Abbreviations -- Note on Citations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Symbols -- Table of Cases -- I Foundations -- Introduction -- 1 Standards of Legal Reasoning -- 1.1 Nature of Law -- 1.2 Clear Cases-Hard Cases -- 1.3 Syllogism and Deductivism -- 1.4 Scepticism: Is Rationality Possible? -- 1.4.1 Interpretative Rule Sceptics -- 1.4.2 Rule Sceptics -- 1.4.3 Moral and Problem Case Sceptics -- 1.4.4 Is There a Universal Language?-the Post-Modern Challenge -- 1.4.5 One Right Answer Thesis vs. Very Moderate Scepticism -- 1.4.6 Summary -- 1.5 Approaches Against Scepticism -- 1.5.1 Dworkin's Principle Approach -- 1.5.2 Evaluation Jurisprudence -- 1.5.3 Common Problems -- 1.5.4 Summary -- 1.6 Major Tenets of Modern Legal Theory -- 1.6.1 Coherence -- 1.6.2 Consistency -- 1.6.3 Universalizability -- 1.6.4 Defeasibility -- 1.7 Justifying Fundamental Rights and Democracy -- 1.7.1 H.L.A. Hart -- 1.7.2 Neil MacCormick -- 1.7.3 Discourse Theory -- 1.7.4 The Relationship between Law and Morals-the Special Case Thesis -- 1.8 Interpretation -- 1.8.1 Ordinary Meaning -- 1.8.2 Systematic Interpretation -- 1.8.3 Teleological Interpretation -- 1.8.4 Relevance of Interpretation for this Study -- 1.9 Case Law -- 1.9.1 Case Law in England -- 1.9.2 Case Law in Germany -- 1.9.3 Comparison -- 1.9.4 Case Law and Community Law -- 1.10 Proportionality and the Application of Fundamental Rights -- 1.10.1 Principle Theory of Fundamental Rights -- 1.10.2 Framework Model of Fundamental Rights -- 1.10.3 Summary -- 1.11 Summary -- II The Application of Fundamental Rights and the Proportionality Principle -- 2 Case Law -- 2.1 Overview -- 2.2 European Court of Human Rights -- 2.2.1 Background and Context -- 2.2.2 Margin of Appreciation and Proportionality -- 2.2.3 The Margin of Appreciation-a Desirable Doctrine? -- 2.2.4 Conclusion.

2.3 German Federal Constitutional Court -- 2.3.1 Background -- 2.3.2 The Proportionality Principle -- 2.3.3 The Court's Role and its Methods -- 2.3.4 Conclusion -- 2.4 US Supreme Court -- 2.4.1 Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review under the Constitution -- 2.4.2 Between 'Mere Rationality' and 'Strict Scrutiny' -- 2.4.3 The Role of the US Supreme Court -- 2.4.4 Conclusion -- 2.5 Summary -- 3 Case Law of the ECJ -- 3.1 Legitimate Aims -- 3.1.1 Legal Bases -- 3.1.2 Fundamental Rights -- 3.1.3 International Treaties -- 3.1.4 Summary -- 3.2 Suitability -- 3.3 Necessity -- 3.4 Proportionality in the Narrow Sense -- 3.4.1 Definition of Review Standards -- 3.4.2 The Application of the Standards -- 3.4.3 Evaluation -- 3.5 The Role of Facts -- 3.5.1 Definitions -- 3.5.2 Burden of Proof -- 3.5.3 The Precautionary Principle-Dealing with Uncertainty -- 3.5.4 Summary -- 3.6 Conclusion -- III Theoretical Treatment of Balancing -- 4 Balancing and Decision Theory -- 4.1 Instrumental Rationality and Utility Theory -- 4.1.1 Utility -- 4.1.2 Cardinal Scales -- 4.1.3 Combination of Utility with other Variables -- 4.2 Utility Theory and the Weight Formula -- 4.2.1 Why the Weight Formula Requires Cardinal Scales -- 4.2.2 Why Cardinal Scales Are Problematic -- 4.2.3 Possible Objections -- 4.2.4 Summary -- 4.3 An Alternative Vision of Individual Choice -- 4.3.1 Overview -- 4.3.2 Satisficing-General Characteristics -- 4.3.3 Priority Heuristic -- 4.3.4 Characteristics Summarized -- 4.4 Heuristics and Legal Reasoning -- 4.4.1 Connexions -- 4.4.2 Characteristics of the Heuristics Approach Summarized -- 4.5 Summary -- 5 Balancing-A Legal Perspective -- 5.1 Methodical Objections -- 5.1.1 Principle Theory and the Structure of Legal Reasoning -- 5.1.2 Cardinal Scales and Objectivity -- 5.1.3 Balancing and Dogmatic Structures -- 5.2 Separation of Powers.

5.2.1 The Relevance of the 'Separation Between Powers' Problem -- 5.2.2 The Role of Separation of Powers Arguments in Light of the Democracy Deficit -- 5.2.3 The Impact of Principle Theory on the Separation of Powers -- 5.2.4 Heightened Scrutiny of Assessments of Facts -- 5.3 The Nature of Fundamental Rights -- 5.3.1 The Analytical Distinction -- 5.3.2 Normative Aspects -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6 A Rule Based Model of Balancing -- 6.1 The Pivotal Role of Methodical Considerations -- 6.2 Justifying the Satisficing Ideal -- 6.3 Objectivity -- 6.3.1 The Standard in General -- 6.3.2 Implementation of the Standard -- 6.3.3 Justifying Minimal Standards -- 6.4 Conformity with Constitutional Requirements -- 6.4.1 Separation of Powers-Discretion in Setting Policy Goals -- 6.4.2 Standard of Protection -- 6.5 Remaining Objections -- 6.5.1 Uniformity -- 6.5.2 Really Non-Consequentialist? -- 6.5.3 Case Law Positivism? -- 6.6 The Model Summarized -- 6.7 Conclusion -- General Summary -- The Plan of this Study Revisited -- A Summary of Concrete Results-in Theses -- References -- Translations -- Index.