Cover -- Half-title -- Series-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dediaction -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. THE NORMATIVITY CONSTRAINT -- 2. THE DEFAULT VIEW: MORAL REALISM -- 3. THE DEFAULT VIEW: MORAL NATURALISM -- 4. SOCIETY-CENTERED MORAL THEORY -- (I) The Standard-Based Account -- (II) The Society-Centered Account of Truth-Grounding Status -- (III) Constructivist and Nonconstructivist Versions of the Theory -- (IV) Morality and Society -- (V) The Relativism in Society-Centered Theory -- (VI) Objections -- 5. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK -- Part 1: Naturalism: Epistemology and Metaphysics -- 1 Why Naturalism? -- 1. G. E. MOORE ON NATURAL PROPERTIES -- 2. CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTIONS OF NATURAL PROPERTIES -- 3. NATURAL PROPERTIES AS EMPIRICAL PROPERTIES -- 4. THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI -- 5. ETHICAL NATURALISM AND THE STRONGLY A PRIORI -- 6. WHY NATURALISM? -- 7. CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- 2 Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective -- 1. FOUR EPISTEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO ETHICAL NATURALISM -- 2. WHAT IS NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY? -- 3. SUMMARY OF A NATURALISTIC THEORY -- 4. MORAL BELIEF AND NATURALISTIC TRUTH CONDITIONS -- 5. MORAL SENSITIVITY -- 6. MORAL REASONING -- 7. HOW ARE MORAL BELIEFS LINKED TO THE MORAL FACTS? -- 8. NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY REVISITED -- 9. CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- 3 Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths -- 1. THE ISSUE -- 2. MORAL NATURALISM -- 3. THE IDEA OF A SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION -- 4. SELF-EVIDENCE AND SYNTHETIC TRUTHS -- 5. SELF-EVIDENCE AND THE A PRIORI -- 6. A NATURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF SELF-EVIDENCE -- 7. THE EMPIRICAL DEFEASIBILITY OF SELF-EVIDENT MORAL PRINCIPLES -- 8. CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- 4 Moral Necessities in a Contingent World -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. THE THESIS THAT THERE ARE MORAL NECESSITIES.

3. SUBSTANTIVE MORAL NECESSITIES AS CONCEPTUAL TRUTHS -- 4. SUBSTANTIVE MORAL NECESSITIES AS METAPHYSICALLY NECESSARY -- 5. MORAL NATURALISM AND THE MORAL NECESSITIES -- 6. PRACTICAL NECESSITIES: A KANTIAN APPROACH -- 7. UNCONDITIONAL ATTITUDES: ANONCOGNITIVIST STRATEGY -- 8. CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- Part 2: Referring to Moral Properties -- 5 Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. SOME EXPRESSIVIST DOCTRINES -- 3. EXPRESSION, SINCERITY, AND THE PRAGMATICS OF ASSERTION -- 4. EXPRESSION, MEANING, AND "COLORING" -- 5. COLORING AND CONTENT -- 6. A PROPOSED REALIST-EXPRESSIVISM -- 7. ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXPRESSIVISM IN REALIST-EXPRESSIVISM -- 8. THE REALISM IN REALIST-EXPRESSIVISM -- 9. CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- 6 Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth -- 1. SYNTHETIC MORAL NATURALISM -- 2. THE MORAL TWIN EARTH ARGUMENT -- 3. THE FIRST REPLY: REINTERPRETING OUR INTUITIONS -- 4. THE SECOND REPLY: INTRODUCING A THEORY OF ERROR -- REFERENCES -- 7 Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again -- REFERENCES -- Part 3: Naturalism and Normativity -- 8 Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity -- 1. THE PROBLEM -- 2. MORAL NATURALISM -- 3. THREE GRADES OF NORMATIVITY -- (1) Generic Normativity -- (2) Motivational Normativity -- (3) Authoritative Normativity -- 4. THE PROBLEM REVISITED -- 5. EXPRESSIVISM AND REALIST-EXPRESSIVISM -- 6. GENERIC NORMATIVITY AND MOTIVATIONAL NORMATIVITY -- 7. AUTHORITATIVE NORMATIVITY -- (1) Doubts about the Significance of Authoritative and Motivational Normativity -- (2) Naturalism and Authoritative Normativity -- (3) Self-Conception Strategies -- (4) That Morality Lacks Authoritative Normativity -- 8. CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- 9 The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. CONFLICT BETWEEN MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST.

3. REASONS, NORMATIVITY, AND SELF-INTEREST -- 4. OVERRIDINGNESS -- 5. MORALITY, SELF-GROUNDED REASON, AND REASON-AS-SUCH -- 6. THE STANDPOINT OF PERSONAL EXCELLENCE -- 7. SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE UNITY OF REASON -- 8. THE STANDING OF MORALITY AND OF SELF-INTEREST -- REFERENCES -- 10 The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason -- 1. INTRODUCTION -- 2. WHY TAKE THIS ROAD? -- 3. AUTONOMOUS AGENCY -- 4. MICHAEL BRATMAN ON AUTONOMOUS AGENCY -- 5. AUTONOMY AND THE IDENTITY OF PERSONS -- 6. VALUES AS POLICIES FOR ACTION -- 7. RATIONALITY AND VALUES -- 8. THE OBJECTION FROM UNGROUNDED ENDS -- 9. GROUNDING A CONCEPTION OF RATIONALITY -- 10. GROUNDING THE VALUES STANDARD IN AUTONOMY -- 11. DELIBERATIVE PRIORITY -- 12. CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- Index.