The Great Telecom Meltdown -- Contents v -- Preface xi -- Acknowledgments xiii -- 1 Ma Bell and Her "Natural Monopoly," 1876-1969 1 -- Natural and Unnatural Monopoly 1 -- Western Union 2 -- Patent Protection 3 -- The Kingsbury Commitment 4 -- The Slow Pace of Progress 5 -- The Smith Decision and Universal Service 6 -- The Final Judgment 7 -- Hushaphone and the First Cracks in the Monopoly 7 -- The Disruptive Transistor 8 -- Endnotes 10 -- 2 The Rebirth of Competition 11 -- Carterfone Made the Network More Valuable 11 -- MCI's Shared Microwave Opened New Doors 20 -- Endnotes 25 -- 3 Divestiture: Equal Access and Chinese Walls 27 -- Vertical Integration 27 -- AT&T Kept Out of the Computer Industry 28 -- The Money's in Long Distance, Right? 32 -- The Centrex Revival 39 -- Digital Switching Becomes the Norm 40 -- Digitization of the Transmission Network 43 -- ISDN Fails to Make a Dent 46 -- Endnotes 53 -- 4 The Internet Boom and the Limits to Growth 57 -- The ARPAnet Was a Seminal Research Network 57 -- OSI, the Big Committee That Couldn't 62 -- Commercialization at Last 65 -- Internet Traffic Explodes as the Public Joins 69 -- ISP Pricing Creates Permanent Losses 74 -- Dotcoms Create a Demand Bubble 76 -- Carrier Hotels Created Too Much Room at the Inn 80 -- The Bubble Bursts in Equipment Manufacturers' Faces 81 -- Endnotes 83 -- 5 The Deuteronomy Networks 85 -- The Short-Term Bandwidth Crunch Invited More Suppliers 86 -- Kiewit Sells MFS, Creates Level 3 88 -- Williams Sold Wiltel, Created Another One 90 -- Metromedia Sold Cellular and Long-Haul, Created MFN 91 -- XO Communications Recycles Cellular Profits 92 -- Undersea, Undersea, Under Beautiful Sea 93 -- How Much Bandwidth Was Available? 94 -- Endnotes 96 -- 6 Losing by Winning: Wireless License Auctions 97 -- Original License Lotteries Led to Farcical Resale 99.

The Top Cellular Networks Grew to Profitability 100 -- Networks Go Digital 101 -- The PCS Auction Was a Success 103 -- "3G" Combined the Allure of Both Internet and Wireless 105 -- Many Large Incumbents Were Left With Huge Debt 109 -- Endnotes 109 -- 7 Competitive Access Providers, the Costly Way to Local Competition 111 -- RBOC Prices to Large Customers Were Out of Line 111 -- States Supported RBOC Monopolies More Than the FCC Did 113 -- Teleport Cracks the NYNEX Monopoly 114 -- Competitors Outrace RBOCs to Provide Local Fiber-Optic Connections 115 -- The Telecom Act Opens Local Service Competition 117 -- Fixed Wireless as an Alternative to Fiber? 119 -- Hybrid Fiber-Coax (HFC) Gave Cable Providers an Advantage on "Triple Play" 122 -- Endnotes 130 -- 8 DLECs and ELECs: An Exercise in Oversupply 133 -- DSL First Failed as a Video Offering 134 -- The Telecom Act Invites Novel Use of Unbundled Loops 134 -- Capital Poisoning Led DLECs to Overexpand 136 -- Ethernet LECs Were Data CAPs 140 -- Endnotes 142 -- 9 CLECs' Winning Strategies Are Met by Rule Changes 145 -- The Telecom Act Anticipated CAPs and Resellers 146 -- Initial Strategies for Serving "Classical" Voice Business 149 -- The ISP Dial-In Business and CLECs: A Match Made in Heaven 152 -- New Generation Switching Equipment Lowered Capital Costs 159 -- UNE-P Dominated CLEC Statistical Growth 162 -- Role Reversal: States Become Champions of Competition 166 -- Endnotes 167 -- 10 Focusing on the Bottom Line 169 -- Asset Valuation is Risky 170 -- Accounting Was Scandalous 171 -- New Services Need to Fit Into a Food Chain 174 -- Competitive Realities Will Change 176 -- Endnotes 178 -- List of Acronyms 179 -- About the Author 187 -- Index 189.