Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Introduction - Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind -An Overview -- 1. Neurophysiology of Action and Decision -- 2. General Psychology of Action -- 3. Moral Physiology -- 4. Moral Psychology -- 5. Overview of the Present Volume -- REFERENCES -- PART I - Free Will, Responsibility and the Naturalised Mind -- Naturalizing Free Will -Empirical and Conceptual Issues -- 1. Naturalization -- 2. Naturalizing Freedom -- 3. Freedom and Determinism - the Conceptual Objection -- 3.1 Conceptual Requirements -- 3.2 Self-Determination -- 3.3 The Self -- 3.4 Determinism -- 4. Empirical Results -- 5. Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- Libet's Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Libet's Experiments -- 3. Causal Interpretation of Libet's Experiments -- 4. Critique of Libet's Experiments and Their Interpretation -- 4.1. The Time of W - Still Unclear -- 4.2. The Interpretation of W - An Urge but not an Intention -- 4.3. The Prior Physiological "Determination" of the Action - Not Determining -- 4.4. The Action Type 'Flexing a Finger' - Not Revealing for "Real" Decisions -- 4.5. The Theory - No Explanation of Decisions -- 5. The Power of Intentions - A Revision of Simplistic Versions of Intentional Causalism -- 6. Free Decisions - Despite Unconscious Preparation -- REFERENCES -- The Effectiveness of Intentions - A Critique of Wegner -- 1. A Challenge to the Intentional-causalist Conception of Action and the Aim of this Chapter -- 2. Prelude - The Concepts of 'Conscious Will' and 'Empirical Will' -- 3. Wegner's Theory of the Experience and Illusion of Conscious Will -- 4. The Illusion Theses' Relying on Libet -- 5. Practical Consequences of the Constructivism of Our Control Experience -- 6. Conclusion -- REFERENCES.

PART II - Naturalising Ethics? Metaethical Perspectives -- Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide -- 1. Basic features of neurosentimentalism -- 2. Moral reflection and moral agency -- 3. Emotions as conditions and motives -- 4. Sentimentalism, rationalism and moral realism -- 5. Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- Experimental Ethics - A Critical Analysis -- 1. Experimental ethics as a kind of experimental philosophy -- 2. On the unreliability of moral intuitions -- 2.1 From the philosophical point of view -- 2.2 From the psychological point of view -- 3. The role of explanation in experimental ethics -- 3.1 Aspects of explanation in experimental ethics -- 3.2 Explanation as a substitute for philosophical justification -- 4. Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- PART III - Naturalised Ethics? Empirical Perspectives -- Moral Soulfulness & Moral Hypocrisy - Is Scientific Study of Moral Agency Relevant to Ethical Reflection? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Exchanging reasons -- 3. Moral Hypocrisy versus Moral Integrity -- 4. Moral Hypocrisy? -- 5. Moral Soulfulness -- 6. Conclusion -- REFERENCES -- PART IV - Neuroethics Which Values? -- The Rationale Behind Surgery - Truth, Facts, Values -- 1. Semantic preliminary -- 2. Sickness as natural processes -- 3. Rationale of surgery -- 4. Rationale of brain surgery -- 5. Truth, facts and values in the rationale of surgery -- Biographical Notes on the Authors -- Name Index.