Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Note on the Author -- Introduction -- Part I: Legal Paradigms -- 1 The Rise and Fall of States -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The rise and fall of civilizations - some theoretical explanations -- 1.3 The success of individual states -- 1.4 Conclusion -- 2 The Influence of Constitutional Paradigms -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The State -- 2.3 Dark Ages and mediæval Europe -- 2.4 The Reformation -- 2.5 The Industrial Revolution -- 2.6 Constitutional paradigms -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3 Hard and Soft Constitutions -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The relationship between law and government -- 3.3 Flexibility and responsiveness - The rule of law -- 3.4 Inflexibility and constitutional arteriosclerosis -- 3.5 Conclusion -- Part II: The Viability of States -- 4 Underlying Theory -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Legitimacy as a normative influence -- 4.3 The necessity for inherent strength -- 4.4 Political ideology underlying the Grundnorm -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5 Authoritarianism -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Egypt -- 5.3 Political collapse and laissez-faire economies -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6 Doctrinaire Liberalism -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Liberalism as a legal/political influence -- 6.3 Constitutions in liberal states - informal limitations in New Zealand -- 6.4 Constitutions in liberal states - a change of Grundnorm: Ireland -- 6.5 Conclusion -- 7 Empires and Supra-national Entities -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Rome -- 7.3 European Union -- 7.4 Conclusion -- 8 Mixed Models -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Modern doctrinaire liberalism and authoritarianism -- 8.3 Conclusion -- 9 Conclusions -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Flexibility and stability -- 9.3 Hard and soft constitutions, democracy and the rule of law -- 9.4 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.