Cover -- Blackwell Companions to Philosophy -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Introduction: Life and Work -- 1. Naturalism -- 2. Extensionalism -- 3. Empiricism -- 4. Naturalized Epistemology -- 5. Analyticity -- 6. Holism -- 7. Underdetermination -- 8. Radical Translation -- 9. Indeterminacy and Inscrutability -- 10. Quine's Influence on the Study of the Logical Form of Ordinary Language -- 11. Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Part I: Method -- 1: Quine and Epistemology -- 1. Empiricism, not "Empiricism" -- 2. Overcoming Traditional Distinctions -- 3. Naturalized Epistemology -- 4. The Rejection of "First Philosophy" -- References -- 2: Quine and the A Priori -- 1. Empiricism Before Quine -- 2. Quine on Analyticity -- 3. Relative Analyticity -- 4. Epistemic and Pragmatic Analyticity -- 5. Quinean Analyticity Again -- 6. Justification -- 7. A Pseudo-Problem? -- 8. Coherentism -- 9. Conservatism -- 10. Is Coherentism Justified? -- 11. A Priori Justification -- References -- 3: Quine and Pragmatism -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Influences -- 3. Belief and Action -- Acknowledgment -- References -- 4: Quine's Relationship with Analytic Philosophy -- 1. Formative Years -- 2. "What is Meaning?" -- 3. Extensionalism and the Vocabulary of Science -- 4. Real Compared to What?7 -- (1) Ontology -- (2) Realism -- 5. Conclusion -- References -- 5: Quine on Paraphrase and Regimentation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Regimentation and Synonymy -- 3. Regimentation à la Quine -- 3.1 The Language of Regimentation -- 3.2 Some Examples -- 3.3 Goals and Methodology -- 3.4 Holism -- 4. Indeterminacy of Reference and of Translation -- 4.1 Indeterminacy of Reference -- 4.2 Ontological Relativity: Indeterminacy under Another Name -- 4.3 Indeterminacy of Translation -- 5. Questions About Regimentation -- 5.1 Alston's Worry -- 5.2 Why Regiment?.

6. Conclusion -- References -- 6: Quine's Naturalism -- 1. Methodological versus Ontological Naturalism -- 2. Naturalized Epistemology -- 3. Naturalism and Scientism -- 4. Demarcation Disputes -- 5. Naturalism and Disciplinary Autonomy -- 6. Naturalism and Reductionism -- 7. Observationality -- 8. Synonymy and Verification -- 9. Anti-Reductionist Naturalism -- 10. Conclusion -- References -- 7: Quine's Naturalism Revisited -- Acknowledgments -- References -- Part II: Language -- 8: Inscrutability Scrutinized -- 1. Terminology -- 2. Inscrutability of Reference -- 3. Indeterminacy of Meaning -- 4. The Relation of Inscrutability to Indeterminacy -- References -- 9: Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction -- 1. Making Sense of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" -- The Circularity Argument -- Kinds of Meaning -- The Argument from Confirmation Holism -- A Second Picture -- A Third Picture -- 2. Arguments Against Truth in Virtue of Meaning -- Definitions Don't Ground Truth -- Conventionalism and the Sentence/Proposition Distinction -- 3. Conclusion -- References -- 10: Quine, Analyticity, and Transcendence -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Verificationism: Radical and Subtle -- 3. Transcendent Semantics5 -- 4. Clarifications and Qualifications -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 11: Indeterminacy, Relativity, and Behaviorism -- 1. Radical Translation -- 2. Evaluating the Indeterminacy Claim -- 3. Ontological Relativity -- 4. Quine's Behaviorism -- 5. Concluding Remarks -- 12: Indeterminacy of Translation -- 1. Historical Background -- 2. What Is Indeterminacy of Translation? -- 3. Behaviorism -- 4. Consequences of Indeterminacy -- 5. Quine's Arguments for the Thesis -- 6. Objections -- References -- 13: Developments in Quine's Behaviorism -- 1. Quine on His Early Behaviorism -- 2. What is Behaviorism? -- 3. Why Behaviorism? -- 4. Social Nature of Language.

