Democratic constitutional design and public policy analysis and evidence
Title:
Democratic constitutional design and public policy analysis and evidence
Author:
Congleton, Roger D.
ISBN:
9780262270731
9780262033497
9780262532808
Publication Information:
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2006.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (viii, 373 p.) : ill.
General Note:
Papers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies.
Contents:
Introduction : Rational choice politics and institutions / Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg -- Direct democracy : designing a living constitution / Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer -- Constitutions and economic policy / Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini -- Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system / Thomas Stratmann -- The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies / Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo -- On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability / Roger D. Congleton -- Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy / John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain -- Federalism : a constitutional perspective / Dennis C. Mueller -- Common tax pool problems in federal systems / Brian Knight -- Judicial independence and economic development / Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt -- Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations / Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney -- Amendment procedures and constitutional stability / Bjørn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton -- Designing constitutional stability / Barry R. Weingast.
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Electronic Access:
EBSCOhost http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=156941