Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction Economics of Rivalry, Conflict and Cooperation -- Violent Conflict as a Profiteering Industry/Business -- Globalization and Diffusion of Market Principles and Homogenization of Economic Cultures -- The Dynamics of Violent Conflict -- Managing Conflicts and Promoting Peace Through Cooperation -- Section A Rivalry, Conflict and Cooperation: Lessons from the Business World -- Chapter 1 Endogenous Collusion and Rivalry: Theoretical Models and Conjectures -- 1.1 Competition and Collusion in a Segmented Industry: Introduction -- 1.2 Baseline Model -- 1.2.1 The model of a segmented banking industry in Australia -- 1.2.2 Endogenous alliance formation/merger -- 1.3 Mimicking as a Low-Cost Entrant: An Extension of the Model -- 1.3.1 Discussion -- 1.4 Measuring Endogenous Collusion: The Traditional Approach -- 1.4.1 Traditional measures of competition in the Australian banking sector -- 1.4.2 Degree of competition: Background of the conjectural variations approach -- 1.4.3 Degree of competition and conjectural variations model -- 1.4.4 The data -- 1.5 Collusion in the Australian Banking Industry -- 1.5.1 Evidence of collusion in the Australian banking industry: A simple analysis -- 1.5.2 An extension: Chaotic discrimination as a colluding strategy in the banking industry -- 1.5.3 "Chaotic discrimination" as an optimal colluding strategy: The basic model -- 1.5.4 Definitions and preliminary results -- 1.5.5 Discussion -- 1.6 Is the Collusion Feasible and Stable? -- 1.7 Why are Secret Discounts Chaotic? -- 1.8 Politics, Conjectural Variations, and Degree of Rivalry -- 1.8.1 Basics -- 1.8.2 The model -- 1.8.3 Stage II: Nature of competition in the product market -- 1.8.4 Stage I: Electoral equilibrium -- 1.8.5 Electoral equilibrium and nature of competition -- 1.8.6 Comparative statics.

1.8.6.1 Comparative statics (under alternative assumption) -- 1.8.7 Discussion and comments -- 1.9 Concluding Comments -- Appendix A -- Appendix B -- Chapter 2 Politics of Campaign Contributions, Economics of Rivalry and Endogenous Market Structures -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Model -- Stage II: Quantity competition in the duopoly -- Stage I: Strategic role of campaign contributions -- 2.3 Comparative-Static Properties -- 2.4 Campaign Contributions and Endogenous Mergers in a Myopic Model -- 2.4.1 Endogenous mergers -- 2.5 Mimicking a Low-Cost Entrant and Endogenous Mergers -- 2.6 Concluding Comments -- Chapter 3 Rivalry in Formation of Social Capital in Networks and Endogenous Social Norms -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 A Modeling of Social Capital and Formation of Group Norms -- 3.2.1 The main intuition -- 3.2.2 Preliminaries -- 3.3 Managerial Returns from Firm Size and U-Shaped Costs: Fragility and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium Integration -- 3.3.1 Sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium integration and its stability properties -- 3.3.2 Bifurcation of the equilibrium -- 3.3.3 The supermodular game of social capital and extremal equilibria and indeterminacy -- 3.4 Discussion -- 3.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 4 Economics of Cooperation in Successive Markets -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Retail and Wholesale Markets Relationships - Successive Monopolies -- 4.3 The Case of Cooperative Investment -- 4.4 Cooperative Investment Analysis -- 4.5 The Tragedy of the Commons -- 4.6 The Case of Wholesale Monopoly and Retail Duopoly -- 4.7 Comparing Outcomes of the Two Case Scenarios -- 4.8 Concluding Comments -- Appendix -- Chapter 5 Secret Price Discounts and Chaotic Discrimination and Industrial Conflicts -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Model -- 5.3 Discussion -- 5.4 Empirical Findings -- 5.4.1 Empirical methods.