5. Quine on Radical Translation -- 6. Stimuli -- 7. Davidson: Maximize Agreement -- 8. Davidson: Triangulation -- 9. Quine on the Distal and the Proximal -- 10. Reception versus Perception -- 11. Receptual Difference - Perceptual Similarity -- 12. Preestablished Harmony -- 13. Perceptual Similarity and Natural Selection -- 14. Sameness and Distinctness -- 15. Individuation -- 16. Quine and Husserl -- 17. What Then Happened to Quine's Behaviorism? -- Acknowledgments -- Part III: Logic, Mathematics, Science -- 14: Quine's Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics -- 1. A Priori Knowledge: Kant to Carnap -- 2. A Priori Knowledge: Quine vs Carnap -- 3. Abstract Objects: The Scope of Logic and "Ontological Commitment" -- 4. Abstract Objects: Nominalism and the "Indispensability Argument" -- 5. Abstract Objects: From Nominalism to Naturalism -- References -- 15: Bolzano, Quine, and Logical Truth -- Acknowledgment -- References -- 16: Quine on Observationality -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Milestones -- The Preliminary Period -- The Word and Object Period -- The Middle Period -- The Late Quine -- Summing up Quine's Development Regarding Observation and Observationality -- 3. Discussions and Evaluations - Perspectives and Comparisons - Past and Future -- Looking Back: British Empiricists and Carnap -- Looking Forward: Davidson, Fodor, and Burge -- 4. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- 17: Observation -- 1. Observation Sentences -- 2. The Two Types of Observation Sentence -- 3. Introspection -- 4. Roles of Experience -- 5. Stimulations as Evidence -- Acknowledgments -- 18: Quine on Evidence -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Interpretations and Criticisms: Kim and Davidson -- 3. "Epistemology Naturalized" Reconsidered -- 4. After "Epistemology Naturalized": The Theory-Evidence Relation -- 19: Quine on Reference and Quantification -- 1. The Nature and Origin of Reference.

2. Defining Reference -- 3. Quantifiers, Logic, and Regimentation -- 4. The Restriction to First-Order -- 5. Quantification into Opaque Contexts -- 6. Ontological Commitment -- 7. Reference and Quantification -- Part IV: Relation to Other Philosophers -- 20: Quine and Russell -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Historical Preliminaries -- 3. The Grades of Modal Involvement -- 4. Modal Paradox -- 5. The Bigger Picture: Holism and Reductionism -- 6. Descriptions, Attitudes, and Scope -- 7. Relational Modality? -- 8. On What There Is -- 9. Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- 21: The Place of Quine in Analytic Philosophy -- 1. The Logical Empiricist Background -- 2. Quine's "Truth by Convention" -- 3. Quine's Battle Against Quantified Modal Logic -- 4. Analyticity, Necessity, and Meaning -- 5. On What There Is: Quine, Carnap, and Ontology -- 6. The Road to Word and Object -- 7. Meaning and Translation -- 8. The Inscrutability of Reference -- 9. Quine's Self-Refuting Eliminativism -- 10. Analytic Philosophy After Quine -- References -- 22: Quine's Naturalistic Explication of Carnap's Logic of Science -- 1. Carnap's Logic of Science -- 2. Quine on Truth by Convention and Analyticity -- 3. Quine's Pragmatism and the Doctrinal Side of Epistemology -- 4. Quine's Naturalism and the Conceptual Side of Epistemology -- Acknowledgments -- References -- 23: Quine and Chomsky on the Ins and Outs of Language -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Study of Language -- 3. Two Conceptions of Language -- 4. Behaviorism, Language, and Linguistics -- 5. Publicity of Meaning and Internal Syntax? -- References -- 24: Quine's Conception of Explication - and Why It Isn't Carnap's -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Carnapian Explication: Exactness, Tolerance, and the Dissolution of Metaphysical Disputes -- 3. Quine's Conception of Explication -- References -- 25: The Relation between Quine and Davidson.

1. A Common Background: Logical Positivism and American Pragmatism -- 2. Naturalism -- 3. Language, Meaning, and Use -- 4. Truth -- 5. Meaning and Radical Interpretation -- 6. A "Third Dogma" of Empiricism? -- 7. Matters of Mind -- References -- 26: Quine and the Revival of Metaphysics -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Quine on Reification -- 3. Quinean Metaphysics: The Case for Classes -- 4. Neo-Quinean Metaphysics: The Case for Modal Realism -- 5. Non-Quinean Metaphysics -- References -- Name Index -- Subject Index.