Preface -- List of figures -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Reference and categorization -- 1.2 Cognitive linguistics -- 1.3 Non-focussed objectives -- 1.4 Overview -- 2 Philosophical issues in reference and truth -- 2.1 Prom intension to extension -- 2.2 The inextricability vs. the inscrutability of language -- 2.3 The collective achievement of intensions -- 2.4 The acquisition of knowledge and language -- 2.5 Joining referential realism with referential holism -- 2.6 Wittgenstein's empirical fallacy -- 2.7 From linguistic object to the objective subject -- 2.8 Intersubjectivizing empirical knowledge -- 2.9 Mutual knowledge vs. relevance -- 2.10 Chomsky's empirical paradox -- 2.11 Linguistic competence as the atomistic residue -- 2.12 The mind as a black box -- 2.13 The encyclopedic unity of linguistic knowledge -- 2.14 Conclusion -- 3 Psychological theories of reference and categorization -- 3.1 Gibson's approach to ecological realism -- 3.2 Neisser's ecological approach -- 3.3 Piaget's constructivism -- 3.4 Johnson-Laird's mental model theory -- 3.5 Conclusion -- 4 Selecting the psychological model of reference -- 4.1 The economical abstraction of prototypes -- 4.2 The economical processing of prototypes -- 4.3 The semantic priority of information processing -- 4.4 Categorization and reference -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5 Representing mental categorization -- 5.1 The speakers' VOLITION -- 5.2 Prototypes and schemata -- 5.3 Centre vs. periphery of a conceptual region -- 5.4 Linguistic vs. encyclopedic meaning -- 5.5 Top-down inheritance -- 5.6 Categorization and the continuity of reference -- 5.7 Categorization and referential integration -- 5.8 The hierarchical representation of categorization -- 5.9 Schematizing along the conceptual type hierarchy -- 5.10 The unification-based formalism -- 5.11 Distinguishing lexical vagueness from polysemy.

5.12 Different types of lexical vagueness -- 5.13 Polysemy across basic cognitive domains -- 5.14 The lexical representation of basic cognitive domains -- 5.15 Autonomous vs. dependent predications -- 5.16 Conclusion -- 6 Domains of the conceptual type hierarchy -- 6.1 Nominal predications -- 6.2 Relational predications -- 6.3 Conclusion -- 7 Representing discourse domains -- 7.1 Schemata, frames, and scripts -- 7.2 Discourse representation by mental models -- 7.3 Relating image schemata and mental models -- 7.4 Inferring implicit information -- 7.5 Conclusion -- 8 Metonymy and metaphor as universals -- 8.1 Metonymy as domain representation -- 8.2 Langacker's billiard-ball model -- 8.3 Metaphors as extensions across domains -- 8.4 Metaphorical models of abstract domains -- 8.5 Conclusion -- 9 Contextual functions -- 9.1 The interaction between lexicon and grammar -- 9.2 Contextual selection -- 9.3 Contextual configuration -- 9.4 Contextual shift -- 9.5 Contextual inference -- 9.6 Conclusion -- 10 Representing token vs. type reference -- 10.1 Reference as a cross-linguistic phenomenon -- 10.2 The functional unity of reference -- 10.3 Reference to an instance of a type -- 10.4 Reference in different valency relations -- 10.5 Type reference to prototypes -- 10.6 Type reference against the profile-base relation -- 10.7 Type reference to COUNT entities -- 10.8 Conclusion -- 11 General conclusions and perspectives -- 11.1 Achievements of this work -- 11.2 Perspectives -- References -- Index.