Contents -- Preface -- Four Decades of Scientific Explanation -- 0. Introduction -- 0.1 A Bit of Background -- 0.2 The Received View -- 1. The First Decade (1948-57): Peace in the Valley (but Some Trouble in the Foothills) -- 1.1 The Fountainhead: The Deductive-Nomological Model -- 1.2 Explanation in History and Prehistory -- 1.3 Teleology and Functional Explanation -- 2. The Second Decade (1958-67): Manifest Destiny-Expansion and Conflict -- 2.1 A Major Source of Conflict -- 2.2 Deeper Linguistic Challenges -- 2.3 Famous Counterexamples to the Deductive-Nomological Model -- 2.4 Statistical Explanation -- 2.5 Early Objections to the Inductive-Statistical Model -- 3. The Third Decade (1968-77): Deepening Differences -- 3.1 The Statistical-Relevance Model -- 3.2 Problems with Maximal Specificity -- 3.3 Coffa's Dispositional Theory of Inductive Explanation -- 3.4 Explanation and Evidence -- 3.5 Explanations of Laws -- 3.6 Are Explanations Arguments? -- 3.7 The Challenge of Causality -- 3.8 Teleological and Functional Explanation -- 3.9 The End of a Decade/The End of an Era? -- 4. The Fourth Decade (1978-87): A Time of Maturation -- 4.1 New Foundations -- 4.2 Theoretical Explanation -- 4.3 Descriptive vs. Explanatory Knowledge -- 4.4 The Pragmatics of Explanation -- 4.5 Empiricism and Realism -- 4.6 Railton's Nomothetic/Mechanistic Account -- 4.7 Aleatory Explanation: Statistical vs. Causal Relevance -- 4.8 Probabilistic Causality -- 4.9 Deductivism -- 4.10 Explanations of Laws Again -- 4.11 A Fundamental Principle Challenged -- 5. Conclusion: Peaceful Coexistence? -- 5.1 Consensus or Rapprochement? -- 5.2 Agenda for the Fifth Decade -- Chronological Bibliography -- Explanation and Metaphysical Controversy -- Explanation: In Search of the Rationale -- 1. Why-Questions -- 2. A Thin Logic of Questions -- 3. The Epistemic Conception of Explanation.

4. Theory Nets and Explanatory Commitments -- 5. Pruning the Web of Belief -- 6. Beyond the Third Dogma of Empiricism -- Scientific Explanation: The Causes, Some of the Causes, and Nothing But the Causes -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Multiplicity, Diversity, and Incompleteness of Causal Explanations -- 3. The Canonical Form for Causal Explanations -- 4. Ontology -- 5. Why Probability Values Are Not Explanatory -- 6. Why Ask Why-Questions? -- Appendix: The Causal Failures of the Covering-Law Model -- Pure, Mixed, and Spurious Probabilities and Their Significance for a Reductionist Theory of Causation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Some Initial Intuitions -- 3. Pure and Mixed Probabilities -- 4. Screening Off and Spurious Correlations -- 5. Spuriousness and Statistical Research -- 6. The Importance of the Single Case -- 7. The Compatibility of Probabilistic Intuitions with a Deterministic View of Causation -- 8. The Deterministic Causation of Chances -- 9. Rational Action -- 10. Quantitative Decisions -- 11. Causal and Evidential Decision Theory -- 12. Action and Causation Again -- 13. The Metaphysics of Probability -- 14. Causal Chains -- 15. Causal Asymmetry -- 16. Digression on Independence Requirements -- 17. Causal Processes and Pseudo-Processes -- 18. Negative Causes -- Capacities and Abstractions -- 1. The Primacy of Singular Causes -- 2. The Failure of the Defeasibility Account -- 3. Abstractions and Idealizations -- 4. Conclusion -- The Causal Mechanical Model of Explanation -- Explanation in the Social Sciences -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Interpretativism -- 3. Rationality and Explanations of Behavior -- 4. The Existence of Appropriate Laws -- 5. Ethical Issues -- 6. Conclusion -- Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Hempel's Accounts -- 1.2 Hempel's Problems -- 2. The Pragmatics of Explanation.

2.1 Van Fraassen's Pragmatics -- 2.2 Why Pragmatics Is Not Enough -- 2.3 Possible Goals for a Theory of Explanation -- 3. Explanation as Delineation of Causes -- 3.1 Causal Why-Questions and Causal Explanations -- 3.2 Are there Noncausal Explanations of Singular Propositions? -- 3.3 Causal Explanation and Theoretical Explanation -- 4. Explanation as Unification -- 4.1 The Ideal of Unification -- 4.2 Argument Patterns -- 4.3 Systematization of Belief -- 4.4 Why-Questions Revisited -- 4.5 Explanatory Unification and Causal Dependence -- 4.6 Unification and Theoretical Explanation -- 5. A Defense of Deductive Chauvinism -- 5.1 The Objection from Quantum Mechanics -- 5.2 The Idealization of Macro-Phenomena -- 5.3 Further Sources of Indeterminism? -- 5.4 Two Popular Examples -- 5.5 Explanation and Responsibility -- 6. Epistemological Difficulties for the Causal Approach -- 6.1 Hume's Ghost -- 6.2 Causal Processes and Causal Interactions -- 6.3 Causation and Counterfactuals -- 6.4 Justifying Counterfactuals -- 6.5 Changing the Epistemological Framework -- 7. Comparative Unification -- 7.1 Comparative Unification without Change of Belief -- 7.2 The Possibility of Gerrymandering -- 7.3 Asymmetry and Irrelevance -- 7.4 Comparative Unification and Scientific Change -- 8. Metaphysical Issues -- 8.1 Correct Explanation -- 8.2 "What If the World Isn't Unified?" -- 8.3 Correct Explanation Again -- 8.4 Conclusions -- Contributors -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- X -- Y -- Z.