperation over time -- 4.2 Citizens as equipped with two moral powers -- 4.3 Citizens as free and equal persons -- 4.3.1 Citizens as free -- 4.3.2 Citizens as equal -- 4.4 Citizens as free and equal as thin political conception -- 4.5 The limits of the project -- 5 Justifying the respect element -- 5.1 Coercive power and the state -- 5.1.1 All state action involves coercion -- 5.1.2 All state action needs to be justifiable to the citizens affected -- 5.1.3 The state has no right to do wrong -- 5.2 Justifying coercion -- 5.2.1 Reasonable agreement justifies coercion -- 5.2.1.1 The addressees of justification -- 5.2.1.2 The scope ofthe need for justification -- 5.2.1.3 The criteria for reasonable acceptability.

5.2.1.4 What citizens can be reasonably expected to agree on -- 5.2.2 Protecting rights justifies coercion -- 5.2.2.1 Interest theories of rights -- 5.2.2.2 Choice theories of rights -- 5.2.2.3 Common ground -- 5.2.3 Protecting rights is the only justification for coercion -- 5.2.3.1 The right to be left alone -- 5.2.3.2 Reasons for state action have to outweigh the right to be left alone -- 5.3 The respect element of neutrality -- 6 Justifying the fairness element -- 6.1 Treating people as equals -- 6.2 Rawls's conception of citizens as equal -- 6.3 Treating citizens as equals with regard to their two moral powers -- 6.4 Respecting the two moral powers equally -- 6.4.1 Respecting the capacity for the right -- 6.4.2 Respecting the capacity for the good -- 6.5 Formal versus fair political participation -- 6.5.1 Cultural differences -- 6.5.2 The implementation of neutrally justified rules -- 6.6 The need to be aware of differences -- 7 Implementing liberal neutrality -- 7.1 Justificatory neutrality -- 7.1.1 Citizens as free -- 7.1.2 Citizens as equal -- 7.1.3 Enabling cooperation -- 7.1.4 Fair cooperation -- 7.1.5 The scope and limits of justificatory neutrality -- 7.2 Procedural neutrality -- 7.2.1 Equal political rights and their fair value -- 7.2.2 Minority representation -- 7.2.3 Contestatory democracy -- 7.3 Liberal neutrality in the headscarf case -- 8 Conclusion -- 8.1 Summary of the argument -- 8.2 The three challenges of pluralism -- 8.3 The third challenge -- 9 Bibliography -- Index.