Contents -- Foreword by Thomas C. Schelling -- Preface, 2004: Old Patterns, New Lessons -- Introduction -- Part I: The Components of Surprise Attack -- 1. The Essence of Surprise Attack -- Reaction to Disasters and Warnings -- Aspects of Erroneous Estimates -- The Strategic Warning -- Surprise and Military Preparedness -- 2. Information and Indicators -- Quality of Intelligence Information -- Early Warning Indicators -- Signal and Noise -- Quantity of Intelligence Information -- 3. Intentions and Capabilities -- Inference and Difficulties in Estimating Intentions -- The Enemy's Conceptual Framework -- Risk Taking by the Enemy -- Estimating Capabilities -- Part II: Judgmental Biases and Intelligence Analysis -- 4. Conceptions and Incoming Information -- The Set of Conceptions -- The Persistence of Conceptions -- Assimilating Information -- Information and Expectations -- Treating Discrepant Information -- Cognitive Biases and Overconfidence -- 5. The Process of Analysis -- Prediction and Intelligence Analysis -- Stages of Intelligence Analysis -- Approaches for Generating and Evaluating Hypotheses -- Analogies and Learning from History -- Evaluating Incoming Information -- Choosing among Alternative Hypotheses -- External Obstacles to Perception -- Changing a View -- Part III: The Environment -- 6. The Analyst and the Small Group -- The Other Opinion -- Groupthink -- Pressures for Conformity -- The Leader and the Expert -- Group Risk Taking -- 7. Organizational Obstacles -- The Military as an Organization -- Rivalry, Coordination, and Communication -- Intrinsic Problems in the Intelligence Organization -- Military Men and Surprise Attack -- 8. Intelligence and Decision Makers -- Decision Makers and Intelligence Production -- Commitment to a Policy -- How Decision Makers Affect the Intelligence Process -- Decision Makers and Surprise Attack.

Conclusion: Is Surprise Attack Inevitable? -- The Complexity of the Problem -- Why Safeguards Usually Fail -- War without Surprise? -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.