Contents -- Preface -- About the Volume Editor -- List of Contributors -- Part 1: Accounting Information for Group Management and Management Control System -- Management Accounting Information for Consolidated Group Management Kazuki Hamada -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Role of Group Headquarters and Three Types of Group Management -- 2.1. The importance of "management of dispersion and unification" -- 2.2. The three types of group management and the roles of the group headquarters -- 2.3. Functions of the group headquarters -- 3. Group Management and Management Accounting Information -- 3.1. Group performance accounting -- 3.2. Characteristics of performance accounting information that are useful for group management -- 4. Example of Using a Performance Evaluation System for Group Management -- 5. Using Management Accounting Information to Generate Synergies -- 6. Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Management Control Systems of Japanese Pure Holding Companies Makoto Tomo, Makoto Yori and Takayuki Asada -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Significance and the Purpose of the Study -- 3. The Meaning and the Purpose of a Pure HD System -- 4. Organizational Restructuring -- 4.1. The pattern of organizational restructuring -- 4.2. The purpose of organizational restructuring -- 5. The Result of Field Study of Pure HD System -- 5.1. Portfolio type -- 5.2. Restructuring type -- 5.3. Hybrid type -- 6. Organizational Structure of Pure HD, and Relation of Authority -- 6.1. The layered organizational structure -- 6.2. Going public of a core business subsidiary, and the conglomerate discount -- 6.3. Dividend policies to holding company and subsidiary's earning retention place -- 6.4. Division of profits into stakeholders -- 7. Summary and Future Tasks -- References -- Part 2: M&A Including MBO and Outsourcing for Group Reformation.

Influence of M&A on Financial Performance: Measuring the Performance of M&A from Sustainability of Utility Kozo Suzuki -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Effects of M&A -- 3. The Outline of the Verification Method and Questionnaire -- 4. Creation of Analytic Models -- 5. Characteristics of the Relationship Between Cost Reduction, Performance, and Financial Indicators in M&A -- 6. Amended Model -- 7. The Result of Verification -- 8. Conclusion -- References -- Appendix 1 -- Management Buyout of a Japanese Business Group Naoyuki Kaneda -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Financial Difficulties and Restructuring at Nissan Motor Company -- 3. Corporate Governance and MBOs -- 4. Vantec, a Logistics Company -- 5. Zero, An Automobile Carrier2 -- Endnotes -- References -- Managerial Significance of Strategic Outsourcing Shunzo Matsuoka -- 1. Introduction -- 2. A Change in the Purpose of Outsourcing -- 2.1. Outsourcing for speed and value added -- 2.2. Introduction of new services through outsourcing -- 3. The Organization and Risk Reduction -- 3.1. Source of the competition's predominance turns from tangible assets to knowledge assets -- 3.2. Reduction in capital investments -- 3.3. Streamlining the administrative body -- 4. Essentials of Strategic Outsourcing -- 4.1. Construction of the core competence -- 4.2. Value creation outsourcing -- 4.3. Source of the competition's predominance: from a thing to a person -- 5. Issues of Quality in Outsourcing -- 5.1. Quality becomes the black box -- 5.2. Customer satisfaction shifts from cost to quality -- 6. Outsourcing is Not a Panacea -- 7. Total Optimization Rather Than Partial Optimization is Important -- 8. Summaries -- Further Readings -- Acquisition Price as an Incentive Price of M&A Yasuhiro Monden -- 1. Research Purpose: How Can the Purchase Price of M&A Function as Incentive to Merger?.

2. Sources and Result of Synergy Effect: Innovation for Supply and Demand Balancing by M&A -- 3. Control-Premium -- 4. Allocation of Synergy Effect Based on the Purchase Price and Acquisition Premium -- 5. Calculation Method of Merger Ratio -- 5.1. Process of acquisition -- 5.2. Calculation method of merger ratio -- 6. Role of Stock Price in Calculating the Merger Ratio -- 7. Formula for Synergy Effect Allocation and Determination of Acquisition Price -- 8. Market Transaction and Intra-Organizational Transaction for M&A -- 8.1. M&A through market transaction -- 8.2. M&A through intra-organizational transaction -- 9. Condition for Realizing M&A Agreement Under the Theory of Cooperative Game -- 10. Conclusion: Other Factors in the Real World -- Endnotes -- References -- Part 3: Analysis of Accounting Information for Consolidated and Business Group and Segmental Business Units -- Consolidated Accounting Information for Business Group Management Manabu Takano -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Differences between Institutional Consolidated Accounting Information and Consolidated Accounting Information for Business Group Management -- 2.1. Scope of consolidation -- 2.2. Types of consolidated accounting information -- 3. Information on Consolidated Accounting that is Indispensable for Business Group Management -- 3.1. Consolidated financial statements by business -- 3.2. Performance evaluation index -- 4. Case Study: Canon Inc. -- 4.1. Adoption of the consolidated divisional organization -- 4.2. Performance determination system for each consolidated operational headquarters -- 5. Conclusion -- References -- Business Evaluation of a Company Group in Japan: A Case Study of Segment Reporting by Panasonic Electric Works Shufuku Hiraoka -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Organizational Innovation and the Management Approach -- 3. Measuring the Entire WACC.

