Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Cognitive Models of Science -- 1. Models from Cognitive Psychology -- 2. Models from Artificial Intelligence -- 3. Models from Neuroscience -- 4. Between Logic and Sociology -- 5. Critique and Replies -- PART I: MODELS FROM COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY -- How Do Scientists Think? Capturing the Dynamics of Conceptual Change in Science -- The Scene -- The Question -- The Problem -- The Path to Solution -- 1. What Is "Cognitive-Historical" Analysis? -- 2. What Would a Cognitive Theory of Conceptual Change in Science Look Like? -- 3. Abstraction Techniques and Conceptual Change -- 4. Wider Implications -- 5. Return To Galloway -- The Scene -- The Problem -- The Procedural Turn -- or, Why Do Thought Experiments Work? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Exemplary Science -- 3. Recovering Reconstruction -- 4. The Procedural Turn -- 5. Representing Experimental Paths -- 6. Experimental Reasoning -- 7. Comparing Narratives -- 8. Why Do Thought Experiments Work? -- Serial and Parallel Processing in Scientific Discovery -- 1. Serial and Parallel Processing -- 2. A Specific Case -- 3. ECHO in the Dark -- 4. Some Moral Lessons -- The Origin and Evolution of Everyday Concepts -- 1. Local Incommensurability -- 2. Five Reasons to Doubt Incommensurability between Children and Adults -- 3. The Evidence -- 4. Weight, Density, Matter, Material Kind -- 5. Conclusions -- Conceptual Change within and across Ontological Categories: Examples from Learning and Discovery in Science -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Conceptual Change across Ontological Categories -- 3. Conceptual Change within an Ontological Category -- 4. Conclusion -- Information, Observation, and Measurement from the Viewpoint of a Cognitive Philosophy of Science -- 1. Scales of Measurement and Information -- 2. Observation, Measurement, and Information.

3. Observation: From Sensations to Sentences -- 4. Kinds of Theoreticity -- 5. A Program and a Conjecture -- Foundationalism Naturalized -- 1. Foundationalist Theories of Conscious Knowledge -- 2. A Foundationalist Theory of Conscious and Unconscious Knowledge -- 3. The Knowing Organism as an Association -- 4. Final Remarks -- PART II: MODELS FROM ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE -- The Airplane and the Logic of Invention -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Why Did the Wright Brothers Invent the Airplane? -- 3. Conclusions -- Strategies for Anomaly Resolution -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Anomalies and Scientific Reasoning -- 3. Previous Work on Anomalies -- 4. Strategies for Anomaly Resolution -- 5. Representation and Implementation of Anomaly Resolution in Genetics -- 6. Conclusion -- Copernicus, Ptolemy, and Explanatory Coherence -- 1. Explanatory Coherence -- 2. Ptolemy and Copernicus -- 3. Ptolemy: Evidence and Hypotheses -- 4. Copernicus: Hypotheses and Explanations -- 5. Running Echo -- 6. Is Echo Necessary? -- 7. Conclusion -- Appendixes: Input to Echo for Simulation of Copernicus vs. Ptolemy -- Appendix A: Evidence Propositions -- Appendix B: Hypotheses in the Ptolemy-Copernicus Simulation -- Appendix C: Explanations and Contradictions in the Ptolemy-Copernicus Simulation -- Understanding Scientific Controversies from a Computational Perspective: The Case of Latent Learning -- 1. Latent-learning Study -- 2. Explanatory Coherence by Harmany Optimization -- 3. Results -- 4. Discussion -- Appendix: Inputs to ECHO. 2 for the Simulation of the Latent-learning Controversy -- PART III: MODELS FROM NEUROSCIENCE -- A Deeper Unity: Some Feyerabendian Themes in Neurocomputational Form -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Neural Nets: An Elementary Account -- 3. Epistemological Issues in Neurocomputational Guise -- 4. Conclusion -- PART IV: BETWEEN LOGIC AND SOCIOLOGY.

Answers to Philosophical and Sociological Uses of Psychologism in Science Studies: A Behavioral Psychology of Science -- 1. The General Problem and the Psychologism Objection -- 2. Epistemology from the Standpoint of Radical Behaviorism -- 3. Summary and Conclusions -- Simulating Social Epistemology: Experimental and Computational Approaches -- 1. Two Types of Validity -- 2. Two Types of Experimental Research -- 3. Computational Simulation: An Alternate Approach -- 4. Experimental Social Epistemology: Toward a Research Program -- 5. Conclusions -- Epistemology Radically Naturalized: Recovering the Normative, the Experimental, and the Social -- 1. The Scope of Social Epistemology -- 2. Naturalizing Knowledge and Cognition: Momentum Lost and Regained -- 3. Churchland and the Limits of Radical Naturalism -- 4. The Limited Naturalism of Experimental Psychology -- 5. The Limits of Naturalism in Analytic Epistemology -- 6. The Limited Naturalism of Ethnomethodology -- 7. Towards an Experimental Constructivist Sociology of Science -- PART V: CRITIQUE AND REPLIES -- CRITIQUE -- Invasion of the Mind Snatchers -- REPLIES TO GLYMOUR -- Reconceiving Cognition -- What the Cognitive Study of Science Is Not -- Computing Coherence -- Contributors -- Index of Authors -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z -- Index of Subjects -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.