The Political Accountability of EU and us Independent Regulatory Agencies -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- List of Tables, Boxes, and Figures -- List of Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction: The Political Accountability of EU Agencies -- 1.1 The Focus of the Book -- 1.2 Concepts, Challenges, and Methods -- 1.2.1 Defining, Investigating, and Assessing Political Accountability -- 1.2.2 Challenges in Studying the Political Accountability of EU Agencies -- 1.2.3 Method -- 1.2.4 Sources -- 1.2.5 Structure of the Book -- 2 Holding EU Agencies to Political Account -- 2.1 Introducing the Council, the European Parliament, and EU Agencies -- 2.1.1 The Council and the European Parliament -- 2.1.2 EU Agencies -- 2.2 Investigating the Political Accountability of EU Agencies -- 2.2.1 Creation of and Delegation to EU agencies: At the EU Legislator's Discretion -- 2.2.2 Appointment and Removal Procedures of EU agencies' Top Officials: A Playground for Political Influences -- 2.2.3 Accountability through Statutory Regulation: Theory and Practice of Reporting and Review Clauses -- 2.2.4 Financial Oversight: A Well-established Accountability Venue -- 2.2.5 Scrutinizing EU Agencies' Performance: An Accountability Venue in Development -- 2.2.6 The 'Common Approach' on the Operation of EU Agencies: Going Forward or Standing Still? -- 2.3 Assessing the Political Accountability of EU Agencies -- 2.3.1 Availability of Accountability Mechanisms: Harmful Implications of Diverse Accountability Obligations -- 2.3.2 'Unconsciousness' of Design of Accountability Provisions -- 2.3.3 Practical Application of Accountability Provisions: Facing a Number of Challenges -- 3 Holding us Independent Regulatory Agencies to Political Account -- 3.1 Introducing the US Congress and US Independent Regulatory Agencies -- 3.1.1 The US Congress.

3.1.2 US Independent Regulatory Agencies -- 3.2 Investigating the Political Accountability of US Independent Regulatory Agencies -- 3.2.1 Creation of and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: At Congress's Will -- 3.2.2 The Law and Politics of Appointing and Removing IRAS' Commissioners -- 3.2.3 Accountability through Statutory regulation of Agencies' Performance: Learning and Cautionary Experiences -- 3.2.4 The Annual Appropriations Process: 'The Accountability Venue' -- 3.2.5 Congressional Oversight: Strengths and Challenges -- 3.3 Assessing the Political Accountability of US Independent Regulatory Agencies -- 3.3.1 The Availability of Accountability Mechanisms: A Solid Arsenal Applicable to All -- 3.3.2 The 'Consciousness' of Design of Accountability Mechanisms -- 3.3.3 The Practical Application of Accountability Mechanisms: Challenges and Solutions -- 4 The Political Accountability of iras in the EU and the US Compared -- 4.1 The Availability of Accountability Mechanisms: Diversity Vs. Uniformity -- 4.1.1 Similar Accountability Mechanisms -- 4.1.2 Similar Mechanisms but Different Approaches -- 4.1.3 Diversity vs. Uniformity -- 4.2 The Design of Accountability Mechanisms: Specificity and Interplay -- 4.2.1 Specificity of Accountability Obligations: Balancing between too Few and too Many Details and Obligations -- 4.2.2 Interplay between Accountability Mechanisms: Something for Future Consideration in the EU -- 4.3 The Practical Application of Accountability Mechanisms: Partial Relevance of the US Experiences -- 4.3.1 Addressing the Challenges to Parliamentary Oversight -- 4.3.2 Addressing the Challenges to Using Sanctioning Tools -- 5 The Political Accountability of EU Agencies: 'The Way Forward' -- 5.1 The Necessity of a Treaty Provision.

5.2 The Necessity of a Legally-binding Framework Based 0n a Streamlining Approach (S, M, and L Models) -- 5.3 The Necessity to Render Account for Holding EU Agencies to Account -- 6 Reflections and Prospects -- Reference List -- A Table of Text and Periodical Citations -- B Table of Cases -- C Reports and Other Official Documents -- Appendix 1 The Political Accountability Arrangements of 35 EU Agencies -- Appendix 2 European Parliament's Committees Scrutinizing EU Agencies -- Appendix 3 The Political Accountability Arrangements of 16 US Independent Regulatory Agencies -- Index.