5.4.2 Differences in demand elasticities -- 5.4.3 Degree of competition/rivalry in localized markets -- 5.4.4 Simple model of regression -- 5.4.5 Data sources -- 5.4.6 Results -- 5.5 Conclusion -- Chapter 6 Globalization, Market Hostility and Endogenous Mergers among Rivals -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Size Asymmetry and Endogenous Mergers: The Baseline Model -- 6.2.1 Evidence from Portugal -- 6.3 A Brief Note on the German Industry Since 1994 -- 6.4 Collection of Data and Data Sources -- 6.5 Empirics of Endogenous Merger Models in the Light of German Mergers and Concentration -- 6.6 Concluding Comments -- Appendix A -- Chapter 7 Endogenous Rivalry, Conflicts and Cooperation in Vertical Markets -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 A Static Model of Vertical Markets -- 7.2.1 An outline -- 7.2.2 The static framework -- 7.2.3 Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the duopoly in the static market -- 7.3 The Threat of Foreign Entry and Strategic Entry Deterrence -- 7.3.1 Post-entry competition in the retail market -- 7.3.2 Entry prevention by upward price distortion -- 7.4 Is Upward Price Distortion an Optimal Strategy? -- 7.4.1 The integrated home incumbent and upward price distortion -- 7.4.2 The non-integrated foreign incumbent and upward price distortion -- 7.4.3 Trigger strategy equilibrium -- 7.5 Concluding Comments -- Appendix A.1 -- Section B Rivalry, Conflict and Cooperation: Goliath against Goliath -- Chapter 8 The Art of Central Banking and Policy Conflicts -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Evolution of Central Banking -- 8.3 Inescapable Pitfalls -- 8.3.1 Inflationary bias and the conflict between rules and discretion -- 8.3.2 The trade-off between inflation and growth -- 8.3.3 On the presumed inverse relationship between central bank independence and inflation -- 8.4 Optimal Contract and Independence -- 8.5 Activism Price Stability and Accountability.

8.5.1 Activism and anticipatory monetary policy -- 8.5.2 The rationale for a dose of secrecy in central banking -- 8.6 Independence Without Accountability: The Road to Conflicts and Central Bank "Bashing" -- 8.7 Concluding Comments -- Chapter 9 Intellectual Property Rights and SIDS: Vertical Foreclosure and the Role of Ethics in Cooperation -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Intellectual Property Rights and Global Forum -- 9.3 Formalization of the Model -- 9.3.1 Ecological footprints of economic progress: The relevance of knowledge assets -- 9.3.2 Vertical markets and regulatory issues: A digression -- 9.4 The Optimal Royalty -- 9.4.1 An outline -- 9.4.2 The sequential game and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the downstream market -- 9.4.3 Stage II: Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the duopoly in the downstream market -- 9.4.4 Stage I: The optimal royalty and the perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential game -- 9.5 Comments and Discussion -- 9.6 Ethics in Cooperation: An Australian Case Study -- 9.6.1 The Competition Policy in Australia -- 9.6.2 Roles of cooperatives in Australia -- 9.7 The Impact of Australian Competition Policy on Cooperatives -- 9.8 The Australian Competition Policy and Cooperatives -- 9.9 Conflicts and Cooperatives: The Role of Ethics -- 9.9.1 Private benefits and public costs -- 9.9.2 Conflicts between insiders and outsiders -- 9.9.3 Tactical rent-seeking -- 9.9.4 Ethics, morality, and the prisoner's dilemma -- 9.10 Concluding Comments -- Chapter 10 Local Governance: Fiscal Decentralization and Conflicts in LDCs -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 The Model -- 10.2.1 Local government -- 10.2.2 Central government -- 10.2.3 Equilibrium configurations -- 10.2.4 Fiscal instability and fiscal reforms -- 10.3 Conclusion -- Chapter 11 Multinationals and Labor Unions in LDCS: Cooperation vis-à-vis Conflicts -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 The Economy.

11.2.1 The macro picture -- 11.2.2 Equilibrium national income -- 11.3 Tax Competition and Production-Location Decision of Multinationals -- 11.4 Wage Bargaining in the National Arena -- 11.5 Multinational Investment and Wage Bargaining -- 11.6 Concluding Comments -- Chapter 12 Globalization, Democratization and Urban Crises in Developing Nations -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Relevant Issues of Globalization -- 12.3 Theoretical Underpinning -- 12.4 The Model -- 12.4.1 The precise sequence of moves -- 12.4.2 Budgetary allocations of Stage II and payoffs functions -- 12.4.3 Electoral framework of Stage II -- 12.5 Conclusion -- Concluding Comments: Whither Rivalry, Conflicts and Cooperation? -- Bibliography -- Index.