4. Measuring the WACC of Each Business Segment -- 5. The First Method of Measuring Each Segment's Economic Profit -- 6. The Second Method for Measuring Each Segment's Economic Profit -- 7. Conclusion -- References -- Part 4: Management of Inter-Firm Relations -- How Can Management Accounting Achieve Goal Congruence Among Supply Chain Partners? Yoshiteru Minagawa -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Literature Review -- 2.1. The SCOR-model -- 2.2. Inter-firm cost management -- 2.3. Time-driven activity-based costing -- 3. Managing Supply Chain Opportunism -- 3.1. Opportunism in supply chains -- 3.2. Controlling supply chain opportunism -- 4. Effects of Management Accounting on Goal Congruence in Supply Chains -- 5. Effects of ABC on Supply Chain Integration -- 6. Using the BSC System to Promote Goal Congruence -- 7. Revenue Sharing in Supply Chains -- 7.1. Precedence in studies -- 7.2. Revenue sharing based on ABC -- 8. Concluding Remarks -- Endnotes -- References -- How to Maintain the Bargaining Position Defined in Toyota's Dealership Control Hiroshi Ozawa -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Framework: Production Quantity Budget and Sales Quantity Budget in Toyota -- 3. Example Relating to Production Quantity Budget and Order Quantity Budget4 -- 4. Management of Toyota's Distributors in Japan -- 4.1. Business structure that enables tight control -- 4.1.1. Monopoly system -- 4.1.2. Franchise system -- 4.1.3. One region, one distributor system -- 4.2. Control of distributors through incentives -- 4.2.1. Sales incentive -- 4.2.2. Product allocation policy -- 5. Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Endnotes -- References -- Royalties and Profit Sharing: Focusing on Seven-Eleven Japan Co., Ltd. Noriko Hoshi -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Convenience-Store Royalties -- 2.1. Mechanism of the franchise system -- 2.2. The bases of the royalty calculation -- 3. Sales Cost and Amount of Loss.

3.1. Relationship between the cost of goods sold and the amount of loss -- 3.2 Dissatisfaction of franchisees with the accounting treatment of the amount of loss -- 4. Gross-Profit Sharing System for Convenience Stores -- 4.1. Interpretation of the gross-profit sharing system -- 4.2. Role of the franchisee -- 5. Disposal Loss and Risk Sharing -- 5.1. Optimum sharing of disposal loss -- 5.2. Risk sharing of disposal loss -- 6. Conclusion -- References -- Factors Influencing Control Mechanisms in Joint Ventures: Evidence from Japanese Manufacturing Industries Yuichi Kubota -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Conceptual Framework and Literature Review -- 2.1. Transaction characteristics -- 2.2. Relational characteristics -- 2.3. Control characteristics -- 2.4. Research model and expectations -- 3. Research Method -- 3.1. Sample -- 3.2. Variable measurement -- 4. Results and Discussion -- 5. Concluding Remarks -- Acknowledgement -- References -- Does Inter-Firm Cooperation Contribute to the Performance of Japanese Firms? Junya Sakaguchi -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Actual State of Inter-Firm Cooperation -- 3. Relationship between Inter-Firm Cooperation and Performance -- 4. Conclusion -- References -- Concept of Incentive Price for Motivating Inter-Firm Cooperation Yasuhiro Monden -- 1. The Purpose of This Paper -- 2. Comparison of the Incentive Price and the Price for Supply and Demand Equilibrium: Numerical Examples -- 2.1. Problem setting -- 2.2. "Supply and demand equilibrium price" when the resource demand exceeds its supply -- 2.3. "Incentive price" when the resource demand exceeds the resource supply -- 2.4. "Supply and demand equilibrium price" when the resource supply exceeds its demand -- 2.5. "Incentive price" when the resource supply exceeds the resource demand -- 3. Problem of the Supply-Demand Equilibrium Price: Redundant Decentralized Decisions.

3.1. Opportunity cost of the constrained resource and the transfer price.