CONTENTS -- Preface -- Introduction -- Part I Belief -- 1 Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Simple Conditional Functions -- 1.3 A Problem with Simple Conditional Functions -- 1.4 Ordinal Conditional Functions -- 1.5 Conditionalization and Generalized Conditionalization -- 1.6 Independence and Conditional Independence -- 1.7 Connections with Probability Theory -- 1.8 Discussion -- Part II Causation -- 2 Direct and Indirect Causes -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Conceptual and Formal Framework -- 2.3 Direct Causes -- 2.4 The Circumstances of Direct Causes -- 2.5 The Difficulties with Indirect Causation -- 2.6 Causation -- 3 Causation: An Alternative -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Variables, Propositions, Time -- 3.3 Induction First -- 3.4 Causation -- 3.5 Redundant Causation -- 3.6 Objectivization -- 4 Bayesian Nets Are All There Is to Causal Dependence -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Causal Graphs and Bayesian Nets -- 4.3 About the Causal Import of Bayesian Nets -- 4.4 Actions and Interventions -- 5 Causal Laws Are Objectifications of Inductive Schemes -- 5.1 Is Causation Objective? -- 5.2 Induction -- 5.3 Causation -- 5.4 An Explication of Objectification -- 5.5 The Objectification of Induction and Causation -- 5.6 Outlook -- Part III Laws -- 6 Laws, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, and the Dynamics of Belief -- 6.1 Preparations -- 6.2 Ranking Functions -- 6.3 Laws -- 6.4 Other Things Being Equal, Normal, or Absent -- 6.5 On the Confirmation of Laws -- 6.6 Some Comparative Remarks -- 7 Enumerative Induction and Lawlikeness -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Ranking Functions -- 7.3 Symmetry and Non-negative Instantial Relevance -- 7.4 Laws -- 7.5 Laws and Enumerative Induction -- 7.6 The Apriority of Lawfulness -- 8 Chance and Necessity: From Humean Supervenience to Humean Projection -- 8.1 Introduction.

8.2 Chance-Credence Principles -- 8.3 The Admissibility of Historic and Chance Information -- 8.4 The Admissibility of Chance Information and Humean Supervenience -- 8.5 Humean Supervenience -- 8.6 Projection Turns the Principal Principle into a Special Case of the Reflection Principle -- 8.7 Humean Projection -- 8.8 Appendix on Ranking Functions and Deterministic Laws: The Same All Over Again -- Part IV Coherence -- 9 A Reason for Explanation: Explanations Provide Stable Reasons -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Induction and Causation -- 9.3 Causation and Explanation -- 9.4 Reason and Truth -- 9.5 Explanations and Stable Reasons -- 10 Two Coherence Principles -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Reasons -- 10.3 Two Coherence Principles -- 10.4 Justifying the Coherence Principles via Enumerative Induction? -- 10.5 Justifying the Coherence Principles via the Essence of Propositions? -- 10.6 Justifying the Coherence Principles via Consciousness? -- 10.7 Justifying the Coherence Principles via a Theory of Perception -- 11 How to Understand the Foundations of Empirical Belief in a Coherentist Way -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Belief, Belief Change, Reasons, and Apriority -- 11.3 Dispositions and Reduction Sentences -- 11.4 A Thesis Concerning the Basis of Empirical Beliefs -- 11.5 Defending the Thesis -- 11.6 The Foundationalist's Last Resort? -- Part V Concepts -- 12 A Priori Reasons: A Fresh Look at Disposition Predicates -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Beliefs and Reasons -- 12.3 Kant, Kripke, Kaplan and Beliefs A Priori -- 12.4 Disposition Predicates and Reduction Sentences -- 12.5 Normal Conditions and A Priori Reasons -- 12.6 The Categorical Base of a Disposition -- 12.7 Outlook -- 13 The Character of Color Terms: A Materialist View -- 14 Concepts Are Beliefs About Essences -- 14.1 Introduction -- 14.2 The Problems Specified.

14.3 How to Define Concepts: A Proposal -- 14.4 Explanations -- 14.5 Individualism Rescued? -- 15 Changing Concepts -- 16 The Intentional Versus the Propositional Structure of Contents -- 16.1 The Thesis -- 16.2 Stage Setting -- 16.3 The Dialectical Background of the Thesis -- 16.4 Two Arguments for the Thesis and an Objection -- 16.5 The Method of Sufficiently Fine-Grained Descriptions -- 16.6 Some Afterthoughts -- Bibliography -- Name Index -- Subject Index.